Halloa Across The Adam’s Bridge

Demonstrating realpolitik, India has not wasted time in repairing ties with Sri Lanka’s Rajapaksa brothers, since Gotabaya Rajapaksa won last November’s presidential elections. Considering Colombo’s tilt towards China during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s last term as president and the excellent political and economic ties Beijing shares with the island nation, New Delhi wants to leave no stone unturned to woo Colombo, as it directly affects security concerns in the teeth of an increasingly assertive China. As Indian and Chinese forces hunker down for the winter in Ladakh, Sri Lanka’s strategic location on the Indian Ocean makes it a vital cog in India’s emerging maritime doctrine.

“Sri lanka is very relevant for India’s maritime policies. This is because of its geographical location in terms of the Indian Ocean and proximity to India. At a time when China is focussing on the Indian Ocean determinedly, it would be prudent for India to have a Sri Lanka which is empathetic and sensitive to India’s composite maritime interests, of which the naval and the military is one particular strand,’’ says analyst C. Uday Bhaskar.

The rise of China, its aggressive moves in the Pacific Ocean and expansion of economic and strategic influence into the Indian Ocean region has forced India to refashion its maritime policy. PLA submarines and warships are no longer confined to the Pacific, but plies the Indian Ocean regularly. Alarm bells went off in New Delhi when a Chinese military submarine docked in Colombo harbour in 2014.

At the same time, Pacific powers such as the US, Japan, and Australia as well as East Asian nations, especially bordering the South China Sea, are concerned about China’s muscle flexing. The US has since 2005 worked towards drawing India out of its subcontinental ambit to play a bigger role in balancing China’s rise. Initially hesitant, a growing Chinese threat has forced New Delhi to elevate ties with the US, Japan and Australia and join the Quadrilateral coalition or ‘Quad’. Joining groups like the 22-member Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), forming the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Quad and working towards an Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative are part of a larger plan to spread New Delhi’s footprints across the Indian and Pacific island nations. “The Indo-Pacific combines both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific into one stretch. But speaking of the Indian Ocean, India sees this as stretching from the eastern coast of Africa out to the Pacific islands,’’ says Deepa Wadhwa, former ambassador to Japan.

Last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a virtual summit with his Sri Lankan counterpart, the first virtual international enga­gement for Mahinda Rajapaksa since assuming office as premier in August 2020. Modi stressed the importance his government att­aches to the isl­and nation. “Relations between India and Sri Lanka are thousands of years old. According to my government’s neighbourhood first policy and SAGAR doctrine, we give special priority to relations between the two countries,” Modi said.

In their hour-long virtual meeting, the two PMs went over the entire gamut of bilateral ties, the COVID-19 crisis and its impact in the region as well as international and regional iss­ues. Whether Modi briefed Rajapaksa on the current situation in Ladakh is not known. But the elephant in the room in India-Sri Lanka ties is China.

India’s immediate concerns were recently assuaged when Sri Lanka’s newly-appointed foreign secretary, Jayanath Colombage, a former naval commander and a confidant of president Gotabaya, publicly declared that his country would never compromise India’s strategic concerns. Once that has been conveyed, the air of past misunderstandings can be cleared. Yet, China remains an important player in the island, and President Xi Jinping’s wolf warriors are certain to push back against Indian influence. In fact, the efforts have already begun.

Unlike in the past, Chinese diplomats today are more aggressively articulate and don’t shy away from media. When Kelum Bandara of the Daily Mirror int­erviewed China’s acting amb­assador to Colombo, Hu Wei, and asked his reaction on Colombage’s assertion that while Sri Lanka has excellent economic ties with China, India’s security interests would not be compromised, he shot back: “First of all, every independent country should not compromise its nat­ional interests for others. As far as Sri Lanka concerned, it should be Sri Lanka first. Secondly, China is a best friend and partner of Sri Lanka when we talk about economic cooperation. But our friendship is far beyond that. Our relationship is based on strategic partnership cooperation, not economic development only…. It is much more colourful, broader and deeper than that.’’ Later in the interview, Hu ass­erted: “As a true friend, China never says China first and forces Sri Lanka to choose sides. We don’t want to do so.’’ The assumption being that unlike India, China does not impose its will on its friends.  

China backs its claims of friendship with huge infrastructure projects it promotes in Sri Lanka. Colombo, like all of India’s South Asian neighbours, is part of Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative too. What started during the pro-China phase of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidency continued through the tenures of Maithripala Sirisena and Ranil Wickre­masinghe—even though both were said to be pro-India, pro-US and pro-EU.

It is difficult for most countries in desperate need of modern infrastructure to turn their backs on China’s BRI and its chequebook diplomacy. Though Xi flags the BRI as a series of connectivity projects to bring development and prosperity through the region, India and the US regard it as China’s way to project its economic, and  military, might.

The $1.4 billion Colombo City project is a case in point. Land has been rec­laimed from the sea for it—expertise Chinese engineers excel in through their long, and intensely controversial, exertions in islands across the South China Sea. The master plan involves building an international financial centre not far from Colombo harbour and is pending approval by Sri Lanka’s newly-elected parliament. With the ruling party having a two-thirds majority, there is no reason why it won’t sail through.

Yet there has been disquiet in many quarters in Lanka over the unviable debt burden China imposes on partners—a concern experts across the world have long since flagged. In fact, president Gotabaya himself is opposed to frittering away the nation’s resources through bad financial arr­angements. The Chinese built and fin­anced Hambantota port in Mahinda Rajapaksa’s constituency is a primeexample. Unable to repay its debt, Colombo had no option but to negotiate a 99-year lease of the port to China. China now holds 86 per cent of the stakes in Hambantota. Gotabaya, it seems, is determined not to repeat the folly. He’s resolved to ensure that in future the government would have a 51 per cent holding in all strategic assets. For the moment, India and Sri Lanka are on the same page, but China’s shadow continues to loom large across the Indo-Pacific.