The Minis And The Midis

Malhotra describes the complex history of the formation and development of the dynasties of the Nehru-Gandhis in India, the Bhuttos and Shah Nawazes in Pakistan, the Bandaranaikes, Senanayakes, and Jayawardenes in Sri Lanka, and the two Begums—Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina—in Bangladesh. Invariably, some of the narrative is based on insiders’ knowledge in all the four countries.

Simultaneously, Malhotra also crafts a narrative of the political events in India since 1964 and in Pakistan and Bangladesh since their formation. He also brings out how, in every case, development of dynastic rule went hand in hand with the centralisation of the leadership of the political party concerned and the personalisation of political power.

Malhotra goes on to ask the big question: why have dynasties arisen and dynastic succession flourished and why has kinship played such a formidable, all-pervasive and near-permanent role in politics in South Asia? Why are, in most cases, founders and carriers of dynastic rule women or "roaring tigresses"? And why does dynastic succession occur when the dynast is already dead and cannot use his or her political clout to enforce succession? In other words, why does dynastic succession secure popular approval, invariably through free and fair democratic elections?

Malhotra has tried to answer the question with the help of several distinguished sociologists, political scientists and fellow journalists. The answers are: the abiding role of kinship and extended family in South Asian societies; the traditional notions of succession (but then why very often daughters and wives, and not sons and brothers, as in traditional society?); a deep-seated feudal mentality, unchanged by "genuine modernity"—a mentality that has continued from the period when emperors, maharajas and sultans passed on their kingdoms to their kin (this view, says Malhotra, is borne out by the strict "family control and family orientation" in business, professions, newspapers and films and other arts); and the stranglehold of caste, reinforced by kinship, linguistic, regional and personal loyalties. Malhotra himself seems to favour the feudal outlook of the people as the explanation.

I would add two more. One is the pervasive atmosphere of careerism and cut-throat competition and the consequent loss of trust in nearly all sections of society, including among political actors. Nehru could trust Patel, C.R., Pant, Krishna Menon, Kamaraj, Shastri and Morarji Desai and so on, for he knew that none of them would stab him in the back or go back on the basic legacy of the freedom struggle. But Indira Gandhi, especially after her experience of 1977-79 when her erstwhile admirers and confidants left her in droves, could hardly believe the same about her colleagues. Rajiv Gandhi discovered too late the cost of trusting those around him. Nor can we blame those who, after their experience with the Rais, Dalmias and Modis have decided to trust Tatas, Birlas and Ambanis. This question of trust, and not infatuation with his son, as Malhotra suggests, probably explains why Morarji chose his son as his unpaid private secretary.

Second, as Malhotra points out in other contexts, the success of the Nehru-Gandhis in forming a dynasty lay not in their appeal to feudal or caste feelings but precisely in their being above religion, caste, language or region and in being seen by the people as ‘all-Indian’. They also had the image of standing for the unity and independence of the country and in particular of being secular and pro-poor. This image and not merely the bickering among the leaders of the Janata Party was responsible for Indira Gandhi’s comeback at the end of 1979. On the other hand, Rajiv Gandhi’s image of being for the elite and the middle classes was a major reason for his defeat in November 1989.

One minor caveat: Malhotra repeatedly describes the BJP and RSS as Hindu nationalists. The proper words, in the tradition of Gandhiji, Nehru, Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and Subhas Bose, are Hindu communalists.