The basic problem in the Israel-Palestine conflict today remains what it's been for decades: the denial of self-determination to the Palestinian people.
The basic problem in the Israel-Palestine conflict today remains what it'sbeen for decades: the denial of self-determination to the Palestinian people.Palestinians have been living under a brutal and humiliating occupation since1967 and no solution to the crisis is likely unless this fundamental reality isaddressed.
Some Palestinians have turned to terrorism as their answer. Targetingcivilians is immoral and it is likely to be extremely counter-productive aswell. But it is not hard to understand the rage that motivates the suicidebombers. As Carl W. Ford, Jr., the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State forIntelligence and Research, testified this past February 6:
"Many who join groups that practice terrorism face a life of joblessnessand poverty. Often living under oppressive governments with little prospect of abetter life, young people -- especially those whose exposure to education hasmade them even more frustrated and embittered -- are prone to seek a way out,perhaps by attempting to migrate, perhaps by joining a movement that promiseschange through violence, perhaps by immersing themselves in religion. Whenunemployment hovers around 40% and nearly 45% of the population is under the ageof 15 (as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), people find it difficult to wait fora brighter future."
And this quote may understate the Palestinian unemployment rate; thePalestinian Authority puts it at 51 percent (see PECDAR, People Under Siege:Palestinian Economic Losses September 2000 September 2001, available at http://www.pecdar.org/).
The New York Times's Thomas L. Friedman declares that it is a "hugelie" to consider desperation a motive for the suicide bombings (March 31,2002). Friedman argues that in fact the Palestinians could have had their statewithout any need for the current Intifada because in July 2000 Clinton offeredthe Palestinians a peace plan that would have ended the occupation, but Arafatturned it down. This has been an argument long-promoted by Friedman, imperviousto the counter-evidence presented by a member of Clinton's negotiating team,Robert Malley (see Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, "Camp David: The Tragedyof Errors," New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001).
Malley first notes the context: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak came toCamp David in July 2000 having reneged on various agreements with thePalestinians and having substantially increased the number of Israeli settlersin the Occupied Territories during his year in office. Palestinians wereunderstandably wary of Israeli peace offers, given that after six years of Oslo"there were more Israeli settlements, less freedom of movement, and worseeconomic conditions." Then at Camp David Barak offered -- but never inwriting and never in detail; in fact, says, Malley, "strictly speaking,there never was an Israeli offer" -- to give the Palestinians landequivalent to 1 percent of the West Bank (unspecified, but to be chosen byIsrael) in return for 9 percent of the West Bank which housed settlementseffectively dividing the West Bank into separate regions. It's a myth, Malleywrote in the New York Times (July 8, 2001), that "Israel's offer met mostif not all of the Palestinians' legitimate aspirations" and a myth as wellthat the "Palestinians made no concession of their own."
The standard story goes that with the failure of Camp David, Arafat opted forwar. But consider what followed. In September 2000 Barak approved a provocativevisit by Ariel Sharon, then a member of Parliament, to the site of the Al Aqsamosque. Given the growing Palestinian rage at the occupation, the results wereentirely predictable. The next day some Palestinians threw rocks and theheavily-augmented police responded with lethal fire, killing four and woundinghundreds. Thus began the second Intifada.
Israeli police and soldiers -- under Barak's authority -- continued to uselethal force in situations where their lives were not in danger. SomePalestinians proceeded to arm themselves, and the killing escalated, with deathson both sides, though the victims were disproportionately Palestinians. It issometimes claimed that Palestinians intentionally try to kill Israeli civilians(which some certainly do) while the unarmed civilians killed by the Israelis areall unintended "collateral damage." But numerous reports byinternational (and Israeli) human rights groups belie this claim. Recentreports, for example, have documented Israeli security forces firing onambulances and medical personnel, and preventing wounded Palestinians fromreceiving medical treatment.
In December 2000 and January 2001, talks between the Barak government andArafat resumed and considerable headway was made. Yossi Beilin, Barak's JusticeMinister, summarizes what ensued: "instead of accepting the successfultalks that had taken place between Israel and the Palestinians ... as a waytoward a final settlement, Ariel Sharon decided, after being elected primeminister, to terminate the peace process" (New York Times, March 30, 2002).Thus when commentators (such as CBS's resident Middle East expert, Fouad Ajami)declare that the current Intifada is "Arafat's war," they are grosslydistorting reality.
One might note too the pattern of escalating terror. In November 2001, therewas a week-long lull in the fighting. Sharon then ordered the assassination ofHamas leader Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, which, as everyone predicted, led to a rash ofterror bombings, which in turn Sharon used as justification for further assaultson the Palestinian Authority. (Hanoud's case is interesting in another respect:despite Israeli claims that Arafat refused to arrest terrorists, or elsearrested them only to release them shortly thereafter, Hanoud had been in aPalestinian jail. He was not released. Instead, in August 2001, an Israeli F-16tried to assassinate him in the jail. The building was destroyed, 11 policeofficers killed, and Hanoud escaped.)
