Amid Jharkhand's Hindutva Vs Adivasi Identity Battle, A New 'Other' Emerges

Jagarnath Murmu, a 39-year-old Santhal man, works as a security guard in a gated society in the Kanke area of Ranchi, the capital city of Jharkhand. With the Diwali baksheesh he received from residents, he plans to buy himself a new pair of pants and a shirt. Unlike previous years, however, he has decided not to purchase from a Muslim-owned store. Curious about this change, I ask him why. He replies, “I saw it on my phone—they are beating Hindus in Bangladesh, and here in Jharkhand, they are marrying our daughters and grabbing lands.” When I press him further, asking if he believes everything he saw on his phone, his colleague, Sonu Mahto, a 32-year-old guard from the Bero block of Ranchi district, interjects. “Muslims are like that,” Mahto says. “They want to dominate and control everything. They are kattar (hardline), and we Adivasi-Moolvasi (non-Adivasi natives) people cannot match their cunning or their power.” Murmu nods approvingly, adding, “We need to be careful.”

With just over a week left before the first phase of polling in Jharkhand’s hotly contested Assembly elections—a showdown between the JMM-led INDIA Bloc alliance and the BJP-led NDA alliance—sentiments around religious and ethnic tensions, while not universal, are increasingly prevalent. Following the JMM’s victory in the 2019 assembly elections and the INDIA Bloc alliance’s gains in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, where the BJP lost all five Scheduled Tribe-reserved seats, the BJP appears more resolute than ever in its bid to unseat the JMM-led coalition government. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, now leading the BJP’s campaign strategy in Jharkhand, has spearheaded a highly polarising narrative. High-profile leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union Home Minister Amit Shah, have visited Jharkhand multiple times recently and are scheduled for another visit before the end of the campaign. Meanwhile, the BJP’s media cell has been working tirelessly, using social media as a potent tool to amplify messages centered around the perceived demographic threat of “Bangladeshi infiltration”, accusations of JMM’s appeasement of Muslims, and allegations of endemic corruption in the JMM-led regime. These narratives have steadily permeated the public discourse, shaping everyday perspectives and influencing opinions, such as those of Jagarnath and Mahto, who express growing distrust towards Muslims.

Insider-Outsider Dynamic: A New “Other”

The entire Hindutva ecosystem in Jharkhand, under the RSS’ leadership, has mobilised to reinforce these themes. Known for framing local issues through a Hindutva lens, Sarma has aggressively reoriented Jharkhand’s historic insider-outsider dynamic—a theme that has animated politics in the region since the inception of the Jharkhand Movement in the 1930s—to support the BJP’s agenda. In this election, Sarma has attempted to change the local political narrative of portraying diku (irritating/exploitative outsider) as dominant caste groups from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Bengal to casting Muslims, particularly the spectre of “Bangladeshi infiltrators”, as the new existential threat. Through narratives of “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad”, the BJP alleges that Muslim outsiders are marrying Adivasi women and seizing Adivasi lands, effectively shifting the discourse to portray the JMM-led INDIA Bloc alliance as appeasers of these supposed threats. By tapping into both local anxieties and Hindu nationalistic fervour, the BJP is taking a calculated approach to reshape Jharkhand’s political landscape, aiming to fracture traditional alliances and consolidate its support among Adivasis, OBC Hindus, and SCs as the elections approach.

Historically, the figure of the diku—an outsider perceived as exploiting Jharkhand’s resources and people—referred to dominant groups from outside the state, solidifying the Jharkhandi identity against them. The BJP, which has traditionally drawn support from many of these so-called diku communities, has often sidestepped this narrative by instead focusing on Christian missionaries, accusing them of engaging in forced and fraudulent conversions among Adivasis. However, in this election, the BJP has shifted its approach, positioning “Bangladeshi infiltrators” as the major outsider threat. These alleged infiltrators are portrayed as marrying Adivasi women through so-called “Love Jihad” and seizing Adivasi land in what the BJP brands as “Land Jihad.” The Muslim “other”—particularly the figure of the “Bangladeshi Muslim”—has now been layered over the Christian “other”, which was previously the BJP’s primary target in its efforts to divide the Adivasi vote.

Top BJP leaders and local party representatives have amplified this narrative, accusing Chief Minister Hemant Soren of appeasing Muslims and supporting demographic changes in Jharkhand through unchecked “Bangladeshi infiltration”. Addressing a crowd in Sahibganj on September 20, Shah referenced these regional tensions, stating, “In Pakur district, slogans are being raised asking

Hindus and Adivasis to leave Jharkhand. Tell me, does this land belong to Adivasis or to Rohingya and Bangladeshi infiltrators?” This remark immediately drew backlash, with Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodging a formal protest, expressing “serious reservations, deep hurt, and extreme displeasure” to India’s Deputy High Commissioner in Dhaka.

