Completing The Chronology

SADDAM

Saddam Hussein is one of the world's great monsters. Nothing would be more welcome than to have him put ontrial, a trial which could offer Iraqis and the world an honest accounting of his many crimes. However, as sooften happens, when a trial is organized by those who are themselves guilty of serious crimes, truth is notthe goal. Instead the historical record is falsified to make the one monster seem uniquely blameworthy and theones running the show above criticism.

We saw this pattern in the Tokyo trials following World War II, where the crimes of Japanese officials weredocumented in gruesome detail (except for the biological warfare programs, which Washington wanted to use foritself and except for the involvement of the emperor, who was to serve U.S. purposes during the occupation),while the crimes of the victors, such as the horrific fire-bombing raids and the destruction of Hiroshima andNagasaki, were disregarded. Likewise, Panamanian ruler Manual Noriega was a thug who certainly belonged in thedock. But when the U.S. military invaded Panama in violation of international law and seized him for trial inthe United States, there was no intention by the kidnappers that the trial be a forum for revealing thelong-time ties between Noriega and the U.S. government, and particularly between Noriega and former CIAdirector George H. W. Bush.

It is a matter of principle in Washington that Americans not be held to the same international standards asothers. Thus, the U.S. refuses to endorse the International Criminal Court and demands that its allies give uptheir right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court when U.S. citizens are involved. But those of us who trulycare about justice ought to demand that Saddam Hussein be tried before a court that is in no way subject toU.S. control or manipulation. Only in that way can the real truth come out.

Already, however, much of the media is falling into line in framing the crimes of Saddam Hussein. Forexample, the Washington Post website offered a summary of "Events in the Life of Saddam Hussein"from the Associated Press. But the chronology was seriously incomplete. Below is that chronology (in bold),corrected to include -- in square brackets -- some of the most serious omissions.

April 28, 1937 -- Born in village near desert town of Tikrit, north of Baghdad.

1957 -- Joins underground Baath Socialist Party.

1958 -- Arrested for killing his brother-in-law, a Communist, spends six months in prison.

Oct. 7, 1959 -- On Baath assassination team that ambushes Iraqi strongman Gen. Abdel-Karim Kassem in Baghdad, woundinghim. Saddam, wounded in leg, flees to Syria then Egypt.

[This was not the only attempt to assassinate Kassem. In April 1960, the CIA approved using a poisonedhandkerchief to kill Kassem. The "handkerchief was duly dispatched to Kassem, but whether or not it everreached him, it certainly did not kill him." (Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: RichardHelms and the CIA, New York: Knopf, 1979, p. 130.)]

[The coup was backed by the CIA.

"As its instrument the C.I.A. had chosen the authoritarian and anti-Communist Baath Party, in 1963still a relatively small political faction influential in the Iraqi Army. According to the former Baathistleader Hani Fkaiki, among party members colluding with the C.I.A. in 1962 and 1963 was Saddam Hussein....

"According to Western scholars, as well as Iraqi refugees and a British human rights organization, the1963 coup was accompanied by a bloodbath. Using lists of suspected Communists and other leftists provided bythe C.I.A., the Baathists systematically murdered untold numbers of Iraq's educated elite -- killings in whichSaddam Hussein himself is said to have participated. No one knows the exact toll, but accounts agree that thevictims included hundreds of doctors, teachers, technicians, lawyers and other professionals as well asmilitary and political figures." (Roger Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," New YorkTimes, March 14, 2003, p. A29.)]

July 17, 1968 -- Baathists and army officers overthrow regime.

["Again, this coup, amid more factional violence, came with C.I.A. backing. Serving on the staff ofthe National Security Council under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in the late 1960's, I often heard C.I.A.officers -- including Archibald Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and a ranking C.I.A. official forthe Near East and Africa at the time -- speak openly about their close relations with the Iraqi Baathists."(Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," p. A29.)]

[From 1973-75, the United States, Iran, and Israel supported a Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. Documentsexamined by the U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence "clearly show that the President, Dr.Kissinger and the [Shah] hoped that our clients [the Kurds] would not prevail. They preferred instead that theinsurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap [Iraqi] resourcesY. This policy was notimparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ourswas a cynical enterprise." Then, in 1975, the Shah and Saddam Hussein of Iraq signed an agreement givingIran territorial concessions in return for Iran's closing its border to Kurdish guerrillas. Teheran andWashington promptly cut off their aid to the Kurds and, while Iraq massacred the rebels, the United Statesrefused them asylum. Kissinger justified this U.S. policy in closed testimony: "covert action should notbe confused with missionary work." (U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence, 19Jan. 1976 [Pike Report] in Village Voice, 16 Feb. 1976, pp. 85, 87n465, 88n471. The Pike Reportattributes the last quote only to a "senior official"; William Safire, Safire's Washington, NewYork: Times Books, 1980, p. 333, identifies the official as Kissinger.)]

