Uncle Sam In Sri Lanka

In a message sent to US President George Bush after the 9/11 terroriststrikes in the US, the then Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga offeredWashington "full access to the country's port, airfields and otherfacilities" for use in its operations against Al Qaeda and theTaliban in Afghanistan.

In March,2002, a delegation of US officials, led by the thenAssistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca andincluding US Brigadier General Timothy Ghormely, commander of the US MarineExpeditionary Brigade, visited Sri Lanka for secret talks with RanilWickremesinghe,the then Prime Minister, his Defence Minister Tilak Marapana andsenior army officers at the Palaly army camp in the north. General Ghormely alsovisited Trincomalee. The next month, a four-member team of US military and legalexperts secretly visited Colombo.

Following these visits, the Sunday Times of Sri Lanka reported thatthe Ranil Wickremasinghe government was secretly negotiating with the US anagreement known as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).According to the Sunday Times, under the proposed agreement, the US would provide military training as well as equipment and spare parts for the SriLankan Armed Forces.. "The training, which will encompass joint exercises withUnited States Armed Forces, will focus on counter terrorism and relatedactivity... Neither Colombo nor Washington is willing to confirm the release oftwo maritime surveillance aircraft and one patrol ship to intensify surveillanceover the eastern seas of Sri Lanka," it added. Even before the conclusion ofthe agreement, US warships began to dock in the Colombo harbour to refuel and toprovide shore leave for sailors. The USS Hopper arrived in April,2002, the firstAmerican navy vessel to dock in Colombo in eight years.

This gave rise to speculation in Colombo that the proposed ACSAagreement would allow the U.S. military to utilize Sri Lanka's ports,airports and air space while Sri Lanka would receive military assistanceincluding increased training facilities and equipment in return.

The then US Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Ashley Wills, was quoted as having tolda gathering of scholars, diplomats and journalists in Washington that "becauseof its location and the talent and ‘entrepreneurial outlook' of itscitizens, the 19-million-strong nation stands to evolve into the Singapore ofSouth Asia and prosper".

Following these reports, Joseph Pararajasingham, who was then a seniorMP of the Tamil National Alliance, met Joseph Novak, the then PoliticalCounsellor in the US Embassy in Colombo, and conveyed to him the concern of theSri Lankan Tamils over these reports. He reportedly told the US diplomat thatthe proposed agreement could be used by the Sri Lankan government "as atool to support the Sri Lankan military's war against the LTTE. Signing theagreement would mean that you support the majority community (Sinhalese) tocontinue the discrimination and subjugation of the Tamil people."

On May 31, 2002, the US Embassy in Colombo issued the following statement:

"The United States has no interest in acquiring military bases anywhere in Sri Lanka. The ACSA is, as its name implies, an agreement that allows the armed services of each party to the agreement to avail itself of servicing, repairs, spare parts and equipment of the other in exchange for payment or through the exchange of identical goods or goods of equivalent value.The United States has acquisition and service agreements with 56 countries, including a number of Asian countries. These are relatively low-level agreements designed to address modest needs in a manner convenient to both parties."

These reports caused considerable concern in New Delhi. In an attempt toallay Indian misgivings, Wickremasinghe assured the then government headed byA.B.Vajpayee that his government had no intention of giving any military basesto the US in Sri Lanka. As proof of Sri Lanka's goodwill for India and itsattention to New Delhi's sensitivities on the future of Trincomallee, he pressedupon the Indian government to have the oil storage tanks in Trincomallee takenover by the Indian Oil Corporation and to assist Sri Lanka in the economicdevelopment of the area.

In December 2002, the government of India was reportedly taken by surprise byreliable reports, which indicated that even while ostensibly giving theseassurances to Vajpayee, Wickremasinghe was holding secret talks with the US,without the knowledge of the government of India, on an expressed US interest inthe petrol storage tanks in Trincomallee. The government of India reportedlylooked upon this as double-dealing by Wickremasinghe---telling the US one thingand telling India something totally different. Following the receipt of thesereports, Vajpayee reportedly sent one of his trusted emissaries on a secretvisit to Colombo to convey to Wickremasinghe the government of India's concernand unhappiness over these reports. It was reported that Wickremasinghe totallydenied these reports and assured the government of India once again that SriLanka had no intention of giving any base facilities to the US or allowing theUS to use the petrol storage tanks. Thereafter, the Wickremasinghe governmentsuspended the negotiations with Washington DC on the proposed agreement.

