The PLA, on the other hand, has three physical—land, air and sea—and three virtual war domains of cyber, space and electromagnetic spectrum, for combat. Having kept its sights high after it was shell-shocked by the spectacular display of US-led forces in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, the PLA quickly realised that since it could not match the US military’s technological superiority, the way forward to meet the US challenge someday was by destroying its advantage. Since the US military’s superiority lay in its network centricity (ability to integrate all sensors, shooters and command post in real time for quick decision making leading to destruction of targets), the PLA devised what came to be known as ‘systems destruction warfare’. It is the capability to cripple US battle network’s command, control, communication, computers and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems—to deny or delay information to the enemy, which is crucial for timely decision making in war. This was sought to be done by both non-kinetic and kinetic means, namely, by focussing on cyber, space and electronic warfare, and missile (ballistic and cruise) capabilities. By early 2000, the PLA’s capabilities meant to incapacitate the enemy, suddenly and totally, by denying him information, instead of fighting him directly, had caught the US military’s attention, who called it ‘assassin’s mace’.