In response, civil society organisations like the Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha have contested the BJP’s infiltration claims, arguing that accusations of “land jihad” and “love jihad” lack any factual basis. They maintain that the tensions in Jharkhand stem from local inter-group dynamics rather than any organised conspiracies. Political commentators and academics suggest that while this brand of communal polarisation might provide some traction for the BJP in the Santhal Pargana region, it lacks the depth to be a game-changer in Jharkhand’s complex socio-political landscape. However, based on field observations and a close examination of the Hindutva ecosystem in Jharkhand, it appears that the BJP has made a calculated political move by framing the “Bangladeshi infiltrator” as a new threat and intensifying the demonisation of Muslims.

BJP’s Campaign Strategy: Targeting Regional Anxieties 

The BJP’s portrayal of Muslims as the “other” is driven by specific socio-political calculations that extend beyond its ideological commitment to Hindutva. Although Muslims constitute 14.5 per cent of Jharkhand’s population, they are particularly concentrated in the Santhal Pargana region, which has 18 assembly seats and is regarded as a stronghold of the JMM. In this region, Muslims have coexisted with Adivasis for generations, and in recent elections, they have often aligned with Adivasis to support parties like the JMM and the Congress. By demonising Muslims and amplifying fears of demographic decline among Adivasis, the BJP seeks to fracture this alliance, hoping to pull Adivasi support away from these parties. 

Additionally, Muslims represent a socially significant minority in other parts of Jharkhand, particularly in regions like South Chotanagpur Division and urban centers such as Ranchi, Hazaribagh and Jamshedpur—areas with a history of communal tensions. Through its anti-Muslim rhetoric, the BJP aims to rally communities against Muslims to strengthen its foothold in these urban constituencies, tapping into underlying resentments in areas that have experienced communal conflicts in the past. 

This strategy also taps into recent shifts in community dynamics. For generations, Muslims in Jharkhand were relatively well-integrated with Adivasi-Moolvasi communities. However, tensions have grown recently, driven by the Hinduisation of Adivasi communities through RSS-affiliated and other Hindu organisations, as well as a rise in Muslim identity assertion in response to increased marginalisation at the regional and national level. By highlighting these emerging divides, the BJP’s campaign is designed to amplify inter-community rifts within Jharkhand’s social landscape. 

Finally, the BJP’s strategy takes into account the economic influence of Muslims, particularly OBC groups like the Ansaris and Kalals, who play a significant role in Jharkhand’s migration networks. These communities manage informal networks that recruit migrant labour for infrastructure and private building projects and have established a strong presence in local markets, especially in Santhal Pargana and South Chotanagpur. This economic prominence has created resentment among certain Adivasi and lower-caste Hindu communities, which the BJP seeks to exploit by portraying Muslims as competitors for resources and economic opportunities. 

JMM’s Jharkhandi Identity vs BJP’s Hindutva Narrative

Despite the BJP’s extensive and aggressive campaign in the run-up to Jharkhand’s assembly elections—backed by the RSS’s strong organisational network and a dedicated party cadre—dislodging the JMM-led INDIA Bloc alliance appears to be an uphill battle. The stakes are high for the BJP, as Soren’s government has consistently challenged Hindutva’s core ideological foundations by emphasising Jharkhand’s distinct regional identity and prioritising the demands of the Adivasi-Moolvasi population. Soren’s strategy focuses on consolidating support among these groups by reviving the “Jharkhandi” identity, which was central to the statehood movement. 

The JMM-led government’s key political moves include the 2020 Sarna Code resolution, which seeks formal recognition of a distinct religious identity for Adivasis in the upcoming census. This initiative challenges Hindu nationalist narratives that attempt to assimilate Adivasis within Hinduism. Additionally, the JMM has introduced two significant bills, which, although currently facing political and legal obstacles, demonstrate a commitment to reinforcing Jharkhand’s regional identity. The first bill proposes a domicile policy based on 1932 land records, defining “Jharkhandi” status and providing preferential access to government jobs for locals, directly countering the BJP’s resistance to regionalist policies. The second bill seeks to raise reservation quotas to 77 per cent, addressing longstanding grievances of Moolvasi communities, particularly the OBCs and the SCs, who feel marginalised in the Adivasi-centered political landscape of Jharkhand. This move is also a calculated effort to curb the BJP’s growing influence among these communities and to strengthen the JMM’s support base. 

Through these strategic measures, the JMM aims to refocus the political discourse around a Jharkhandi identity rooted in regional autonomy and social equity, contrasting with the BJP’s approach, which emphasises broader communal and nationalist themes. As the JMM frames the BJP as an outsider force and the BJP accuses the JMM of appeasing Muslim outsiders, supported by turncoats like former Chief Minister Champai Soren, the upcoming election promises to be a close and high-stakes contest for control of Jharkhand’s political future. 

(The author is a PhD student of sociology at IIT Bombay and an Academic Fellow at the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru) 

(Views expressed are personal)