Crime Against Humanity
Volume 2 An inquiry into the carnage in Gujarat -- Findings And Recommendations by Concerned Citizens Tribunal -Gujarat 2002
Introduction
1. Selective Targeting of Muslims
2. Brutality and Bestiality of Attacks
3. Unprecedented Scale andDegree of Violence – Ethnic Cleansing
4. Looting and Destruction of Property
5. Military Precision and Planning behindAttacks
6. Complicity of Civil Society
7. Role of the RSS/VHP/BD/BJP
8. Use of Hindu Religious Symbols
9. Use of Hate Speech and Hate Writing
10. Mobilisation of Women, Adivasis and Dalits
11. Preparation for violence –Immediate and Long Term:
A noticeable feature of the Gujarat carnage is the distinct and similar patterns thathave emerged from different parts of the state. While some local conditions and socio-economic factors do differentiate the attacks from one place to another, detailed andextensive evidence before the Tribunal points to the overwhelming and sinister simi-larity behind the attacks that were engineered and launched. This is evident in themanner in which innocent people were quarterised, sometimes sexually violated andkilled; in the ammunition used for the gory killings and the arson; in the immediateand long-term preparations for the violence. All these are detailed below:
1. Selective Targeting of Muslims.
2. Brutality and Bestiality of Attacks.
3. Unprecedented Scale and Degree of Violence — Ethnic Cleansing.
4. Looting and Destruction of Property.
5. Military Precision and Planning behind Attacks.
6. Complicity of Civil Society.
7. Role of the RSS/VHP/BD/BJP.
8. Use of Hindu Religious Symbols.
9. Use of Hate Speech and Hate Writing.
10. Mobilisation of Women, Adivasis and Dalits.
1.1. From the extensive evidence recorded by the Tribunal, it is clear that Muslimsfrom all social strata, rich and poor, were the prime targets for the state-sponsoredpogrom unleashed all over the state of Gujarat. From cities and towns to villages, beit the question of life, dignity or property, barring few exceptions, Muslims were thesole target. While the targeting of economically better off Muslims was limited totheir property, and this damage was vast and extensive (the carnage in Gulberg soci-ety, where former MP Ahsan Jafri was specifically targeted, being an exception), thelower middle class and the working class sector, be it in urban centres or villages,faced attacks on their life, property and dignity. Except in the few cases where someHindu establishments were targeted (in the immediate vicinity of areas that havebeen converted into Muslim ghettos), in cities like Ahmedabad and Vadodara, therecent carnage was marked (unlike earlier rounds of violence where sections of bothcommunities were affected) by the selective targeting of Muslim lives, Muslim homes,Muslim business establishments and Muslim properties. Whether it was on the poshCG Road of Ahmedabad, the main streets of Bharuch, Ankleshwar and Vadodara, orthe villages of Kheda district or the Panchmahal, small and large farms and proper-ties, homes and shops, only of Muslims were the target of marauding mobs. A poten-tially gruesome tragedy, where the rampaging mobs nearly set upon and burnt alive 70children in a Muslim-run orphanage in the city of Bhavnagar, was averted by a con-scientious police official loyal to his uniform, is worthy of mention here. For havingshown exemplary courage and saving innocent lives, the SP Bhavnagar, Rahul Sharmawas ‘rewarded’ with a summary transfer.
1.2. In most places, Hindu houses amongst Muslim bastis had been marked outbefore the attacks using saffron flags, or pictures of Ram and Hanuman, or withcrosses. Evidence before the Tribunal shows that in some places this marking wasdone a few days before February 27 and which was the ostensible justification for the‘retaliation’. These markings were to avoid inadvertent attacks on Hindu homes andbusinesses in areas that were targeted later.There was no damage whatsoever to the Hindu houses so marked. Months later,saffron flags were still aflutter in many villages of Gujarat and it is evident how theattacks and destruction were carried out so that the Hindu houses were not damaged. Insome villages, the adjoining Hindu houses were first sawed away from the Muslim housesbefore the latter were set on fire. Each attack, therefore, took not just extensive plan-ning but also several hours to execute, which further indicates an abdication of respon-sibility by the police in its failure to come to the rescue of the targeted community.
1.3. From the state wide evidence earlier recorded and placed before us, it is alsoclear that apart from the lives of Muslims, several symbols of India’s composite cul-ture were deliberate targets during the carnage in Gujarat. The durgahs (shrines) ofSufi saints that are revered by persons from all communities, especially the oppressedcastes, deserve special mention here.
