'We Have To Consider The Many Unfreedoms'

A recent survey by the Centre for Study ofDeveloping Societies says that four-fifths of Indians, which is 800 million of the 1billion who comprise our population, are unaware of reforms. This only underlines thepoint you've often made: that creation and use of social opportunities require much morethan the "freeing" of markets. Does liberalisation and globalisation intended atjust a fifth of the population make sense? What are the specific steps that the governmentmust take to draw the majority into the reform process so that it touches their lives?
The reforms that are needed in India require not only greater access to economicopportunities offered by the market and exchange but also greater ability of common peopleto make use of these opportunities. I keep repeating myself in public discussions (I don'tmind that, since the issue is important) that fuller use of the opportunities opened up byappropriate economic reforms requires commensurate expansion of social opportunities, inthe form of more schooling, expansion of basic healthcare, greater availability ofmicro-credit and of course more land reform.

In fact, both globalisation and domestic economic reforms can work in the interest ofthe population at large if the ability to participate is widely shared. I was recently inChina, visiting Shenzhen in October, and I was truly impressed by the extent to which themarket economy is vibrant and lively in that part of China. In order to make use of theopportunities offered by the market economy combined with expansion of social facilities,one has to understand how the market economy operates. It opens up transactionalpossibilities which can lead to higher productivity and economic efficiency, as well asthe creation of incomes and entitlements. But in order to be able to seize theopportunities that the market offers, social reform is as important as economic reform.

The alleged opposition between social reform, on one side, and economic reform, on theother, is entirely mistaken. We do need both, and not sequentially (in either order), butjointly at the same time. This is the way the process of overall reform of the society andthe economy can enhance the living condition and effective freedoms of the broad masses.

The Food and Agricultural Organisation last weeksaid there were more malnourished people in India (204 million) than sub-Saharan Africa(180 million). Does the statistic once again expose the hollowness of India's agriculturalself-sufficiency through the Green Revolution? Or are we seeing a whole new phenomenon atwork? And in the light of this, should the government continue with subsidies, as it has,to ensure that mouths do not go hungry or should it do away with them as the pro-marketforces are demanding?
The problem to which you are referring does not show, in any way, "hollowness"of India's agricultural achievements. In fact, the progress made in Indian agriculture(under the leadership of such great scientists as M.S. Swaminathan) has been substantialand it would be a mistake to rubbish the Green Revolution. However, agricultural expansionis not enough. What causes hunger in India at this time is the wide prevalence of povertyand the inability of a large section of the population to buy enough food, or (moregenerally) to establish entitlement over an adequate amount of food. So the"hollowness" at which one should point concerns dubious claims that the problemof poverty has been adequately addressed in India, not the legitimate claims ofagricultural progress.

Just raising agricultural output including food output (important as it is) would notsolve the problem of undernourished people in India. It is indeed the case thatundernourishment is higher in India than in sub-Saharan Africa, not only in absolute termsbut also proportionately, especially among the children. The problem relates to theendemic poverty of the Indian masses. Africa is, of course, more susceptible to periodicdeclines and transient famines. In contrast, India has a larger proportion of persistentundernourishment and endemic hunger. In my joint book with Jean Dréze (India: EconomicDevelopment and Social Opportunity, oup, 1995), we have discussed this contrast quiteextensively.

The number of people below the poverty line inIndia has shot up by 4 per cent in the last five years. Is the poverty line as it isprojected by the government and in the media still unreal? Are the rich getting richer inIndia and the poor, poorer, post-liberalisation? Has there been any change in theurban-rural divide in poverty, as well?
To judge poverty only by low income gives us a very inadequate understanding of economicdeprivation. Moreover, it leaves out of account serious deprivations in other spheres,such as the social and political. The increase in the number of people below the povertyline to which you refer is certainly a reason for concern. However, there are biggerproblems and bigger failures of which we must not lose sight.

There are two crucial issues here. First, the question isn't only whether the number ofpeople below the poverty line is going up or down but whether it is going down adequatelyfast. The level of poverty is massively high in India and we cannot be satisfied withanything other than a very fast reduction. Second, deprivation cannot be judged only bythe lowness of incomes. We have to consider the "unfreedom" involved inilliteracy, preventable morbidity, premature mortality, social exclusion and other suchdeprivations. These unfreedoms deserve much greater attention than they get.

Regarding the urban-rural divide, this manifests itself both in terms of differences inincomes per head (typically much lower in the rural areas) and in the greater intensity ofother types of deprivation, related to schooling, healthcare and so on. The real issue,again, is not whether the urban-rural divide is getting sharper but that the severeinequality between urban and rural areas is not getting eliminated adequately fast.