On February 8, 2004, Devinda Subasinghe, the Sri Lankan Ambassador to the US,addressed the Sri Lankan community in Washington DC on the occasion of SriLanka's Independence Day. He said, inter alia, in his address as follows:

[Quote]

I am happy to report to you that I think that we have made significant advances for a small country such as ours being able to access the highest levels of the US political leadership, both within the executive branch and the legislative branches of this country.

I would add that we have been benefiting tremendously from President Bush's decision to designate the Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Richard Armitage to be responsible on a daily basis for issues of concern to Sri Lanka and to the United States. I think we have benefited tremendously from that level of commitment and understanding. The United States government has dedicated significant political, financial and human resources that have been invested in our relationship and through some very difficult and challenging times globally, where Afghanistan, Iraq and other "hot spots" around the world do take the US attention away. But I must say that over the past years we have had a commitment and an implementation of their commitment to keeping Sri Lanka's interest in focus here in Washington.

The key elements of this relationship, as I have observed over the past year, are the values that Sri Lanka and the United States share, both among the people and within the governments. Shared values of democracy, free enterprise, our position on the global war on terrorism from which we ourselves have suffered for a 20-year period, and the continued global openness of the global trading and economic systems. I would refer you back to the policy statement that Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Armitage made at the Center of Strategic & International Studies last year in February, which articulated the US policy position with regard to Sri Lanka.

With regard to the legislative branch as well, we have been successful in reactivating and restructuring the Sri Lanka Congressional Caucus of the 108th Congress.

We have had one congressional delegation visit Sri Lanka, several staff delegations have visited. We have also had a group of Senators and Congressmen who have written to the President of United States in support of our economic agenda here in the US.

Finally, I might also add that from within the executive branch the commitment that has been made, has been followed through as Deputy Secretary Armitage said to me, "I gave you my word, and I will keep my word that we will standby Sri Lanka as it goes forward facing the challenges that you face".

I would also like to recognize a new dimension to the Sri Lanka - US relationship that is symbolized by the appointment of a Defense Attaché to the Embassy. That is the increasing defense and security relations between our two countries. We have been fortunate the Sri Lanka Navy has received a Cutter that will provide the offshore patrol capabilities in interdicting arms smuggling and other activities that are ongoing off our eastern shores. As well, the increase in the number of positions that the Sri Lanka military has received in terms of training and other defense related training courses. There are two officers present here with us today who are currently following a course at the National Defense University. There has been a significant increase in the number of slots that are being made available to Sri Lanka and its military services in terms of interaction at the US Pacific Command in Hawaii.

I myself visited the US Pacific Command along with the Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri last year to discuss military-to-military relationships as well as increased sourcing and transfer of equipment as we fight our global war against terrorism and maintain the military capabilities of all three armed forces in Sri Lanka. I am happy to report to you that the Commanders of all three services have had exchanges with their US counterparts in Hawaii as well in the case of the Sri Lanka Navy the counterparts in the US Coast Guard and the Chief of Naval Operations. This is a new dimension to our relationship, underscoring the need to maintain a balance as we go forward on the Peace Process with a very realistic view that we do need to maintain our military readiness and our defense capabilities at the same time as we try to resolve a conflict that has plagued us for 20 years.

In this context, the United States last year re-designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which has its own legal and other implications globally. That re-designation occurred in October last year for a two-year period. The LTTE has been on the FTO list since 1997, when the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar actively lobbied for that eventuality which did occur during the Clinton Administration, and that consistency of policy is significant. I think in terms of the relationship and its attributes that I have discussed with you, we have benefited tremendously from the policy attention we have received, from the financial and other resources that the United States government has placed at our disposal in terms of pursuing our dual strategies of regaining peace and economic prosperity.Unquote

(End of citation from the Ambassador's address)

11. After his election as the President in November 2005, Mahinda Rajapakseresumed the negotiations with the US on the proposed ACSA. In an article titled MarginalisingIndia on November 25,2006, I had stated as follows:

His [Mahinda Rajapakse's] lack of concern for the humanitarian catastrophe and his indifference to India's anxieties in the matter became evident after the meeting of the representatives of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donors' Conference of 2003—Japan, Norway, the European Union and the US—held in Washington on November 21, 2006. This meeting, while articulating proforma criticisms of the acts of violence and indiscriminate killing of civilians by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, came out strongly in support of the Sri Lankan government and showed a calculated indifference to the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr R. Nicholas Burns, was particularly forthcoming in support of the Sri Lankan government during the joint press briefing by the participants at the meeting. The remarks of Mr Burns and others at the press briefing have been interpreted by the hard-liners in the Sri Lankan government as amounting to an indirect endorsement of the methods followed by the security forces in their operations against the LTTE and as indicating that the Co-Chairs are decreasingly averse to the Sri Lankan government's efforts to solve the problem of the Tamils militarily. The hardliners have come to believe that the Co-Chairs are increasingly inclined to close their eyes to the brutal suppression of the Tamils.