1.4. The other targets of violence were couples who had entered into inter-commu-nity marriages. Evidence was specifically placed before us about the shameful strip-ping, gross sexual abuse and subsequent quartering and killing of Geeta (Mumtazbano),a Hindu woman from Ahmedabad who had married a Muslim man, Salim. The couplewas tricked into visiting her family on April 5. They were set upon while travelling ona scooter. Geeta died while Salim survived.
1.5. Violence against mixed couples has become common all over Gujarat and theissue of inter-religious marriage has become part of the hate propaganda againstMuslims and those Hindus who enter into or accept such marriages.
2.1. The Tribunal recorded over 1,500 testimonies of eye-witnesses, victims and sur-vivors of the violence from Ahmedabad, Kheda, Mehsana, Himmatnagar, Sabarkantha,Banaskantha, Vadodara, Godhra, Bharuch, Ankleshwar, Patan, Anand, Bhavnagar,Rajkot and elsewhere. This includes the written evidence collected by others and placedbefore us. The widespread violence that targeted Muslims in urban and rural Gujaratwas marked by utter bestiality and brutality. We have recorded evidence from NarodaPatiya in Ahmedabad, as also from witnesses from Kheda, Bharuch, Ankleshwar,Panchmahal, Mehsana, Sabarkantha, Banaskantha and Vadodara, that training campswere conducted by the Bajrang Dal and the VHP, backed by the RSS and supported bydemocratically elected representatives from the ruling BJP. The camps were often con-ducted in temples. The aim was to generate intense hatred against Muslims painted as‘the enemy’, because of which violence was both glorified through the distribution oftrishuls and swords, and justified as the legitimate means to self-defence.
2.2. In the attacks all over Gujarat, as recorded before the Tribunal, areas werebesieged for 7-8 hours, by mobs of over a few thousand (this varied in different casesbut the marked similarity was the scale of the attackers). In all the cases, the leadersof the mobs co-ordinating and supervising the transport of gas cylinders, trishuls andtalwars, chemicals and gelatine sticks have been identified by witnesses and survivorsas prominent leaders and elected representatives from the BJP or leaders of the VHP,Bajrang Dal or the RSS. In most cases, there was large-scale mobilisation from localareas; neighbours attacked neighbours even though outsiders were called in to makeup the numbers; rapes, too, were carried out by known figures from the village orlocality. This, too, was the result of definite planning, intended to terrorise completelyand to destroy the faith of the survivors in co-existence or living in neighbourhoodsthat had been their homes, for centuries in many cases.
2.3. Women and young girls were targeted brutally, as were children. Evidencerecorded before us shows how in the macabre dance of death, human beings werequartered and the killing protracted while the terrorised survivors looked on; the per-sons targeted were dragged or paraded naked through the neighbourhood; victimswere urinated upon, before being finally cut to pieces and burnt. Hundreds of testi-monies before us show how this manner and method of killing has left an indelibleimprint on the minds of the survivors, who saw their near and loved ones killed and,that too, in such a fashion. These are images that have the potential to haunt, traumatiseand enrage the survivors. In the case of the now well-known Gulberg society, whereformer MP Ahsan Jafri was killed along with 60 others (estimate of independentsources), after the housing colony was set upon, the massacre orchestrated, and thesurvivors had finally managed to escape in the evening, the skulls of those killed wereused by some in the neighbourhood to play cricket with. (See section on Incidents ofViolence, Volume I). It would be relevant here to record that whether it was the killingsat Naroda Gaon, Naroda Patiya or Gulberg society in Chamanpura, Ahmedabad, Odein Anand district, Visnagar, Kadi, Sardarpura or Kidiad in Mehsana district, in Pandharwada, or on the highways of Panchmahal district, or in scores of other placeswhere lives of persons were taken, the killings were effected in a bestial fashion,suggesting systematic training aimed at the demonisation of Muslims and their subse-quent terrorising.
2.4. Muslim men, women and children were killed by stabbing, in private or policefiring, or by burning them alive. Evidence before the Tribunal shows that the burningalive of victims was widespread. This is not accidental. For the victim community,Muslims, who bury their dead, the killing by burning was meant to annihilate as alsoto terrorise and establish dominance over the entire community. When 6-year-oldIrfan asked for water, his assailants at Naroda Patiya made him forcibly drink kero-sene, or some other inflammable liquid, before a lit match was thrown inside his gulletto make him explode within. Such brutality, which was encouraged or condoned bythe government in power, is now cynically being denied.
