Heat And Dust

July 17 - July 23, 1947

WAS Mountbatten beginning to lose his touch as the countdown to the transfer of power approached zero? Or was the heavy cost of his panzer strategy of pushing through to objectives irrespective of casualties making him hesitant? Historians have noted the contrast between the decisive, well-planned moves in his first four months as viceroy and the belated responses of the closing weeks.

The failure of his ambition to be governor-general of both India and Pakistan after August 15 had hurt his self-confidence. His assumption that he would serve as a mediatory link between the two Dominions was rudely rejected by Jinnah. It was his first serious setback as viceroy but it also stemmed from his inability to rise above his dislike of Jinnah. It was obvious to the League leader that Mountbatten was closer to Nehru. He feared he would not be impartial, a fear that came to a head later. His self-esteem, too, was no less than the viceroy's; he was unwilling to take second place.

Heat and fatigue may have been other factors contributing to Mountbatten's decline. Delhi was going through a particularly hot summer and he worked 16 hours a day. But the high human cost of his impetuosity and the important issues left undecided were becoming apparent.

The viceroy showed signs of impatience and indiscretion. Arguing with Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, dewan of Travancore, he told him that the Congress would spend lakhs on fomenting unrest in his state unless he acceded to India.

On July 17, Mountbatten called a meeting of the Partition Council to approve plans to set up a joint boundary force to police the border after August 15. The meeting was attended by Jinnah and Patel and field marshal Claude Auchinleck, who would be supreme commander of the armed forces of both Dominions. Auchinleck said the force would be led by Maj. Gen. Rees, commander of the famed Fourth Indian Division in the area.

The troops would be in position in the disturbed districts on August 7 or 8. This indicated a continuing lack of urgency since signs of widespread unrest were already obvious, as reported by Governor Jenkins. Not until July 20 did Mountbatten respond to Jenkins' messages and visit Lahore. There the governor as well as the Indian and Pakistani members of the Partition Committee urged the need for the Boundary Commission award to be announced before August 15. After the tour, Mountbatten said that five per cent of the walled city and one per cent of the entire city had been destroyed in the disturbances. But he admitted that half the Hindu population had left.

The Boundary Commission had yet to decide in which dominion Lahore would be located. The Partition Committee resolved that the preparatory governments of both East and West Punjab should stay there until August 15. On the basis of the notional border, which had awarded Lahore to Pakistan, it suggested at the same time that the East Punjab government prepare to move to Simla (which it eventually did). While in Lahore, Mountbatten held a meeting of his advisors and military officers to determine the area to be policed by the Punjab Boundary Force which was to come into being on August 1. The extent of the disturbances was reflected in the number of disputed districts placed under its charge. They were Sialkot, Gujr-anwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Jalandhar, Ferozepore and, crucially, Lahore. Maj. Gen. Rees would have one Indian and one Pakistani advisor. The Pakistani officer, incidentally, was Col. Ayub Khan, a future president of the country.

Rees would be responsible, through the supreme commander, to the governments of India and Pakistan. His force had several British officers and would consist of five brigades and an armoured regiment, some 50,000 men in all. The size of the force aroused widespread hope in the disturbed areas. But, in fact, the men had little training in dealing with riot situations and hand-to-hand encounters. They had little impact on the rioting.

The Partition Council authorised a statement which also aroused hope that the leaders of the two Dominions would cooperate in protecting minorities. The viceroy’s press attache, Campbell-Johnson, described it as a charter of liberty, but added, off the record, that he did not know whether the two sides knew what they were signing. The statement was impressive. Part of it read: "Both the Congress and the Muslim League have given assurances of fair and equitable treatment to the minorities after transfer of power. The two future governments reaffirm these assurances. It is their intention to safeguard the legitimate interests of all citizens irrespective of religion, caste or sex. In the exercise of their normal civic rights all citizens will be regarded as equal and both the governments will assure all people within their territories the exercise of liberties such as freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right to worship in their own way and the protection of their language and culture."

