Majority V/s Minority

It is a new round of war over territory in Assam. In this ethnicallypolarised state, local politics and probable, yet unconfirmed involvement offormer and active insurgent groups, is fuelling the existing schism between thetwo communities, the Bodos -- the largest plains tribe in the state settledprimarily in the north bank of the Brahmaputra river -- and immigrant Muslimsettlers. On last available reports at the time of writing, 40 persons from bothcommunities had been killed in the north Assam districts of Udalguri and Darrang,located about 100 kilometres from the state capital, Dispur. 

Clashes started between the two communities on October 3 at Bhalukmari andMohanbari villages of Udalguri district following rumours that a Bodo youth wasmissing. Though the youth was later traced and found to be safe, peoplebelonging to two communities indulged in competitive arson at Ikrabari, guttinga total of 40 houses. Precipitating the already charged situation, a Muslimyouth, Abdul Jabbar, was stabbed to death within the premises of the deputycommissioner’s office in Udalguri. There was no stopping the violence afterthis, in spite of the initial deployment of police personnel and theirsubsequent reinforcement by five companies of the para-military Central ReservePolice Force (CRPF) and 11 columns of army personnel. 

Since October 3, violence has affected 35 villages and led to the death of 40persons, 17 killed in clashes between armed mobs carrying bows and arrows,spears, machetes, and even guns and the remaining 15 in police firing.Unofficial counts, however, put the toll well past 50. The wave of violence hasforced almost 80,000 people from both communities to take shelter in 36 reliefcamps (22 in Udalguri and 14 in Darrang districts) set up by the government. Theworst affected areas include Rowta, Dalgaon, Kharupetia, Bhakatpara and Udalguri.Fresh reports indicate that the violence was gradually spreading into theadjoining Baksa district -- which has significant Bodo and Muslim populations --as well. 

The violence has followed a ‘majority attacking the minority’ pattern inboth the districts. In Darrang, with over 35 percent Muslims and a far smallerBodo presence, it was mainly Muslim mobs that attacked tribal villages. However,in Udalgiri district, which was carved out of Darrang district in 2004, has aBodo population in excess of 50 percent and Muslim settlers are in a distinctminority. Here the Bodo population went on a rampage against the Muslims.

Ethnic violence in the Bodo heartland of Assam has a long history. The BodoAccord of 1993, which attempted to bring end to years of arson, violence andinstability led by the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), which had commenced in1986, sought to identify areas where the Bodo population exceeded 50 percent as‘Bodo Areas’ to be brought under the direct administration of the BodoAutonomous Council (BAC). An unintentional result of this provision has led torecurring and organised ethnic cleansing in areas where the Bodos do not yetconstitute 50 percent of the population. The willing participants in thesemovements have been Bodo leaders, drawn either from political or community basedorganisations or insurgent factions. Their targets have sometimes have been theadivasis (tribals from outside the state brought to work in the tea plantations)and sometimes, the Muslims (Bangladeshis or otherwise).

It is important to note that majority of the Muslim victims in the current spateof violence (loosely referred to as Bangladeshi Muslims by the media) are ofEast Bengal (which later became East Pakistan) origin. They had migrated intoAssam much before the creation of Bangladesh. As per the agreements of the AssamAccord, "All persons who come to Assam prior to 1.1.1966, including thoseamongst them whose names appeared on the electoral rolls used in 1967 electionsshall be regularised." This makes these migrant settlers bona fide Indiancitizens, notwithstanding their origin. 

Contrary to media reports, which have linked the violence to the overall problemof illegal migration from Bangladesh and its concomitant pressures on the nativepopulation, this spate of violence thus, needs to be analysed from the point ofBodo aspiration to secure or sustain their majority in areas in and adjoiningthe Bodo heartland.

Reports indicate that people of both communities are confronting each other withfull preparation. Both have access to sharp weapons, bows and arrows, a factwhich further reinforces the claim that it is just not an assault by a dominantgroup on hamlets of vulnerable migrant population, but almost an equal fightbetween two well-prepared communities.

Two months earlier, in August 2008, Bodo majority areas in Assam had witnessed asimilar violence, albeit of lesser intensity. At least seven people were killedand 50 injured in a series of clashes between both communities in Darrang,Udalguri and Kokrakhar and Sonitpur districts. Violence on that occasion hadstarted on August 14 in the Udalguri district, when two Bodo boys were killed ina clash during a 12-hour shutdown called by a little-known organisation, theMuslim Students’ Union of Assam, against the harassment of genuine IndianMuslims in the state. Nearly 5,000 people fled their homes at that time andnormalcy was restored only after a fortnight. 