2.5. Bodies of victims were dismembered in a merciless fashion before they werefinally killed. Women and children were especially subject to this; women were notjust raped but all kinds of objects and instruments were brutally inserted into theirbodies. There were instances where young children, even infants, were hoisted onswords or trishuls before being flung into flames.
3.1. The Tribunal recorded evidence from more than 16 districts of Gujarat. From theevidence placed before us it is clear that starting from February 28, within the first 72hours, even as Shri Modi claimed the situation to be under control, there was unprec-edented loss of life and property. Thereafter, violence continued in 3-4 distinct stagesright up to mid-May. Even the hearings of the Tribunal in the first half of May werepreceded by warnings to call off the Tribunal. We, too, had to ask for state security.
3.2. To cause the maximum possible damage swiftly and comprehensively, a pow-dery-white chemical was widely used, which not only burnt human beings to the bone,but even cement houses were completely burnt down. From Vatwa to Gulberg soci-ety in Chamanpura, Ahmedabad, to far-flung district-places like Ode, Sardarpura andparts of Vadodara, we have recorded evidence of the use of this powdery-white chemi-cal. When Tribunal members visited Gulberg society on May 5, the compound of thesociety was littered with small bottles with remnants of a whitish powder inside.From Vatwa we collected not only evidence of use of this powder but also ingeniouselectrical wiring to ensure that all 65 homes of the Vohra Muslim Burhani societycaught fire almost simultaneously. During our visit to Ankleshwar, a few days later,we recorded testimonies of many victims who said that in the attacks in that district,gelatine sticks of the kind used in mining operations were widely used. The premedi-tated and meticulously planned attacks were obviously intended to ensure that thetargeted homes and business establishments of the minority were reduced to bareshells. A noticeable pattern in the attacks on rural farms was the total destruction ofbore-wells in such a way that it left no scope for repair of the device. The scale of the economic loss suffered by Muslims in the villages can be gauged from the fact thateach bore-well costs not less than Rs. 50,000; it can even go up to Rs 1.25 lakhs.Evidence before the Tribunal shows that, guided by leaders, the trained mobs firstsprinkled the targeted buildings with fuel drawn from kerbas (large cans/barrels), oreven a tanker in some cases, followed by a spray of acid. Immediately thereafter, a gascylinder brought along by the mobs was unsealed and tossed into the flame. Theresult was a deadly explosion that ripped buildings apart and killed a large number ofpersons on the spot. The complete destruction of the Noorani Masjid at NarodaPatiya at around 9.30 a.m. on February 28 was probably the first among the largenumber of such deadly assaults launched across the state using gas cylinders and acid.
3.3. Across Gujarat, over 1,100 Muslim-owned hotels, the homes of not less that1,00,000 families, over 15,000 small and big business establishments, around 3,000larri gallas (handcarts), and over 5,000 vehicles (private cars, trucks, taxis,autorickshaws) were badly damaged or completely destroyed in the attacks. Thesefigures, arrived at by the Tribunal through the voluminous evidence presented beforeus indicate the attempt to economically cripple a community on a scale unprecedentedin the post-independence history of communal violence in the country.
4.1. The destruction of property across Gujarat, in the most affected cities ofAhmedabad and Vadodara, as also elsewhere, was thorough and precise. The exten-sive evidence before the Tribunal shows that this, too, was part of the pattern and theplanning behind the attacks; to devastate and completely destroy the property of thetargeted Muslim section. The Tribunal has photographs and written and oral evidencethat shows how even RCC slabs of homes and shops caved in because of the inten-sity of the chemically-fuelled fires. As significant is the fact that every single Muslimhousehold and business establishment was looted before being reduced to an emptyshell. There are instances where, at the more affluent shops located on the main roads inAhmedabad or Bharuch, the middle and affluent classes among Hindus, women andgirls noticeably, were seen looting choice collections from a boutique or shop before itwas completely destroyed. Whether it was household articles painfully collected by theworking classes, or dowries that were carefully amassed over the years for girls to bemarried, the marauding mobs made sure that no recovery was possible and that to re-build their lives, the affected families would, literally, have to begin from scratch. Thiswas evident all over, whether in the Panchmahal, Himmatnagar, Mehsana, Sabarkantha,Chhotaudaipur, Anand and Kheda or in the cities of Vadodara and Ahmedabad.
