Interestingly, it is very rare to find the phrase Islamophobia in the vast bulk of scholarship on the subject of Hindu-Muslim violence in India or South Asia that occurred during the 20th century and after. The prominent explanatory term deployed for this has been ‘communalism’. During the 20th century, there are two movements that created fertile conditions for widespread Hindu-Muslim violence. The first one was the separate Muslim homeland movement, also called the Pakistan movement which took place in the first half of the twentieth century culminating in the 1940s. The great debate that took place between Gandhi, Nehru and Maulana Azad versus Mohammad Ali Jinnah is widely interpreted as a debate over India’s communal problem—not Islamophobia in any particular sense. The Hindu Right was very much part of this conversation, but it became hegemonic in the second movement, the Ayodhya movement (also known as the Babri Masjid-Ram Janambhoomi movement) that flourished during the latter half of the 20th century causing a great deal of Hindu-Muslim violence directly or indirectly, and continues to spawn even now. It is also explained as a communal problem, mainly by secular scholarship. In both instances, particularly in the second one, one would find evidence of plenty of Islamophobia. But the dominant argument is about India’s growing communalism, and its more dignified parallel concept called Hindu nationalism. To make sense of the Indian variant of Islamophobia, it is vital to examine its relationship with the notion of communalism—particularly their points of convergence. It will be safer to argue that Islamophobia existed all along, but its manifestations as a prominent phenomenon took place during the Ayodhya movement in the 1980s and later, with abuses such as Babar’s santan and Aurangzeb’s aulad gaining public currency in political conversations. Maharashtra’s deputy chief minister Devendra Fadnavis’ use of the phrase, “Aurangzeb ki aulad” during the Kolhapur violence in June 2023 is a good example.