Blinkered Lights

Vulnerable EVMs

Hackers say chips, display board can be tampered with strongroom access

Tampering During Assembly

• Basic US, Japanese-made computer chips can be replaced with duplicate ones programmed with “software that counts (electronic) votes dishonestly”. But requires bribing and complicity of people at various stages till the EVMs are finally assembled.

• It is possible to replace the main board of an EVM within 10 minutes

• Replacing entire EVM units is difficult as its outer shell is tough to replicate except in a large operation.

Attacks Demonstrated

• In a video available online, experts constructed and swapped EVM’s display board with a duplicate. The new board shows the total votes polled but could be manipulated to favour specific candidates. Android phones can hack EVMs over Bluetooth to change the result.

• In another attack, a small, simple clip-on device was attached to the EVM’s microchip to detect the number of votes cast, erase the records and issue fresh votes within seconds. This is possible after polling and if there is a long gap between polling and counting.

• Previous studies abroad have demonstrated how seals, similar to the ones used on EVMs can be removed and replaced without detection.

EVMs manufactured by: Bharat Electronics Ltd & Electronics Corporation of India Ltd; Study date: 2010. Study by: Hari Prasad, Jop Gonggrijp, Alex Halderman

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Why doesn’t the Election Commission of India start the widespread use of a voter-verifiable paper trail of electronic voting machines despite a Supreme Court order? The campaign for the Delhi state assembly elections dragged at least one undemocratic skeleton out of the closet—the compromised security of electronic voting machines (EVMs). This creates suspicion about the sanctity of elections, despite the presence of security personnel at the booths and strongrooms where the voting devices are stored.

A week before the Delhi polls, AAP convenor Arvind Kej­riwal alleged security issues regarding four EVMs in the Delhi Can­t­onment constituency. For­mer NSG commando Surendra Singh contested and won this seat on an AAP ticket.

“When I pressed the button next to the AAP symbol, the light next to the BJP symbol lit up,” alleges Neeraj Kumar, a volunteer in Surendra’s team. Neeraj says he saw this happening in four of the 13 machines at the polling booth in IITD, Dwarka Sector-9. An election official present there apparently told him it was a malfunction and that those units would be replaced. AAP members lodged a formal complaint and informed party leaders, leading to the buzz on social media.

Kejriwal’s Twitter post on the incid­ent went viral. It read: “Large-scale EVM tampering? Yes, during inspection of EVMs in Del Cant, in 4 machines, whatever button u pressed, light aga­i­nst BJP lit (sic).” AAP leaders met with election officials fearing EVM tampering by the BJP. (Interestingly, it was BJP leader L.K. Advani who had first alle­ged that EVMs could be tampered with, way back in 2009.)

The AAP wanted that there should be banners and posters outside each booth warning of possible tampering, how to identify it and what to do in such a situation. On February 2, the EC also uploaded a 2012 notice to its website which laid down the procedure for complaints against malfunctioning EVMs.

In a letter to Kejriwal, ec officials rejected the AAP contention that the machines had been compromised. It merely said that three control units and four voting units had been replaced due to broken locks and defective buttons. The EC said the defects were physical, connected to the hardware. It said the machines were neither tampered with, nor was it possible to tamper with them.

This is not the first time the EC has rejected such allegations, claiming its machines to be “100 per cent tamper-proof”. After a group of electronic security experts conducted and released an independent study, with videos, demonstrating how a moderat­ely skilled technician could hack into the EVM, the EC shifted its standard line. It then claimed that “physical security” of EVMs and the procedure followed made it impossible to tamper with them. This includes guarding of the boxes by security personnel and locks in a strongroom, “trust in the election officials” and seals on the EVMs—the supposed safeguards for one of the biggest democratic exercises in the world. 

The EC took the same stand in its letter to Kejriwal—that the invulnerable EVMs were stored in a guarded strongroom after being sealed in the presence of the agents of election candidates and accessed only in their presence.

The independent study on EVM secur­ity dates back to 2009-10 and was cond­ucted by Hyderabad-based ent­r­epreneur Hari Krishna Prasad;  assistant professor of computer science and engineering, University of Michigan, Alex Halderman; and communications security expert Jop Gonggrijp (see box).

Hari Prasad was arrested for trespassing and theft of an EVM and kept in police custody for seven days to force him to name his source. (India is yet to enforce whistleblower protection laws). Halder­man and Gonggrijp were labelled cons­pirators out to destabilise India and intelligence agencies were directed to probe them. During a later visit, the two were detained for 12 hours at Delhi airport, despite having valid visas. Finally, they were allowed entry into the country following US government intervention.

“Studying India’s EVMs is hard mainly because the EC is likely to continue to be uninterested in making available machi­nes for independent study. We believe the existing design cannot ever be secure and that even the broader DRE principle that underlies the design cannot ever produce a voting machine that warrants the level of trust a democratic society would need to place in it,” says Gonggrijp.

The paper on Indian EVMs recommended that India switch to a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) system with the EVMs. VVPAT prints a paper record of the vote generated by the button click on an EVM and the voter can see the paper physically. The paper vote can be counted physically in addition to the electronic ballot. One of the engineers who assisted in the independent study on EVMs, Anil Kankipati, says the ec had shown them EVMs with VVPAT systems and he felt satisfied with their performance because of the physical verification factor involved.

In an October 2013 judgement, the Supreme Court had directed the EC to start using the VVPAT system on EVMs to instil voter confidence. The EC said it would do so in a phased manner. According to a former EC official, the commission already has EVMs with VVPAT. They were used as a pilot project in the 2013 byelections in Nagaland and Mizoram and some constituencies in the 2013 Delhi assembly elections.

 Indeed, VVPAT EVMs were also used in the 2015 Delhi state assembly elections and, in fact, at the same Delhi Cantonment constituency as well. But the ex-EC official says all of Delhi could have been covered this time around.

Most of the developed world, including Germany, Netherlands, Ireland and also the states of California and Florida in the USA, has rejected EVMs after using or studying them and finding them unsafe. Indeed, a return to the paper ballot or use of the VVPAT systems may be the best alternative for India.