New Delhi prepares to face the nuclear powers' ire as it blocks the test ban treaty in Geneva
THERE was no mushroom cloud. But the ripples caused by India's decision to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were perhaps as powerful and far reaching as the political impact of the nuclear device it exploded in 1974. And the reaction was immediate. The day after India formally blocked the treaty, the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director, John Holum, told an American newspaper that India will have to "pay a price" for blocking this treaty.
After repeatedly reiterating its decision not to sign the CTBT and to block the treaty text if it was sought to be pushed through with the current formulation on entry-into-force (EIF), India finally did it on August 14. It brought to an end the intense diplomatic parleys that were taking place in New Delhi and Washington, with the US spearheading the efforts to prevent India from acting on its objections to the draft text.
It indeed "exasperated" the world, especially the five nuclear weapon powers. The US, in particular. "We were very disappointed," says an American official. "We did try to find a way to accommodate India's objections." "We were willing to give a guarantee that no coercive action will be taken against India even after three years, when the conference meets in case the treaty hasn't come into force by then. We were willing to exchange diplomatic notes on this issue and even offered to get an authoritative interpretation from the CD chairman," he adds.
The EIF clause that so worried India says that if the treaty does not come into force in three years, a conference will be organised to decide by "consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process". India saw in this possibilities of sanctions or pressures to join up three years down the line. It had announced that it would not block the treaty if this was modified. Russia and China were adamant and argued that this clause could not be touched. This had made the treaty's entry into force incumbent on India, as one of the three threshold states, signing it—virtually putting on it the entire onus of seeing the CTBT through. This clearly was an affront to India's sovereignty. As defence analyst K. Subrahmanyam has repeatedly stressed, it is only in times of war that defeated nations are forced to sign a treaty they do not agree with. Concurs Savita Pande, of the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA): "India has been pushed into blocking the treaty and that is the right thing to do under the circumstances. Though I don't think blocking is per se good because the CD works through consensus and this sets a bad precedent. But what option did India have? It's a question of our sovereignty".
Americans say the conference which so worries India couldn't have taken a decision without a consensus. "The US would have blocked that consensus and there would've been no sanctions". However, despite a letter from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to External Affairs Minister I.K. Gujral, India rejected this assurance. The show of spunk clearly troubled the nuclear haves.
What rankles with the nuclear powers, especially the US, is that with India blocking the treaty, they may lose the opportunity of getting a test ban through. Little before India acted on its word, an American official had told Outlook that they wanted the CTBT passed now because it was an opportunity which could be unravelled by unforeseen circumstances, something they wanted to insure against. Holum's threat wasn't entirely unexpected. But Indian analysts didn't seem bothered. "What price?" queried Jasjit Singh, IDSA director. "What law have we violated? They will impose sanctions just because they are unhappy? Some arm twisting may go on. The US will have to make a clear assessment on how far to go. They've imposed sanctions on Iran and the Europeans are up in arms and the Turkish Prime Minister has gone to Iran to sign some agreements," he says.
Adds Subrahmanyam: "Holum has been making threatening noises, but apparently he hasn't learnt much from events so far. All fears about isolation and sanctions originate from people who feel uncomfortable unless we are subservient and keep bowing and scraping before the US."
But what did Holum mean? "I haven't spoken to him. But I don't think he was threatening India. He was expressing concern at India's action," explains the US official. "And it's not just the US which is feeling like that. Efforts were made to take India's concerns into account, but in vain. People are confused and not everyone is conspiring to impose sanctions." Which are the areas where India can expect to "pay the price"? While there may be no straightforward sanctions on India, some impact may be felt in these areas:
Americans insist they will do everything to keep ties with India on track. Which means: no sanctions. But they admit that India's decision, which has confused people, might influence things. Already, India has been receiving very negative press. "The government can't stop the press from writing. The businessmen will read about it and that colours their judgement. The reactions can be in any form. Some invitations may never come, some initiatives may never get launched. We'll try to keep our relations normal. India's decision, though, makes it complicated," the US official says.
WHAT about technological cooperation and transfer of dual-use technology? Both are areas where export in any case is restricted by the US and other advanced nations presently. "The thought that was being given to try and lessen the restraint will encounter opposition now. We can understand your not signing the CTBT, but why has India put itself in this situation vis-a-vis the world?" he asks.