What are the five measures you wouldurgently and immediately advise the new Indian government to undertake? You have oftenrecommended an alternative economic policy. What long-term Common Minimum Programme shouldthe government embark upon and implement, starting at the turn of millennium?
I am not sure that I can identify exactly "five measures"! Five is, of course, agood number, but there is perhaps nothing particularly special about it. I remember thatwhen I was teaching at the Delhi School of Economics in the 1960s, it was explained to meby a mathematician colleague that "the five principles of peaceful co-existence"were "the Ten Commandments divided by two". That certainly got the arithmeticright, but perhaps not exactly the content of the principles of peaceful co-existence (nomatter what we might have thought of the limited merits of those principles).

However, by pointing to five you are possibly referring to the important fact - thevery important fact - that efforts will be needed in multiple directions. If so, you areabsolutely right. Along with the expansion of basic education and basic healthcare, wealso have to foster economic reforms. And - this too is of outstanding importance -reduction of gender inequalities. Issues of land reform and micro credit also deserve veryserious attention. There is no conflict between rapid economic reform and expansion ofequitable social opportunities; they complement each other very well. It is not possibleto analyse these diverse demands in a brief interview like this, but Jean DrŽze and Ihave already tried to discuss the need for such a multidimensional approach in our book,India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity, to which I referred to earlier. In abroader context (that of the world and not exclusively India), I have also taken on theseissues in my recently published Development as Freedom (oup, 1999).

You have gone on record to state that you wouldnever vote for the BJP. Given the acceptance it has gained, have you reason to change yourmind? How do you view its rise in the last three elections? It won 182 seats this year(same as in 1998) in spite of contesting a full 58 fewer seats than last time (388). Itspercentage voteshare however has been lower than that of the Congress and lower than lasttime. Does this mean anything? Has its growth reached a plateau?
An individual in a democratic society has to take views not only on the politicalpositions and political parties one can support but also on the rules and processes thatshould influence political mechanisms and the legitimacy of governance. I have been avocal and adamant defender of democracy throughout my life and have been persistentlycritical of the intellectual undervaluing of democracy that often occurred in India inearlier decades, coming both from the left and from the right of the political spectrum.(Scepticism or what used to be described as "bourgeois democracy" competed withcynicism about what were seen - very misleadingly - as "Western values".) Evenas I was admiring China's pragmatic economic policies and supportive social changes (fromwhich India has much to learn) in my recent visit to Shenzhen, I saw reasons, at the sametime, to compare India favourably in the fields of political liberty, openness of debatesand participatory politics. The fact that we don't have to look behind and make sure whoare or are not listening to us is a great boon, which we must not underestimate.

It is very good that the value of democracy has become more widely accepted across thepolitical spectrum in India. In that spectrum, my own political position is distinctly onthe left but that is no reason whatever for not accepting the legitimacy that has beenearned by the BJP-led coalition which has won the recent elections. They certainly haveexcellent right to govern the country, in line with democratic principles (which includehonouring minority rights and responding to the fears of minority communities).

Regarding the BJP itself, its general interpretations of "Indianness" and of"Hindutva" are views which I cannot at all share. India was a multi-religiouscountry even before the arrival of Islam. One has to think only of Emperor Ashoka, thegreat Buddhist, or Harsha, to understand the presence of heterodoxy in Indian history.When Islam came to India, nearly all the other existing major religions were alreadypresent in our country: namely various traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism,Christianity and Judaism, among others, not to mention the different schools of agnosticand atheistic thought.In the years to follow, along came - or emerged - Sikhism and thereligion of the Parsees. India produced a remarkable synthesis through religious toleranceand that is the view of India that inspired the nationalist leadership of the country(from Mahatma Gandhi or Rabindranath Tagore) in the period of struggle against the BritishRaj. I see no reason for changing that broad and inclusive approach.

While I have no reason to start voting for the BJP, I am, of course, favourablyimpressed at this time by the non-sectarian moderation of the party's highest leadership. The fears, which were raised by intolerant acts of militant Hinduism, that even at thelevel of leadership, the BJP may go in a divisive (and particularly anti-Muslim)direction, have been considerably reduced by the form that the moderate leadership of theparty has taken. In economic policies too, the mesmerising appeal of such simplisticslogans as "swadeshi" seems to have been well resisted. I hope very much thatthe days of breaking down mosques and terrorising Muslims or Christians will not returnwith the greater self-confidence of the BJP. It is also to the credit of the Indian votersthat the BJP could not choose to project a narrowly "Hindu" view of itsprogrammes, and presented instead a broader and more humane nationalist approach inelectoral platforms. Indian citizens did not encourage the BJP to believe that a narrowadvocacy of Hindutva (rather than a broad nationalist appeal) would help it gain support.

I am not a psephologist so I shall not comment on the exact trends in voting. But I'mconcerned that at various levels of political activism, expressions of intolerance can bepersistently found from some members of the BJP and parties related to it. The persecutionof Christians in some regions, the sense of hostility to Muslims in some areas, and so onoften find expression in words and deeds of members of the Sangh parivar. This does notinspire confidence in the ability of the moderate leadership of the BJP to make theirsupporters more "Indian" (and less intolerantly Hindu). Sometimes we also seeintolerance in the behaviour of parties that are nominally secular. It is extremelyimportant to be vigilant in keeping the tradition of secularism, plurality and tolerancealive and flourishing across the board in Indian polity and social life. This is morecrucial than the exact counting of votes and seats won by any particular party.