None of this justifies terror bombing of civilians. Various Palestiniancommentators -- among them Edward Said, Jonathan Kuttab, and Mubarak Awad --have persuasively argued that on moral, political, and pragmatic grounds thePalestinians would be far better served by a policy of nonviolent resistance.But when nonviolence is urged on Palestinians by the likes of Thomas Friedman,who at the same time calls for Israel "to deliver a military blow thatclearly shows terror will not pay," the hypocrisy is palpable. No doubt thesuicide bombers are following the same warped logic as Friedman, believing thattheir acts of terror will restrain, rather than provoke, terror from the otherside.
Various arguments have been advanced as to why Israel cannot withdraw fromthe Occupied Territories. None of them is compelling. One argument is that toreturn to the 1967 borders will leave Israel in a militarily vulnerableposition. This, of course, was the same argument given for why Israel couldn'treturn the Sinai to Egypt or pull out of Lebanon. Both of these were done,however, with no harm whatever to Israeli security. True, the Oslo Accords,which turned over disconnected swatches of territory to Palestinianadministration, have not enhanced Israeli security. But as Shimon Peres, one ofthe architects of the Oslo agreement and currently Sharon's Foreign Minister,acknowledged, Oslo was flawed from the start. "Today we discover thatautonomy puts the Palestinians in a worse situation." The second Intifadawith all its suffering could have been avoided, Peres said, if the Palestinianshad had a state from the outset. "'We cannot keep three and a half millionPalestinians under siege without income, oppressed, poor, densely populated,near starvation,' he said, adding that without a visible political horizon thePalestinians will not make peace with Israel" (Jason Keyser, "PeresSays Mideast Peace Process Flawed From Outset," Associated Press, Feb. 21,2002). It is simply not credible that the strongest military power in the region(even apart from its nuclear arsenal) would be indefensible without occupyingneighboring territory. And with the Arab League declaration that all of itsmembers would establish diplomatic relations with Israel if it withdrew to its1967 borders, it is clear that nothing would better guarantee the Israeli peoplea peaceful future than pulling out of the Occupied Territories. The Israeligovernment, however, rejected the Arab League offer and the next day launchedits latest offensive against Palestinian cities.
A second argument against withdrawal is that Palestinians insist on the rightof return, which, it is said, is a way to destroy Israel. Allowing people whohave been expelled from their homes the right to return is hardly an extremedemand. Obviously this can't mean throwing out people who have been living inthese homes for many years now, and would take complex planning. Both Arafat andthe Arab League have indicated that in their view the right of return should beimplemented in a way that would not create a demographic problem for Israel. Ofcourse, one could reasonably argue that a Jewish state is problematic on basicdemocratic grounds, but in any event neither the Arab League nor Arafat haveraised this objection.
A final argument against withdrawal is that Palestinians just view this asthe first step to eliminating Israel entirely. Hamas objects not just to theoccupation but to the very existence of Israel. But the Hamas position is adistinctly minority sentiment among Palestinians, who are a largely secularcommunity that has endorsed a two-state settlement. To be sure, Hamas has beengrowing in strength. In its early days Hamas was promoted by Israeli officialsto weaken the PLO (see the Richard Sale, "Israel gave major aid to Hamas,"UPI, Feb. 24, 2001), but most of its growth has been a result of the inabilityof the Palestinian Authority to deliver a better life for Palestinians. If therewere a truly independent Palestinian state, one can assume that Hamas would findfar fewer volunteers for its suicide squads. It must be acknowledged, though,that the longer the mutual terror continues, the harder it will be to achievelong term peace.
The current situation is grim indeed. On March 31, the Los Angeles Timesreported that five Palestinian police officers "appeared to have been shotin the head or neck at close range. The room where they were found ... wassplattered with blood and pocked with bullet or shrapnel holes. A string ofbloodstains was sprayed across the wall at what would have been about head levelif the men had been sitting when shot." And now, as the international pressis expelled from Ramallah and other Palestinian cities, the prospect of evenmore horrific atrocities looms.
Washington has little inclination to restrain Sharon. The Bushadministration's attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has beenentirely opportunistic. After September 11, when it seemed necessary to puttogether a coalition of Muslim nations, Secretary of State Powell declared theU.S. in favor of a Palestinian state. But as it became clear that Arab supportwasn't particularly needed in the Afghan war, Sharon was given a free handagain. Then, as Washington hawks hoped for a war against Iraq, the U.S. againthought it might need Arab allies, and Israel was told its policies"weren't helpful." But once the Arab League made clear its unequivocalopposition to a U.S. attack on Iraq, Washington's need for calm in Palestinereceded, and again Sharon was given a green light.
Washington's inclinations won't restrain Sharon, but mass protests in theUnited States -- to add to those now sweeping the Arab world -- might make itpolitically impossible for the Bush administration to continue its support forIsrael's war on the Palestinians. It is these protests that we need to build.
Stephen R. Shalom teaches political science at William Paterson University inNew Jersey.
(Znet)