After Lahore, Mountbatten realised the need for ending the uncertainty created by the border dispute as early as possible. He wrote to Radcliffe that the Punjab partition committee was anxious that the award be announced before August 15 to avert disorder. "We shall be grateful," he said, "for every day earlier that you could manage to get the award announced. I wonder if there is any chance of getting it out by the 10th?" Radcliffe’s reply on July 23 indicated the problems he faced. "The time schedule, as you know," he wrote, "has to be a fine one owing to the necessity of giving adequate time first for public hearings and then for full discussion of their differences with the judges of the two simultaneous Commissions (Punjab and Bengal). Unless the Punjab judges agree with each other more than I have reason to expect, I do not think that I could manage the 10th; but I think that I could promise the 12th, and I will do the earlier date if I can."

Belatedly on July 21, Nehru raised an issue that Radcliffe had brought up earlier. He wrote to Mountbatten suggesting that the border follow natural features, like rivers, to help defence, avoid creating enclaves and discourage smuggling. If necessary, population could be exchanged. Four army officers were asked to make suggestions to the Boundary Commissions. But it was too late to make major changes from the line drawn to accord with religious majorities. Several enclaves were left on both sides of the border in Bengal with no access to their governments.

PARTITIONING Bengal proved less explosive than Punjab. Despite memories of the Great Calcutta Killing the previous August, relations between Hindus and Muslims were tolerant. Leaders of both communities had been pressing for an independent Bengal. But the proposal had been rejected by Nehru who did not want yet another nation to be carved out of the subcontinent. Nehru worried about Bengal and asked Mountbatten to ensure that Calcutta was not left in flames. The viceroy sent a message to Calcutta where Sir Frederick Burrows, a rare non-ICS working class governor, got on well with the people. His area commander was Lt Gen. Sir Francis Tuker who had formulated a contingency plan months ago for deploying the army to avert unrest. Ignored then, he was confident he could manage Bengal. Together they formed an effective team. Burrows asked for additional army units as Partition approached, but told the viceroy to assure Nehru that "Calcutta will not be destroyed."

 On July 20, the results of the referendum in the NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) were received. Just over half the electorate voted to join Pakistan. In his personal report to London, Mountbatten said the result disposed of any possible Congress argument that the province did not want to join Pakistan. The problem of whether to dismiss the existing Congress ministry led by Dr Khan Sahib and replace it with a Muslim League one remained since the ministry still enjoyed a majority in the legislature.

The viceroy was pleased that the referendum passed off without a major incident. But, noticeably, did not give the credit to Abdul Ghaffar Khan who had urged his Red Shirt followers to avoid violence while boycotting it. Presumably, he was influenced by the official view that Badshah Khan was working for closer links with Afghanistan when in fact he was campaigning for autonomy. The perceived threat from Afghanistan continued to worry the British.

In the same report, Mountbatten described an extended interview with Ramaswami Aiyer which provided insights into the Travancore dewan’s personality. Aiyer was incensed with the Indian press and flourished a sheaf of cartoons, of which the latest showed him being spanked by the viceroy. He was not amused. He also brought a file of cuttings depicting Gandhi—whom he considered the most dangerous influence in India—as a sex maniac. He said he would never ally himself with such a Dominion.

Aiyer was more receptive when he returned the next day and confessed that his more inflammatory statements were designed for consumption in Travancore. He was still talking in terms of a treaty with India, not accession, when Mountbatten told him, according to the report: "Dalmia had that morning paid 5 lakhs of rupees into the Travancore Congress party funds in anticipation of starting internal trouble after August 15, and that I was confident that there was more to follow. I pointed out that his only escape for internal trouble lay in accession before August 15." The dewan climbed down and said he would refer the matter of accession to his Maharaja.

Before the week ended, Mountbatten received a long, emotional letter from the only prince who knew him well enough to address him as Dear Dickie. As chancellor of the chamber of princes, the Nawab of Bhopal had led the campaign against accession. Now, recalling family loyalty to the Crown, he pleaded for protection against "Congress duplicity" and "communist penetration".

But with the enactment of the India Independence Bill, no protection was available. As a relatively small state surrounded by India, Bhopal did not have the advantage of Hyderabad, Kashmir or Travancore. The Nawab’s eloquent five-page plea had the cadence of despair.