Sectarian Monster

The sectarian war between Pakistan's Shias and Sunnis is bloody and deadly.Available figures indicate that, between January 1989 and May 31, 2005 a totalof 1,784 Pakistanis were killed, and another 4,279 injured in 1,866 incidents ofsectarian violence and terror across the country. This averages out to over 100persons per year over the past 17 years, with no end in sight. And there aresome indications that the trends may worsen. Thus, 187 persons were killed andanother 619 were injured in 19 incidents of sectarian violence in 2004. Withinthe first five months of 2005, 120 Pakistanis have already lost their lives, and286 have been injured in 30 incidents of sectarian violence. The worst of theincidents in the current year include:

May 30, 2005: Six people, including two of the three assailants, amongthem a suicide bomber, are killed and 19 persons sustain injuries during anexplosion in the courtyard of a Shia mosque at Gulshan-e-Iqbal in Karachi.

May 27, 2005: At least 25 people, including a suspected suicide bomber,are killed and approximately 100 others sustain injuries during a powerfulexplosion at the Bari Imam shrine of the Shia sect located in vicinity of thediplomatic enclave in capital Islamabad.

March 19, 2005: At least 50 people are killed and over 100 others sustaininjuries during a suicide bombing at a crowded gathering near the shrine of aShia saint at Fatehpur village in the Jhal Magsi district of Balochistanprovince.

In view of the current wave of sectarian violence, it seems that the governmenthas simply failed to curb the activities of the banned jehadi andsectarian groups, despite repeated claims by General Pervez Musharraf of havingadopted strict administrative measures against them. The unfortunate factremains that most of these groups continue to enjoy a free hand under the verynose of the administration, which is more interested in taking cosmetic stepsinstead of doing something practical to scotch the evil.

It was the support extended by the country's third military ruler, PresidentGeneral Zia-ul-Haq, to the jehadi and sectarian groups during the Afghanwar that created these unmanageable monsters, who now rise to consume their owncreators. The sectarian and ethnic essentialism that came into its own in anorganized, militant form during the Zia period, now poses an ever more seriouschallenge to the state. The genie of sectarian violence refuses to be bottledand even as President Musharraf exhorts the people of Pakistan to adopt'enlightened moderation', the country's tentative quest for a non-discriminatoryliberal democracy continues to unravel. 

Indeed, the ideology of fundamentalist Islam appears toremain at the heart of the Musharraf establishment's strategy of nationalpolitical mobilisation and consolidation, despite talk of enlightenedmoderation. Pakistan continues to be caught in the trap of extremist Islamistmilitancy and terror that its mighty military establishment constructed as partof its Afghan and Kashmir policies. Official support - both explicit andimplicit - to Islamist terrorist groups continues, even while the statestruggles to cope with the internal fall-out of the burgeoning terroristcommunity.

Since the overall direction of Pakistan's military establishment remainscommitted to an Islamic ideological state, some of the militant groups that aresupported by the regime are often found involved in bloody acts of sectarianviolence. The Musharraf administration's support for the jehadis fightingin Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and Afghanistan - and the growing nexus betweenthe jehadi and sectarian outfits - has indirectly promoted sectarianviolence in Pakistan. 

The linkages between militants active in J&K andAfghanistan, on the one hand, and those within Pakistan, on the other, are notsurprising, since these jehadis share the same madrassas(seminaries), training camps and, often, operatives. Thus, though the Pakistanimilitary establishment's support for these groups has kept the Indian Army tieddown in J&K, it has created a serious 'principal-agent' problem on thedomestic front. By facilitating the actions of irregulars in J&K, Pakistanactually promotes sectarian jehad and terrorism back home.

Facing international criticism over its status as a host to numerous Islamistextremist elements, the Musharraf administration has, from time to time, soughtto take steps to deflect growing internal and international criticism of theactivities of fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. Inner contradictionswithin the ruling establishment are, however, bound to hamper these efforts.

It is significant that, for decades, the country's Shia and Sunni sects livedside by side without any major problems. The roots of sectarian killing lie notin religious differences, but in political and social developments withinPakistan and the region. They are intimately tied up with the country's widerproblem of militant and extremist Islam. With the passage of time, the largelytheological differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims of Pakistan have beentransformed into a full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications forlaw and order, social cohesion and governmental authority.

It was during the Afghan jehad against the Soviet occupation, withdollars coming from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that theInter Services Intelligence (ISI) promoted the proliferation of a huge number ofmilitant groups and religious seminaries inside Pakistan. At that time,Washington needed Islamists to wage jehad against the Soviet troops inAfghanistan, while Islamabad needed them to bring in billions of Americandollars. Consequently, both turned a blind eye to their radical ideology andmethods.

The shortsightedness of the American administration and their Pakistani proxiesbecame apparent soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.While radical Islamists in Afghanistan formed the Taliban, their brethren inPakistan turned their attention towards J&K or to sectarian opponents insidethe country. Each act of sectarian killing provoked a cycle of revenge killings,with the civilian governments failing to curb the menace, either because theyalso wanted the militants to fight in Pakistan's corner in J&K or becausethey lacked the will and the strength to do so. 

External factors other than Kashmir also promotedsectarianism - the foremost being funding of certain Pakistan-based Shia andSunni sectarian groups by Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively. As successive governmentsin Pakistan allowed Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and Shia-dominated Iran tofight a proxy war on Pakistani soil, the country and the people have had tosuffer the devastating consequences.