Is a memorandum of understanding on technological cooperation coming up for renewal soon? "I hope not. The time is not going to be very propitious," the official says. According to Americans, the task of those in the Clinton administration who were arguing for positive steps towards India will become all the more difficult.
Jasjit Singh feels differently about these pressures. He argues that the Indian economy may slow down with reduced foreign investment. "The American profit motive will slow down. But they will also pay a price," he contends. Says Subrahmanyam: "Western nations are unlikely to gang up on us. Some developing countries have secretly come and praised us for our stand. The US is unlikely to be able to do much. For instance, although it huffs and puffs about Iran, what exactly has it been able to do? The IMF is not totally under US control, so they can't use that against us."
Having failed at the CD, what option does the US now have? The talk in the corridors in Geneva is that it will get about 30 or 40 nations to sponsor a resolution at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and try to get the treaty opened for signatures, bypassing the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The alternative, say the Americans, could be to take the treaty to any capital and open it for signatures.
Procedurally, taking it to the UNGA may be simpler, but politically it's a lot more tricky. Arundhati Ghose, India's ambassador to the CD, told Outlook : "Anybody can go to the UNGA with anything. They can go with the same treaty and the EIF clause. But why have they not done it? Because they are worried it will be put to vote and India will vote against it. Many countries may not do that, but they may abstain and the whole purpose of taking it there will be defeated. There's another danger. Once it goes to the UNGA, anybody can table amendments and the text can be changed".
For it to be procedurally correct, the treaty had to be transmitted to the UNGA with a report that it has been cleared by consensus and could be opened for signatures. But with India blocking a consensus, the CD's ad hoc committee will have to prepare a note saying there was no consensus either on the text or on transmitting it. The CD plenary meeting on August 20, which Ghose described as the "final show", is when the decision will have to be taken.
But bypassing the CD is not an "option we relish", Americans maintain. "That will weaken the CD. It's an organ carrying on arms control and disarmament negotiations and it has been working at it diligently for many years. If we bypass it, it will be a real blow to it," they point out.
Clearly, the credibility of a treaty which bypasses the CD will not be very high. The Americans admit this, adding: "It will depend on the nature and strength of opposition in the UNGA. India's opposition won't change. But any decision on any option now can't be taken lightly. The choice is: either give up the CTBT or damage the CD."
Ghose says anybody can do anything at the UNGA or take the treaty anywhere and open it for signatures. "You can't expect us to participate in it. If it's in the UNGA, we will vote against it. Like with the NPT, where you had a group of countries who last year agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely. We were not a party to that."
Subrahmanyam feels a treaty passed in the UNGA will have lost most of its credibility, but adds that if it actually happens, "we will be under some kind of moral pressure not to test". A long-time votary of India going nuclear, he says this pressure may influence our thinking about whether to go ahead with nuclear tests or not. "India has to now decide what it wants. After all, we don't want to start a nuclear war. We just need about 100 to 150 weapons to provide a credible deterrent against anyone thinking about launching a nuclear strike against us, particularly China and Pakistan." According to him, the US already claims that India has 50 weapons. "The Indian Government has to think this through, but there does not seem to be much clear thinking on this issue so far in the Government".
This is another point of departure with the Americans, who say India has sufficient capability and a deterrent and don't need more sophisticated weapons. Michael Krepon, head of the Henry L. Stimson
Centre in Washington, told an Internet chatshow— Rediff on the Net —on August 13 that India can maintain its nuclear option without testing. "The design of simple fission devices is no mystery. In other words, India should have the capacity to destroy a Chinese or a Pakistan city with a Hiroshima-sized detonation without testing."
Indian analysts decry this as nuclear hypocrisy. The five nuclear powers have conducted hundreds of tests to improve their arsenals, but are now trying to clampdown on countries like India and Pakistan doing that.
With the CTBT stuck, it has other implications. Says Jasjit Singh: "What they have done is complicated the CTBT; it may never come into force. Even more important, they have killed the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty before it is even born." And if there is a treaty which should bother India, it should be the FMCT more than the CTBT.
Curiously, India has been left with Iran, which too has threatened to block the treaty if its objections are not taken care of. Subrahmanyam doesn't think Iran will finally block. "They'll succumb to Chinese pressure." And the US official laughs this off: "For India to have a partner like Iran, what can you expect me to say?"