With the then Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, November 1978 file photo.

July 16, 1979 -- Takes over as president from al-Bakr, launches massive purge of Baath.

[In the late 1970s, Saddam also purged the Iraqi Communist Party and other oppositionists. (Marion Farouk-Sluglettand Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, London: I. B. Tauris, 1990, pp. 182-87) "We see no fundamentalincompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq," declared U.S. National Security adviserZbigniew Brzezinski in April 1980. (Quoted in Barry Rubin, "The United States and Iraq: From Appeasementto War," in Iraq's Road to War, ed. Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, New York: St. Martin's 1993, p. 256.)]

Sept. 22, 1980 -- Sends forces into Iran; war last eight years.

[When Iraq invaded Iran, the United Nations Security Council waited four days before holding a meeting. OnSeptember 28, it passed Resolution 479 calling for an end to the fighting, but which significantly did notcondemn (nor even mention) the Iraqi aggression and did not demand a return to internationally recognizedboundaries. As Ralph King, who has studied the UN response in detail, concluded, "The Council more orless deliberately ignored Iraq's actions in September 1980." The U.S. delegate noted that Iran, which haditself violated Security Council resolutions on the U.S. embassy hostages, could hardly complain about theCouncil's lackluster response. (R.P.H. King, "The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1986,"in The United Nations and the Iran‑Iraq War, ed. Brian Urquhart and Gary Sick, New York: FordFoundation, August 1987.)

Despite the fact that Iraq had been the aggressor in this war and that Iraq was the first to use chemicalweapons, the first to launch air attacks on cities, and the initiator of the tanker war, the United Statestilted toward Iraq. The U.S. removed Iraq from its list of terrorist states in 1982, sent Donald Rumsfeld toBaghdad as Reagan's envoy to meet with Saddam Hussein in 1983 and 1984 to discuss economic cooperation,re-established diplomatic relations in November 1984, made available extensive loans and subsidies, providedintelligence information, encouraged its allies to arm Iraq, and engaged in military actions in the PersianGulf against Iran. The United States also provided dual-use equipment that it knew Iraq was using for militarypurposes. (See Joyce Battle, ed., "Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq,1980-1984," National SecurityArchive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, Feb. 25, 2003.

March 28, 1988 -- Uses chemical weapons against Kurdish town of Halabja, killing estimated 5,000 civilians.

[From Iraq's first use of chemical weapons in 1983, the U.S. took a very restrained view. When the evidenceof Iraqi use of these weapons could no longer be denied, the U.S. issued a mild condemnation, but made clearthat this would have no effect on commercial or diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq. Iranasked the Security Council to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use, but the U.S. delegate to the U.N. wasinstructed to try to prevent a resolution from coming to a vote, or else to abstain. An Iraqi official toldthe U.S. that Iraq strongly preferred a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution and did notwant any specific country identified as responsible for chemical weapons use. On March 30, 1984, the SecurityCouncil issued a presidential statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as theoffending party. (Battle.)

At the same time that the U.S. government had knowledge of that the Iraqi military was using chemicalweapons, it was providing intelligence and planning assistance to the Iraqi armed forces. (Patrick Tyler,"Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq In War Despite Use Of Gas," New York Times, Aug. 18, 2002, p.1.)

When Iraq used chemical weapons in March 1988 against Halabja, there was no condemnation from Washington. (DilipHiro, "When US turned a blind eye to poison gas," The Observer, September 1, 2002, p. 17.) "InSeptember 1988, the House of Representatives voted 388 to 16 in favor of economic sanctions against Iraq, butthe White House succeeded in having the Senate water down the proposal. In exchange for Export-Import Bankcredits, Iraq merely had to promise not to use chemical weapons again, with agricultural credits exempted evenfrom this limited requirement." (Rubin, "The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement to War,"p. 261.)]

[The chronology omits one of Saddam Hussein's most egregious atrocities, his Anfal campaign against theKurds from 1987-89, in which at least 50,000 and possibly 100,000 Kurds were systematically slaughtered.(Middle East Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, New York: Human Rights Watch,1993.)

