Perhaps the principal outstanding issue, apart from the question of the minorities, was the sharing of the Indus waters. Raghavan sets the stage by pointing out that this was an issue that long pre-dated Partition and went back to the 1920s and 1930s when “complaints had been made to the (Imperial) Government of India by the provincial governments of Sindh, Patiala and Punjab”. So, in the immediate aftermath of Partition, a Standstill Agreement was put in place and an Arbitral Tribunal established. Although Raghavan does not mention this, the West Punjab government failed to seek an extension of term for the Tribunal before the Standstill Agreement lapsed on 31 March. So, from April 1 “India unilaterally cut off the water supplies to Pakistan” (p.121) [Actually, it was not ‘India’ but the Government of (East) Punjab that egregiously did so without consulting the central government]. Instead of refusing to engage, as is the practice now, a negotiating team from Pakistan that included the finance minister and two senior West Punjab ministers was despatched to work out an interim agreement, signed on May 4, 1948, defusing, at least for a while, an issue of the highest concern in both Punjabs (p.121). In September 1948, chief engineers of the two Punjabs met at Wagah to “further elaborate the arrangements by which irrigation supplies should be distributed” (p.121). Numerous bilateral meetings, largely technical but also at high political level (Zafrullah Khan and Gopalaswamy Ayyangar), and some convened by the World Bank, followed but it was not till more than a decade later, in 1960, that the Indus Waters Treaty was signed, with India retaining absolute control over the headwaters, Pakistan securing an assured supply of water, and the World Bank providing funding to building the alternative irrigation arrangements in Pakistan and the Bhakra-Nangal dams in India. Not all the wars that have happened since between India and Pakistan have been able to cause the abrogation of this mutually negotiated Treaty. It shows what persistence and patience can do. As Ayub Khan, as cited by Raghavan, wrote in his memoirs, “The only sensible thing to do was to try and get a settlement, even though it might be second best, because if we did not, we stood to lose everything” (p.136). That unexpected wisdom applies to every outstanding dispute between India and Pakistan.