The competing claims of the Doko-La crisis can only be met on the talks table
Amore than three-week long stand-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers—part of the world’s two largest armies—in close proximity to each other on a contested land, contains the seeds of a fearsome possibility. Their history of a long, disputed boundary over which they had fought a war and which remains unresolved, underlines the dire situation.
The fact that the epicentre of the current crisis, Doka-La in the Doklam plateau, is in Bhutan, though China claims it as part of its own territory, has only complicated the situation. As the two countries try to stare each other out diplomatically and on the ground, it calls into question which one is the pre-eminent power in South Asia.
Though the word ‘Indian’ is often dropped as a prefix of the ‘subcontinent’, the region has always been regarded by India as its backyard and Bhutan, traditionally and through treaties, treated as a protectorate of New Delhi.
Irrespective of whether the stand-off is being played out beyond the delimited Sino-Indian boundary at the Sikkim sector, the Indian leadership could hardly turn a blind eye to China’s ‘bullying’ of Bhutan. Though not a single shot has been fired, the Chinese are extremely unhappy with the Indian stand and, if one has to go by the commentaries streaming out of its government agencies and media, are itching to “teach India a lesson”. Unlike in the past, Beijing has made little effort to keep the belligerent Chinese rhetoric at its minimum. In contrast, barring the initial provocative remarks of its army chief, claiming India’s ability to fight in “two-and-a-half fronts”, the rhetoric from New Delhi has been subdued. But that alone hasn’t minimised the chances of an armed confrontation.
“I don’t think the ongoing crisis will have a happy ending,” laments strategic commentator, Commodore (retd) C. Uday Bhaskar, pointing out that in recent days, the Chinese position has become “very strident”. A possible area of tension could also be the proposed Malabar joint naval exercise involving the Indian, US and Japanese navies. “There is no way that India will be able to withdraw from this exercise,” he says. Bhaskar says that since 1976, the Sino-Indian borders have been peaceful and tranquil, with not a single shot being fired in anger. “Whether that will hold or not will depend on future developments at Doka-La. But, going by the present mood, I will not be surprised if that calm is breached,” he adds.
He also appreciates the difficult choice before India, as its inability to come to Bhutan’s help in face of the rising Chinese pressure will be seen as a major setback by not only the Bhutanese, but also by other South Asian nations. India is in a bind; can events be managed so that it can extricate itself honourably?
According to military historian and senior fellow of Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, Srinath Raghavan, “As ever, the Chinese have chosen the place and time carefully.”
India and China have a delimited and demarcated international border in Sikkim, going back to 1890—much before they emerged as modern, independent republics. However, the boundary between Tibet and Bhutan is disputed and, as a result, the location of the India-China-Bhutan trijunction is also contested. Bhutan has no diplomatic relations with China and it does not negotiate directly with it. Much of its stance on the boundary issue with China is in close consultation with India.
Though China’s high-pitched statements blame India for the present crisis and castigates the ‘intrusion’ of its solidiers into Chinese territory, experts in New Delhi see a set pattern in China’s stand at Doka-La.
“The Chinese have been claiming this area and encroaching into it since 1980,” says former Indian ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha. He points out that until recently, it had no permanent PLA personnel deployed there or constructed roads. “What they are trying to do now is to change facts on the ground unilaterally,” he adds.
According to Kantha, currently director of Delhi’s Institute of Chinese Studies, this has now become a habit for the Chinese—they are doing it in other theatres as well. “They create new facts on the ground and others adjust according to them.”
He points out that the Chinese road construction in Doka-La is not only in Bhutanese territory, but is also an unilateral attempt by them to change the trijunction point. Though this had to be done in consultation with all three countries, the Chinese have gone ahead with the construction in total disregard to the existing agreement.
Kantha feels this will materially impact India’s security ‘negatively’, particularly because it is in close proximity to the strategically important Siliguri corridor that connects India’s northeastern region with rest of the country.
The same Chinese tactic of a bold sally, then daring others to act, was seen in the South China Sea, where China tried to establish its territorial claims—which are hotly contested by other countries—and trying to make it a core issue. This, in turn, had shrunk the space available for negotiations. In this “assertive and muscular” manner are the Chinese trying to achieve their territorial claims.
But why is this happening now and what are the Chinese trying to achieve by this intransigent stand?
“This has to be seen in the overall context of the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations over the past several months,” says Raghavan. He points out that the two sides have been holding extreme views on a number of issues that range from the unresolved boundary along the Line of Actual Control, the Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, the One Belt One Road project and the Indo-US growing convergence on South China Sea. Though Chinese intractability over India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Masood Azhar’s proscription by the UN had been hyped by India as key areas of hostility by China, Raghavan feels Delhi needs to decide on its “core issues” carefully while raising it with the Chinese leadership.
“To prevent the slide in our bilateral relations, we need to go back to the first principles that talk about mutual cooperation in the development of each other’s growth and for the overall stability and progress of Asia when we sit across the table with the Chinese leadership,” suggests Raghavan.
Such sage advice also finds a willing partner in Ashok Kantha, though he finds positive developments in Sino-Indian relations over the past years, including the positive outcome of the visits of President Xi Jinping to India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s return visit to China.
“The first thing is to de-escalate the rhetoric and avoid provocative action on the ground and resolve differences through negotiations,” says Kantha. He points out that both India and China must keep the “big picture” in mind and scale down the tension and rhetoric.
A possible opportunity to do so is surely at the G-20 Summit in Germany’s Hamburg on July 7-8, where President Xi and PM Modi would be present among other world leaders. It’s doubtful if they will have a bilateral meeting but a separate meeting of BRICS leaders will provide an opportunity for the two to meet in a closed-door discussion. Whether Xi and Modi will try to rekindle the warmth they showed some weeks back on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Astana—agreeing to iron out their outstanding differences peacefully—remains to be seen. Otherwise, it may open the doors where other major international players like the US, Russia or even Germany may step in to diffuse the rising tension.
Over the past few days there has been a lot of reference to 1962—a war in which the Chinese decisively beat India. But while Chinese hardliners have been talking about ‘the lessons’ of that war, a key factor that should be remembered is that it was miscalculation on part of the leadership of the two countries that finally led to the armed conflict. The wisest lesson to be learnt is to be on guard against such mistakes about the other’s intentions. Then, a realistic assessment must be made on how best to get out of this deteriorating situation.
Interestingly, despite the ongoing crisis at Doka-La, preparations for the forthcoming BRICS Summit in Beijing, scheduled for September, is also going on apace. Several senior Indian leaders had visited the Chinese capital in recent days. This and more meetings like it can act as a confidence-building, tension-busting measure.
Yet the Sino-Indian border hasn’t only been the site of cut-and-thrust disputes. Bhaskar points to the fact that despite occasional hiccups in their relations in the past few decades, India and China have managed to resolve their outstanding differences, including those pertaining to the border, bilaterally and without outside influence. Will they allow to break this practice and allow a leader like Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is a friend of both countries and a key BRICS member, to come forward and mediate between the two nations?
This, as Bhaskar states, will raise a serious question on both the Indian and Chinese leadership’s ability to play a major international role in resolving global crises and challenges. Neither Modi nor Xi will like such an intervention, even from Putin, opines Bhaskar. Therefore, he feels both Xi and Modi may look at the emerging scenario and take urgent steps to defuse the situation before it gets out of hand. As aspirational nations and societies with vaulting ambitions of prosperity, the leaders owe their peoples a break from the twentieth century’s poisonous, bruising legacies.
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A Gathering Storm