Gambling In Najaf

The Bush administration has embarked on a desperate military adventure in hopes of creating the appearanceof a pacified Iraq. The assault on the holy city of Najaf, with its attendant slaughter of combatants andcivilians, its destruction of whole neighborhoods, and its threat to Shia holy cites is fraught with thepossibility of another major military defeat. But the military commanders are hoping it will instead produce arare military victory, since they are fighting lightly armed and relatively inexperienced members of Muqtadaal-Sadr's al-Mahdi Army. Nevertheless, even such a victory would be short-lived at best, since the fightingitself only serves to consolidate the opposition of the Shia population. The administration is apparentlyhoping that a sufficiently brutal suppression of the Sadrists will postpone the now almost inevitable nationaluprising until after our November election.

To understand this desperate and brutal strategic maneuver, we must review the origins of the new Battle ofNajaf:

A truce in May ended the first round of armed confrontation between U.S. Marines and Muqtada al-Sadr'smilitia, the al-Mahdi Army, but was never fully honored by either side. American troops were supposed to stayout of Najaf, and al-Sadr's militiamen were supposed to disband as an army. In the intervening months ofrelative peace, neither side made particularly provocative moves, but the U.S. still mounted patrols and theal-Mahdi army continued to stockpile arms, notably in the city's vast, holy cemetery. Lots of threats wereproffered on both sides.

The new confrontation began after the Americans replaced Army troops with Marines in the area outside Najafand then sent two armed patrols, including local police, to al-Sadr's home. The arrival of the second patrolled to a firefight with casualties on both sides. In the meantime, the Marines and the Iraqi police detainedat least a dozen Mahdi's Army members.

The al-Mahdi soldiers retaliated by attacking a local police station. Previously, there had been a modestpattern of peaceful coexistence between the police and al-Sadr's followers, except when the Sadrists weredirectly attacked. They also took policemen as hostages, a new tactic that they justified by pointing to thedetained Sadrists and calling for an exchange of prisoners.

On August 5, the U.S. counterattacked in force -- with the official blessing of Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi-- using a remarkably similar military strategy to the one that had created an international crisis in Fallujaback in April. After first surrounding the city, they assaulted al-Mahdi positions with long range weapons,notably helicopter gunships armed with rockets, and even jets. They then sent Marines (and Iraqi securityforces) into the holy cemetery at the heart of Najaf to root out dug-in al-Mahdi soldiers and capture theirweapons caches. This fierce attack produced two days of heavy fighting, heavily reported in the press, andevidently destroyed significant portions of the downtown area. A tank, for instance, was described in onereport as firing directly into hotels where al-Mahdi fighters were said to be holed up.

In the three days that followed, the Marines penetrated ever further into the city (at a cost so far of 5dead, 19 wounded, and one helicopter downed) and for a period, even took the cemetery itself, though in adescription which had a Vietnam-era ring to it, "AMarine spokesman said insurgents had fled the cemetery after an assault on Friday. But when U.S. forceswithdrew from the area, the insurgents moved back in." Byday six, Americans tanks had moved into the cemetery and helicopters were strafing the area. The Sadristswarned that further attacks would be met by extending the fight to other cities (as had happened in theprevious round of fighting in April and May) and al-Sadrhimself swore he would never leave the city but would defend it to "the last drop of my blood,"calling for a more general uprising. At least some Shiaclerics supported this call for general insurrection.

As the fighting continued, it became ever clearer that this was anything but a small incident that had spunout of control; it was, on the American side, a concerted effort to annihilate the Sadrist forces. Thedevelopment of the battle points strongly to this conclusion:

*The original patrols to Muqtada al-Sadr's house and the arrest of his followers were unprovoked,distinctly provocative acts. They occurred just after the Marines replaced Army troops on the scene and areamong numerous indicators of a planned new campaign against Sadrist forces.

*Once the city was surrounded, the helicopter and jet attacks on "suspected positions" of al-Mahdisoldiers would hardly have been needed to rebuff the modestly mounted Sadrist attack on one police station,but fit perfectly with a larger strategy of "softening up" the resistance after preventing it fromescaping. So do a number of other American acts, including thecommandeering of Najaf's major trauma center (ostensibly for a military staging area), clearly a punitivemeasure of a kind previously used in Falluja, meant to maximize suffering and expected to hasten surrender.