There has been a revival of the pre-1983 interest of the US Navy in acquiring a presence in Trincomallee and hopes of achieving this with the support of the government of Mr Rajapakse should at least partly account for the growing open support of the US for Mr Rajapakse and its disinclination to take a firm stand against the methods employed by the Sri Lankan security forces against the Tamil population. Trincomallee has acquired a new importance in the eyes of the US and the NATO forces presently fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan as an alternative naval base for logistic support to the NATO operations in Afghanistan should instability in Pakistan after the next year's general elections there make the continued use of Karachi untenable.

Mr Burns has showered encomiums on what he described as India's responsible attitude on Sri Lanka----which is nothing but an euphemism for its inactivism. Even while making from time to time proforma statements expressing themselves in favour of a more active role by India, the US and Sri Lanka seem happy with the present inactivism of New Delhi.

On March 5, 2007, the US Embassy in Colombo issued a statement announcingthat the Sri Lankan Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse and U.S. AmbassadorRobert Blake signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)that day. Gothabaya Rajapakse, who is the brother of Mahinda Rajapakse, ispresently co-ordinating the counter-LTTE operations. He is reportedly a UScitizen. Thus, two US citizens have signed an agreement with seriousimplications for the future of Sri Lanka and this region.

A press release by the US Embassy said: "The agreement will increaseinteroperability between the two countries. This (the agreement) allows theUnited States and Sri Lanka to transfer and exchange logistics supplies,support, and re-fuelling services, either in kind or at cost, duringpeacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations and joint exercises." It wasclarified that the agreement would allow exchange of food supplies,petroleum, and transportation services, but expressly prohibits theprovision of weapons systems or ammunition."ACSA will facilitate theexchange of non-lethal equipment, increase cooperation in the field and reducethe paperwork involved," US Ambassador Blake was quoted as saying by thestatement. The US Embassy said that the logistics support allowed under thisagreement cannot be transferred beyond the forces of the receiving party withoutthe consent of the providing party. The agreement is to be valid for ten years.

In a commentary the same day, the British Broadcasting Corporation quoted theSri Lankan defence affairs spokesman, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella as statingthat the details of the agreement would be revealed "in duecourse". "We have informed India about this agreement and they arevery supportive," he added.

If the claim of the Sri Lankan spokesman that the government of Indiasupported the agreement with the US is correct, the present government in NewDelhi has allowed what the previous governments of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi,V.P.Singh, Chandrasekhar, P.V.Narasimha Rao, Deve Gowda, Inder Gujral andA.B.Vajpayee had strongly resisted.

There has been opposition from the Central Asian Republics to the continuedpresence of US bases in their territory. The US government is worried that ifPresident Pervez Musharraf falls, it may no longer be able to use the Pakistaniterritory as a logistics base for its operations in Afghanistan and as a covertaction base for its destabilisation operations in Iran. The Gulf countries haveno qualms about allowing the US to use their territory as a logistics basefor its operations in Iraq, but hesitate to let it use it for its operations inAfghanistan. If it loses the use of Pakistan, the only base available for itwill be Diego Garcia. It is keen to have a back-up logistics base in Sri Lankafor its future operations in Afghanistan and for a military strike against Iran,should that become necessary. It has now got it. Apparently with the blessingsof the government of India, if the Sri Lankan spokesman is to be believed.According to reliable sources, the US has agreed to encourage Israel to supplymore military equipment to Sri Lanka. The US is likely to pay for it.

It is important for the Parliament to debate the wisdom of the government ofIndia's acquiescence in the US developing a foothold in Sri Lanka in order tomake it a second Singapore to serve its strategic interests and a second DiegoGarcia to serve the interests of its so-called war against terrorism and othermilitary operations in this region.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi,and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.