The response of the new Bush administration was to increase Iraq's commodity credits from half a billion toa billion dollars, making it the second largest user of the credit program in the world. As late as April1990, the administration was opposing sanctions against Iraq ("They would hurt U.S. exporters and worsenour trade deficit," said the State Department). (Guy Gugliotta, Charles R. Babcock, and Benjamin Weiser,"At War, Iraq Courted U.S. Into Economic Embrace," Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1990, p. A1.) Theadministration also blocked efforts to cut back high-tech exports to Iraq with obvious military applications.(Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "Bush insisted on aiding Iraq until war's onset," ChicagoSun-Times, Feb. 23, 1992, p. 17.) And the United States was providing intelligence data to Iraq until threemonths before the invasion. (Murray Waas, Douglas Frantz, "U.S. shared intelligence with Iraq until 3 months before invasion of Kuwait," Houston Chronicle, March 10, 1992, p. A6.)]

[As part of the U.S.-led attack, the civilian infrastructure of Iraq was intentionally targeted (BartonGellman, "Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond PurelyMilitary Targets," Washington Post, 23 June 1991, p. A1; Thomas J. Nagy, "The Secret Behindthe Sanctions," Progressive, Sept. 2001), which together with more than a decade of economicsanctions would lead to hundreds of thousands of excess deaths. (See Richard Garfield, Morbidity andMortality Among Iraqi Children From 1990 through 1998: Assessing the Impact of the Gulf War and EconomicSanctions, March 1999)]

[After urging Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein, the U.S. denied the rebels access to captured Iraqiweapons and allowed Saddam Hussein to use his helicopters to slaughter the insurgents as U.S. aircraft circledoverhead. (Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein,New York: Harperperennial. 1999, chap. 1)]

[The bombing was conducted without Security Council approval and without consultations with allies. Thewithdrawal of the inspectors was ordered by Richard Butler, the head of UNSCOM. "France was also annoyedwith Washington for getting Mr. Butler to pull out his inspectors from Iraq without discussion with theSecurity Council." U.S. Secretary of State "Albright did not speak with Secretary General Kofi Annanat the United Nations, officials said. Mr. Annan issued a personal statement, calling this 'a sad day' for theworld and 'me personally,' because of his failure to avert the use of force." (Steven Erlanger,"U.S. Decision to Act Fast, and Then Search for Support, Angers Some Allies," New York Times, Dec.17, 1998, p. A14.)]

[Actually, U.S. officials made clear that U.S. troops would enter Iraq whether or not Saddam and his sonsleft the country. (Michael R. Gordon, "Allies Will Move In, Even if Saddam Hussein Moves Out," NewYork Times, March 18, 2003, p. A16.)]

["On the eve of war, Iraq publicly offered unlimited access for American and British weaponshunters." (David Rennie, "Saddam 'offered Bush a huge oil deal to avert war'," Daily Telegraph[London], Nov. 7, 2003, p. 17) And privately Iraq went well beyond this. In several back-channel contacts withU.S. officials, Iraq offered the U.S. "direct U.S. involvement on the ground in disarming Iraq," oilconcessions, the turn-over of a wanted terrorist, cooperation on the Israeli-Palestinian peace-process, andeven internationally-supervised elections within two years. (James Risen, "Iraq Said to Have Tried toReach Last-Minute Deal to Avert War," New York Times, Nov. 6, 2003, p. A1) One doesn't know where theseoffers may have led, since they were rejected by the U.S.: "A US intelligence source insisted that thedecision not to negotiate came from the White House, which was demanding complete surrender. According to anArab source, [a U.S. intermediary] sent a Saudi official a set of requirements he believed Iraq would have tofulfill. Those demands included Saddam's abdication and departure, first to a US military base forinterrogation and then into supervised exile, a surrender of Iraqi troops, and the admission that Iraq hadweapons of mass destruction. (Julian Borger, Brian Whitaker, and Vikram Dodd "Saddam's desperate offersto stave off war," Guardian, Nov. 7, 2003, p. 3.)]

[That they would need asylum follows from the U.S. policy of detaining family members of those they areseeking, in violation of elementary standards of justice. ("The arrest of close relatives of fugitiveregime members has been used by US forces in the past both as a way to gather intelligence - throughinterrogation - and to put emotional pressure on the hunted men to surrender." Colin Nickerson, "USTroops Detain Wife, Daughter Of Key Hussein Aide Ex-Deputy Suspected Of Plotting Attacks In IraqiInsurgency," Boston Globe, Nov. 27, 2003, p. A40.)]

[It didn't take a genius to note that "the United States and its allies misjudged the difficulty ofoccupying Iraq."]

Courtesy, Znet