*Instead of denying or apologizing for the initial attack on the holy cemetery, the Marine commander on thescene justified it in apublic statement. ("The actions of the Moktada militia make the cemetery a legitimate militaryobjective.") The same statement also implied that the Marines would destroy the Holy Shrine if the al-Mahdioccupied it. •

*Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the leading Shia cleric in Iraq, left Najaf just as hostilities erupted. Though hegave what may have been valid medical reasons for his departure for Lebanon and then England, his timing aswell as other factors made it appear that he had been informed by the Americans of what was to come and hadmade a decision to avoid being caught, in every sense, in a major battle for Najaf. (It's possible as wellthat the Americans, through intermediaries, informed him that they could not guarantee his safety.)

*Public statements by Iraqi officials of Iyad Allawi's Baghdad government and of American militarycommanders, asreported in the New York Times, made it clear that their goal was to take control of the entire city awayfrom the Sadrists. The national police commander, for instance, told the press that "the interimgovernment ordered a combined operation … with the task of regaining control of the city." The governorof the province in which Najaf is situated, Adnan al-Zorfi, told a press briefing: "This operation willnever stop before all the militia leave the city." And the Marine commander left no doubt that thisconquest would involve the physical occupation of those areas currently controlled by the al-Mahdi army,including the cemetery that had previously been "off limits to the American military for religiousreasons. " He told Times reporters Sabrina Tavenese and John Burns, "We are fighting them onclose terrain but we are on schedule. You have to move very slowly because the cemetery has a lot ofmausoleums and little caves [where guerrillas could hide]." (The words "on schedule," by theway, have a particularly ominous ring; they suggest a battle plan for conquering all parts of the city on astreet by street basis, a strategy that annihilated whole neighborhoods in Falluja.)

This well-planned attack thus constituted the beginning of a major U.S. offensive almost certainly aimed atmaking Najaf into the showcase military victory that Falluja was once supposed to be. A rapid and thoroughdefeat of the insurgents, followed by an uncontested occupation of the entire city, was undoubtedly expected,especially since the lightly armed al-Mahdi soldiers had previously proved a relatively uncoordinated fightingforce. Huge and well publicized casualties, as well as heavy physical destruction, were, as in Falluja,undoubtedly part of the formula: since they provide an object example to other cities of the costs ofresistance.

The immediate goals of the ongoing battle were summarized byAlex Berenson and John F. Burns in the New York Times, in response to an offer of a cease fire by theSadrists:

"There was little sign a cease-fire would be accepted by the Iraqi government and American commanders.Instead, the indications at nightfall were that the American and Iraqi units intended to press the battle, inthe hope of breaking the back of Mr. Sadr's force in Najaf."

Reporters Tavernese and Burns characterized the more generalgoals of the offensive in this way:

"In effect, the battle appeared to have become a watershed for the new power alignment in Baghdad, withthe new government, established when Iraq regained formal sovereignty on June 28, asserting political control,and American troops providing the firepower to sustain it."

In their attempt to achieve a noteworthy victory, the Bush administration and its Iraqi allies have createda potential watershed for both the war and the American presidential election. To understand why this might beso, consider the following:

*This major offensive was probably motivated by the increasing possibility that the U.S. and its allieswere losing all control over most of the major cities in Iraq. In the Sunni parts of the country, city aftercity has in fact adopted the "Falluja model" -- refusing to allow an American presence in itsstreets and establishing its own local government. As a recent Tomdispatchsuccinctly summarized the situation: "Think of Sunni Iraq -- and possibly parts of Shia Iraq as well --as a 'nation' of city-state fiefdoms, each threatening to blink off [the U.S.] map of 'sovereignty,' despiteour 140,000 troops and our huge bases in the country." The attack in Najaf is certainly an attempt tostem this tide before it engulfs the Shia areas of Iraq as well, and it validates historianJuan Cole's ironic description of Prime Minister Allawi as "really… just the mayor of downtownBaghdad."

*The U.S. and its Iraqi clients probably chose Najaf because it represented their best chance of immediatesuccess. Unlike the mujaheddin in Falluja (and other Sunni cities), the al-Mahdi soldiers were generally notmembers of Saddam's army and are therefore more lightly armed and considerably less undisciplined as fighters;nor do they enjoy the unconditional support of the local population. (For an indelible portrait of civilianattitudes in Najaf, see Scott Baldauf's first-handaccount of the fighting in Najaf in the Christian Science Monitor.) An ambivalent city is easier toconquer, even if victory results in a sullen hatred of the conquerors. A quick victory would therefore be anoteworthy achievement and might have some chance of convincing rebels in other Shia cities not to follow theFalluja model -- at least not immediately.

