These differences were due to Nawaz Sharif's over-ruling Musharraf'sobjections to the appointment of Ziauddin as the Director-General of the ISI.Ziauddin was a close confidante of Nawaz Sharif and kept him informed of allactions of Musharraf, who stopped inviting him to some of his meetings with theCorps Commanders.
Jamshed Gulzar Kiani ingratiated himself with Musharraf by keeping him informedof the activities of Ziauddin. A small coterie of Army officers headed byLt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS), staged a coupwhen Musharraf was returning to Karachi from Colombo on October 12,1999, and hadNawaz Sharif arrested because he dismissed Musharraf and appointed Ziauddin asthe COAS. They prevented Ziauddin from entering the office of the COAS. He wasarrested subsequently.
A question often debated in senior circles of the Pakistan Army is whether thiscoterie would have behaved in this manner if Nawaz Sharif had appointed aPunjabi Lt.Gen.from a fighting formation instead of an engineer as the COAS.Those, who held this view, used to argue that the objection of this coterie wasnot to the dismissal of Musharraf, a Mohajir, who was disliked by many of thePunjabi officers, but to his appointment of Ziauddin as the COAS. It isdifficult to know the truth.
A month after taking over power as the Chief Executive, Musharraf promotedJamshed Gulzar Kiani as a Lt.Gen and appointed him a Corps Commander. The twowere very close to each other. Musharraf greatly appreciated his action beforeOctober 12,1999 in keeping him informed of the activities of Ziauddin and hislinks with Nawaz Sharif.
When Jamshed Gulzar Kiani reached the age of superannuation in 2003, Musharrafrewarded his loyalty by appointing him as the Chairman of the Federal PublicServices Commission, which post had a fixed tenure of five years under the law.Serious differences developed between the two when Kiani as the Chairman of theCommission did not do the bidding of Musharraf and Mr Shaukat Aziz, the formerPrime Minister,in respect of some appointments and postings of officers.Musharraf asked him to resign. He declined. Musharraf had a bill passed by theNational Assembly in September 2006 reducing the tenure from five to threeyears. He was replaced at the end of three years.
A bitter Jamshed Gulzar Kiani, who felt humiliated by the treatment meted out tohim by Musharraf despite his loyalty to him when he was Maj.Gen. and Lt.Gen,joined the group of anti-Musharraf officers such as Gen.Mirza Aslam Beg, formerCOAS who succeeded Zia-ul-Haq, after he died in a plane crash, Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul,former DG of the ISI etc and has been keeping on a campaign against Musharraf.
In his interview to the Geo TV, he made various allegations against Musharrafregarding the Kargil episode, Musharraf's post-9/11 co-operation with the US inthe so-called war against terrorism and the commando raid into the Lal Masjid ofIslamabad in July last year. He stated on follows on the Kargil episode:According to his information, Nawaz Sharif did not know anything about theKargil episode. He was never thoroughly briefed on the same. He (Kiani)supported the holding of a probe into the Kargil fiasco. He had briefed NawazSharif and told him that it was a very sensitive issue and he could not unveilall the details to him. In a meeting of May 17, 1999, Nawaz gave a green signalto the operation. He assured conditional support to General Musharraf that theGovernment would back the operation when he successfully moved forward. Ifunfortunately the same failed, he would not be in a position to support him (Musharraf).
In his interview to the Dawn on June 2, 2008,, Kiani said: Nawaz Sharif,the majority of corps commanders and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) werekept in the dark about the Kargil operation in 1999.Although Nawaz was briefedon the Kargil issue, it was fairly late and the conflict had started by then."It was not a comprehensive briefing that the chief executive should have beengiven."
Talking to the media on June 3,2008, Nawaz Sharif demanded the trial ofMusharraf on treason charges for his illegal Nov 3, 2007, steps in imposing aState of Emergency, the Lal Masjid carnage and keeping the nation, militaryofficials and the then political leadership in the dark on the Kargil issue.Nawaz termed Musharraf’s account on the Kargil issue in his book, In theLine of Fire, a pack of lies and said the interview of Lt-Gen (retd) JamshedGulzar Kiani to Geo TV upheld his stance that he was not informed about theKargil operation.
Nawaz was being clever. Kiani did not tell either Geo TV or the Dawn thatNawaz was not informed. He only said that Nawaz was informed later and that toonot in a comprehensive manner. At the same time, he added that Nawaz approvedthe already on-going operation provided it would be successful.
Who is telling the truth--Musharraf in his book in which he claimed that Nawazwas on board or Kiani, who claims that Nawaz was informed in passing after thePakistan Army had moved into the Kargil heights and that he had not objected toit provided it would succeed or Nawaz, who claims that he like many CorpsCommanders was not informed at all?
T
he definitive answer to this question is to be found inthe archives of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). In the last week ofMay, 1999, Musharraf had been to Beijing. He was in daily telephonic contactwith Lt.Gen.Mohammad Aziz, the CGS, in Rawalpindi from his hotel room inBeijing. All these conversations were intercepted by the R&AW. Thegovernment of Atal Behari Vajpayee decided to release to the media thetranscripts of two of these tapes for three reasons.