Divisive politics in the Bodo heartland, between the erstwhile Bodo LiberationTigers (BLT) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) cadres -- bothoperating under ceasefire agreements with the government -- is also gettingintertwined in the entire issue. The BLT, after a seven-year insurgent campaign,had settled for a peace deal with the government of India, which led to theestablishment of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in December 2003. TheBTC comprises four districts -- Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri. The BTCwas the second such attempt at providing the Bodos -- the largest plains tribein Assam -- with an autonomous self-governing body, after the 1993 Bodo Accordbetween the Union and state governments and the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU),which had led to the setting up of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC).Internal divisions among the Bodos led to the collapse of the BAC. 

The BLT surrendered en masse just before the establishment of the BTC inDecember 2003. The Bodo movement however, split into two factions, one under theleadership of Hagrama Mohillary and Chandan Brahma, who formed the BodolandPeople’s Party (BPP) and took control of the BTC with the backing of theCongress; and the second faction, the Bodoland People's Progressive Front (BPPF),led by moderates Rabiram and U.G. Brahma, which was sidelined as they faredpoorly in the 2006 state Legislative Assembly polls. Both factions continue toaccuse each other of fomenting trouble in the area. 

The other key player in the Bodo heartland, the NDFB has been 22 years inexistence. On May 25, 2005, this outfit signed a cease-fire agreement, with theUnion and Assam governments. The NDFB’s over-ground status bothers the BPP toa considerable extent, not just because of the low-level violence that continuesbetween NDFB and former BLT cadres, but also as a result of the complicationsthe NDFB’s eventual political agreement with the government is likely tocreate for Hagrama Mohillary and co. Unsurprisingly, Hagrama Mohillary, onOctober 4, pointed to an NDFB role in the continuing violence and asked theAssam government to call off the ceasefire with the outfit. 

The Assam government, BPP’s political partner, echoed Mohillary’s concerns.Assam government spokesman and health minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, on October5, stated that the violence in Udalguri and Darrang was "not an ethnicconflict", but rather the result of a planned ethnic cleansing by the NDFBto drive out all non-Bodos from the area: "This is not a clash betweenHindus and immigrant Bangladeshi Muslims as projected, but a systematic pogromby the NDFB, as many of the people affected by the violence are genuine AssameseMuslims, Bengali Hindus, common Bodos, besides a few Adivasis (tea plantationtribals) as well." The minister’s conclusion relied heavily on the"use of guns" by the attackers as he painstakingly explained that noneexcept for the militants had access to such weapons in the area. The ministeralso announced that four NDFB cadres had been arrested in this connection. Onthe same day, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi stated that the ceasefire agreementwith the NDFB was under review in view of its participation in violence.

On the face of it, the NDFB’s capacity to initiate and sustain such a‘pogrom’ is doubtful. A bulk of its cadres is settled in three designatedcamps set up by the Assam government. Others live in their respective villages,complaining of inadequate space and facilities in the camps. Even thoughoccasional clashes between the former BLT and NDFB cadres have taken place onseveral occasions, it is highly improbable that the outfit would be central towidespread violence in areas closely monitored by the BLT and also by the Assamgovernment. NDFB, moreover, is an outfit consisting of the minority Christiansegment among the Bodos and has little antipathy towards the Muslims. Moreover,the NDFB’s top leadership, including ‘chairman’ Ranjan Daimary, is stillbased in Bangladesh and is unlikely to participate in any movement which targetsthe migrant settlers, who are alleged to be drawn from Bangladesh. 

In the immediate future, the clashes between the two communities are likely toreduce in intensity solely due to the large presence of Security Forces in theaffected areas. However, the recurrence of violence in the near future -- andperiodic reverberations in years to come -- cannot be ruled out. 

The state government’s knee-jerk responses are being executed at a war footingin Assam. Customary requests for rushing in CPMF companies have already beenplaced with the union home ministry. The deputy commissioner of Udalguri hasbeen transferred and the police chief of the district suspended. In all, thespate of violence has exposed the state government’s lack of preparedness todeal with the sudden outburst of violence, and this is particular cause forconcern in view of similar communal clashes that rocked the same districts justtwo months ago. To blame it all on an outfit, 90 per cent of whose cadres areoverground, is nothing less than evasive and dishonest, an attempt to cover upthe utter failure of administration over several years

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia TerrorismPortal