You called the decision to conduct the nucleartests last year an "ethical and moral mistake". Have you had reason to alteryour opinion following the defeat of the CTBT in the US Senate and the coup in Pakistanwhich places a more "hands-on" general with his finger on the nuclear button?
I think you understate my criticism of the nuclear test! Not only (as you say) do I thinkthat it was an "ethical and moral mistake", but I believe I said in fact that itwas an "ethical as well as strategic mistake". The distance between"ethical" and "moral" is not all that great. When I argued that wehave lost something of our moral stature (and the right to be critical of the self-servingpolicies of recognised nuclear powers), I was making an ethical point, among others. Thediagnosis of a "strategic" mistake takes us beyond that. That point too I wastrying to make.

Let me comment a little on the strategic issues in particular. That India can blast anuclear bomb has been known to the world since 1974. The new round of blasts last yearestablished Pakistan as an established nuclear power, a recognition that India alreadyhad. Given the massive superiority of India in nuclear technology as well as computerprogramming, India's need for further testing was also much less than that of Pakistan,which had not exploded a bomb earlier and could not be sure of how it would work inpractice. Nor had it the scientific and computational personnel to use computer simulationin the way India can. Nuclear technology is, of course, a part of science and Indiahappens to be much ahead of Pakistan in this respect. (No one doubts that Japan or Canadaor the Netherlands or Germany can make nuclear bombs if they want to, though they havechosen not to.) The spectacle of India and Pakistan blasting five or six bombs each onlyproduced a world impression of "equality" which is far from the reality andproduced a misleading impression of the respective nuclear capabilities. Pakistan'sstrategic gains were much greater than India's.

India also has massive superiority over Pakistan in non-nuclear military strength. Thefrank declaration of nuclear capability on both sides (with each blasting five or sixbombs) as well as their evident willingness to use it under certain circumstances (in thecase of Pakistan, not even agreeing to abstain from "first use") has certainlymade the situation much more unstable.

The fear of instability also encourages non-nuclear adventurism. Even the incursionsinto Kashmir earlier in the year may well have been, to some extent, informed by theunderstanding in Pakistan that India will not undertake retaliatory actions across theLine of Control, if only because of the fear of precipitating a nuclear exchange. India'sreticence to cross the line was, of course, admirable, but it was also necessary under thecircumstances.

Also, India's international status has not been enhanced by the reassertion of itsnuclear capability, which was known generally and which could have been more sensibly andmore strategically used as a talking point in making demands on the existing nuclearpowers. I don't personally see any great reason for India to seek a permanent seat in theSecurity Council, but for those who want that to happen, the blasting of Indian nuclearbombs followed by Pakistani ones has not helped matters at all. The determination of othercountries (not just the recognised nuclear powers but also others) to resist the"buying" of a permanent seat in the Security Council through the nuclear bombhas also been strengthened by the events in the summer of 1998. The "equality"of Pakistan with India in nuclear recognition does not help either.

The nuclear issue is, of course, very complex. The rejection of the CTBT by the USSenate brings out how the legislators there can be in conflict with the US administrationitself. You say that the coup in Pakistan has put in office "a more 'hands-on'general with his finger on the nuclear button". This may be the case, but I don'tknow. The weakness of a corrupt civilian government, unable to resist fundamentalistpressure, is not a great recipe for stability in Pakistan. We have to see how the newgovernment forms its international policies and that issue is quite independent of theresentment that any defender of democracy must feel about the replacement of an elected(though intolerant) government by military rule.The nuclear situation on the subcontinenthas certainly made things more unstable and every move has to be assessed with fullunderstanding of the new level of instability in the region.

Sometimes, comfort is taken by particular observers in India that nuclear developmentshave been economically much more expensive and ruinous for the Pakistani economy. However,they are expensive for India as well. But perhaps more importantly, India's security isnot at all well served by an economically chaotic Pakistan, rather than one which hasgreater self-reliance and a larger stake in peace and stability and in harmonious traderelations of an expanding economy. India's and Pakistan's real interests are morecomplementary to each other - -and less conflicting - than is often imagined. The"bus diplomacy" was, of course, bold, insightful and excellent; the process canbe facilitated by less chaos in Pakistan.

I do think that the nuclear tests were a mistake, given where India already was in1998, as a recognised nuclear-capable state showing restraint but insisting on anacross-the-world reduction of nuclear armament, along with controlling conventional meansof destruction. The loss of the moral quality is supplemented by the strategic problemsthat have been created by nuclear testing in India, combined with a virtual"invitation" to Pakistan to retaliate.