When Musharraf seized power in October 1999, he faced a formidable foe:well-armed, well-trained and well-financed Islamist-sectarian organisations,with a huge resource pool of recruits in thousands of religious madrassasin the country. Dealing with such a foe was never going to be easy for anisolated military dictator. Yet his task was made somewhat easier by the 9/11terror attacks and the worldwide backlash against extremist Islam that itunleashed. Islamabad's decision to cut down support to the Kashmiri militantsalso boosted its drive against sectarianism.

Once Islamabad decided to put the Kashmir issue on the back burner for the sakeof better ties with New Delhi, it no longer had to put up with the jehadigroups operating in J&K, or the sectarian outfits within Pakistan. The firstclear sign of a shift in the Pakistan government's attitude came in a televisedspeech by Musharraf to the nation on January 12, 2002. 

While announcing a massive campaign to eradicate thesectarian menace, the General banned three sectarian groups, Sipah-e-SahabaPakistan (SSP), Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-ShariatMohammadi (TNSM) and put the Sunni Tehrik on notice. Another two sectariangroups - Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)had been banned earlier, on August 14, 2001.

Despite the government ban, however, almost all these sectarian groups continueto operate freely under changed names without much difficulty. Contrary toMusharraf's much-trumpeted claims of having dismantled the sectarian mafia inPakistan, the hard fact remains that his administration has hardly taken anyconcrete measures to implement the ban in letter and spirit, except in arrestingand later releasing some of the cadres of these groups. Enforcement agenciesarrest some of these cadres every time there is an escalation in sectarianconflict, but they are released shortly after the wave of violencesubsides. 

The organisational infrastructures of the banned sectariangroups has essentially remained intact, with most of the groups retaining thesame office bearers who refused to go underground even after the January 2002ban. Most of the banned groups continue to operate out of their old officepremises, though some have shifted to new premises. They are still bringing outtheir periodical publications, in most cases under the old names, besidesraising funds and holding congregations without any check or fear. And thesectarian tensions refuse to die down, given the fact that the contending groupsare well organised and well armed. Their ability to maintain effectiveness andto elude enforcement agencies also has to do with an extensive support networkthat includes madrassas, political parties, bases across the border inAfghanistan, and financial support from foreign countries, if not foreign governments.The International Crisis Group has noted, in its April 2005 report, The Stateof Sectarianism in Pakistan:

Sectarian terrorists in Pakistan are thriving in an atmosphere of religious intolerance for which its military government is largely to blame. General Musharraf has repeatedly pledged that he would eradicate religious extremism and sectarianism and transform Pakistan into a moderate Muslim state. In the interests of retaining power, he has done the opposite.

The report notes, further, that as Musharraf is praised bythe international community for his role in the war against terrorism, thefrequency and viciousness of sectarian terrorism continues to increase in hiscountry. Regulating madaris, reforming the public education sector,invoking constitutional restrictions against private armies and hate speech, andremoving all laws and state policies of religious discrimination are essentialand overdue steps to stem the tide of religious extremism. 

The choice that Pakistan faces is not between the militaryand the mullahs, as is generally believed in the West; it is betweengenuine democracy and a military-mullah alliance that is responsible forproducing and sustaining religious extremism of different hues. The reportrecommends to the Pakistan government that it recognise the diversity of Islamin Pakistan, reaffirm the constitutional principle of equality for all citizensregardless of religion or sect, and give meaning to this by repealing all laws,penal codes and official procedures that reinforce sectarian identities andcause discrimination on the basis of faith.

If these changes do not occur, the situation can be expected to worsen. ArifJamal, a Pakistani writer on jehad, notes a troubling trend in thepatterns of sectarian violence in the country:

…the Pakistani groups used to carry out sectarian violence on the pattern of non-sectarian violence in the country before the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The sectarian violence became intense and brutal after the jehadis had to leave Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US attack. The sectarian terrorists started using suicide attacks to perpetuate sectarian violence in Pakistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington. Suicide attacks were unknown in Pakistan in the pre-9/11 period and were largely associated with the al-Qaeda network, although the al-Qaeda-affiliated groups never used them in Pakistan. However, a new mode of violence has been introduced during the current wave of sectarian conflict: a car bomb. It is for the first time that the terrorists have used a car bomb in Pakistan. And if past is any guide, they are likely to use this mode of violence more frequently in the future.

Sectarian conflict and violence are an unpleasant reality inPakistan today, and are becoming more and more intense. Administrative measurestaken by the Musharraf-led government have failed to produce results so far.Analysts believe that the sectarian problem cannot be overcome by suchadministrative measures alone, while the state itself remains in alliance withextremist elements. The problem for General Musharraf is that it is difficult topromote the so-called jehad in J&K without inadvertently promotingmany of the Pakistani sectarian outfits. In the process, state authority standseroded in one way or the other.

The increasing militarisation and brutalisation of theconflict shows that there are virtually no sanctuaries left - neither home, normosque nor hospital. Not even a jail is safe. And being innocent is not theissue. Just 'being' is enough - being Shia or Sunni, Barelvi orDeobandi. In a situation where different sectarian groups are vying to provethemselves the standard bearers of Islam, one strategy to secure prominence as arepresentative of 'true Islam' is obviously by displaying extreme hostility andintolerance to those designated as being 'un-Islamic' by virtue of belonging toreligious minorities and minority sects.

Amir Mir is Senior Assistant Editor, Monthly Herald,Dawn Group of Newspapers, Karachi. Courtesy, the South Asian Review ofthe South Asian Terrorism Portal