However, a loss in Najaf (which could occur even with a military "victory") would be catastrophicfor the U.S. and for its interim administration in Baghdad, which is now indelibly identified with the Najafoffensive (and has ostensibly "ordered" it). Even a victory would, at least in the long run,undermine the already strained tolerance of the country's deeply suspicious Shia population. The Americansinside the Green Zone in Baghdad (and assumedly in Washington) are, however, banking on the possibility thatan immediate victory might be worth the negative publicity. It might establish the interim administration (andits American muscle) as a formidable, if brutal, adversary, worthy of fear if not respect. A defeat, on theother hand, would make it nothing more than an impotent adjunct of the American occupation.

For the Bush administration, the battle of Najaf shapes up as a new Falluja: If it doesn't win quickly, itwill likely be a major disaster. A quick victory might indeed make it look, for a time, as if the occupation,now in new clothes, had turned some corner, particularly if it resulted in temporary quiescence throughout theShia south. But a long and brutal fight, or even an inconclusive victory (which led to further fightingelsewhere in Shia Iraq or renewed low-level fighting in Najaf) would almost certainly trigger yet moreproblems not just in Iraq but throughout the Middle East. And this would lead in turn to another round ofworldwide outrage, and so to yet another electoral problem at home.

A loss after a long bloody battle would yield all of the above, while reducing the American military to theuse of air power against cities, without any real hope of pacifying them.

Our presidential election could be decided by this battle. President Bush's approval ratings dropped 10%during the April and May battles, creating the opening for a Kerry victory. Since then they have neitherrecovered, nor deteriorated further. If the battle for Najaf dominates the headlines for as long as a week, itwill likely be the next big event in the Presidential campaign. A resounding victory for American forces couldbe exactly what Karl Rove has been dreaming of -- proof that the tide has turned in Iraq. At the very least,it might remove the subject from the front pages of American papers and drop it down the nightly networkprime-time news for a suitable period of time. But a defeat as ignominious as Falluja -- or even a bloody anddestructive victory bought at the expense of worldwide outrage -- would almost certainly drive away manyremaining swing voters (and might weaken the resolve of small numbers of Republican voters as well). Thiswould leave Bush where his father was going into the electoral stretch drive --in too deep a deficit for anycampaign rhetoric to overcome.

One has to wonder why the Bush Administration has selected such a risky strategy, fraught with possiblydisastrous consequences. The only explanation that makes sense is that they are desperate. In Iraq, theircontrol is slipping away one city at a time, a process that actually accelerated after the "transfer ofsovereignty." A dramatic military offensive may be the only way they can imagine -- especially sincetheir thinking is so militarily oriented -- to reverse this decline.

In the United States, their electoral position is not promising: their hope for a dramatic economicturnaround has been dashed; a post-sovereignty month of quiescence in our media about Iraq did not reduceopposition to the war; and recently there has been a further erosion of confidence in Bush's anti-terroristpolicies. No incumbent president (the Truman miracle of 1948 excepted) has won re-election with aless-than-50% positive job rating. (The President's now stands somewhere around 47%.) A dramatic militaryvictory, embellished with all sorts of positive spin, might reverse what has begun to look like irretrievableerosion in his re-election chances. The Bush administration appears to have decided that it must take a hugerisk to generate a military victory that can turn the tide in both Iraq and in the United States.

The agony of the current American offensive begins with the death and destruction it is wreaking on anancient and holy city. Beyond that, the primary damage, may lie in the less visible horror that animates thisnew military strategy. The U.S. is no longer capable either of winning the "battle for the hearts andminds" of the Iraqis or governing most of the country. But by crushing the city of Najaf, the Marinesmight be able to quiet the rebellion for long enough to spin the November election back to Bush.

For details on the battle of Najaf, see the excellent daily summariesof Juan Cole on Informed Comment

Michael Schwartz, professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook has writtenextensively on popular protest and insurgency, and on American business and government dynamics. His work onIraq has appeared at ZNET and TomDispatch, and in Z magazine. His books include Radical Politics andSocial Structure, The Power Structure of American Business (with Beth Mintz), and Social Policy and theConservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo). Copyright C2004 Michael Schwartz. Thisarticle first appeared on Tomdispatch.com , a weblog of the Nation Institute, which offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news, and opinionfrom Tom Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing and author of