4.2. Most of the attacks in the first round of violence began on the morning ofFebruary 28, or on March 1, the day of the Bharat bandh. On day one of the murderand loot, brutal state wide killings were conducted with precision. Apart from that, incities and in far-flung rural areas, evidence shows that the attacks were on the housesand business establishments of the Muslim community, which were either in Hindudominated areas like market-places or on the outskirts of villages. This was almost like a prelude or ‘warm-up’ activity for what was to follow. In most places, the attacksstarted in the afternoon, driving Muslims out of their homes. From March 1-3, in allthe affected villages, Muslims were forced to flee their homes taking nothing withthem. In the villages, people first tried to gather in the local mosque or in the fewconcrete houses that belonged to better-off Muslims. When these were also attacked,they had to flee in some available vehicles or on foot. Trees were felled to block roadsand obstruct Muslims trying to escape from the frenzied, armed mob. The way inwhich large masses of victimised Muslims were terrorised and made to flee is despi-cable in a society where democracy and secularism is said to be the norm. Although ina large number of cases, people managed to escape from their villages and reach saferplaces, many were chased, caught, killed, and sometimes even dismembered and com-pletely burnt. Women were stripped naked and repeatedly sexually assaulted by mobs.In many cases, the dead bodies have not been found.
4.3. Once the Muslims fled from their villages, mobs looted and then burnt theirhouses and shops at leisure. In many villages, houses were being torched until as lateas March 10-13, and, in some instances, even later. In every structure targeted, be it ahouse or a shop, doors, windows, window frames, grills, electric wiring, water pipes,taps, switch-boards, electric meters, all movable property, even roofs, went missing.There were traces of the chemical powders used even when Tribunal members visitedthese villages two months after the crime. Every place was burnt completely. In someplaces, even walls have been broken down. Elsewhere, only burnt, bare walls re-mained. The dwellings looked as though they had been bombed. Even bore-wellswere totally damaged or blocked. Every single tree, including all fruit-bearing trees,was cut down. The marauders made sure there was no sign of life left anywhere. Inmost places, the looting and the destruction of property went on for days after thepeople had run away from their villages. Victims deposed that many of their goodscan still be found in the homes of their Hindu neighbours but no attempt has beenmade by the state to look for them and book the culprits.
4.4. The evidence recorded before the Tribunal shows that, while Godhra provided thepretext, there was prior mobilisation of men and materials, and an organisation in placethat made possible the systematic and calculated preparations that preceded many of themassacres. The mass use of gas cylinders in Ahmedabad and many other places, evenwhile there was a shortage a fortnight before, the training needed to torch the fire-proofshowroom of Harsoliya Motors (Sabarkantha), the selection of the kind of blasting de-vices and detonators needed to destroy Muslim-owned factories and establishments in theGIDC area in Modasa (Sabarkantha) or Vatwa (Ahmedabad), while the areas were undercurfew between March 1-3; they all suggest detailed military-style pre-planning.
4.5. Take Over of Agricultural Holdings Owned By Muslims. The Tribunal has receivedevidence from across the state of Gujarat that a deliberate motive behind driving Mus-lims out of villages where they have lived for centuries, and where an economic andsocial boycott is even today being carried out, is to surreptitiously and illegally takeover landholdings held by them.
5.1. How the operations were executed: Large mobs running into thousands were led bywell-known elected representatives from the BJP, leaders of the VHP, Bajrang Daland RSS and even cabinet ministers. From the evidence before us, it is clear that theseleaders (see sections on Incidents of Violence, Volume I and List of Accused, Vol-ume II) quite often carried computer printouts of the names and addresses of Mus-lims homes and shops. Field operations were co-ordinated by a central commandusing mobile phones.
5.2. The formation of arson battalions: The evidence before the Tribunal clearly pointsto scores of key actors leading large mobs, fully aware of what they had to do andachieving their task with precision. This suggests the existence of a private, trainedmilitia running into thousands in Gujarat. A militia, moreover, established and madefighting fit through training camps, distribution of weaponry and hate propagandaglorifying violence. Weapons used in attacks, such as swords, were of the same brand,and must obviously have been distributed in advance across large tracts of the state.Thedeployment in many of the attacks of large tempos or trucks, full of hired hooligans,some local and others from UP, MP or Maharashtra, identified as such because theyspoke in Hindi or Marathi, is a worrying indicator of the scale and reach of theseunderground operations. Village-level evidence points to hired mobs, where the hoo-ligans were equipped with trishuls, iron rods and swords, carrying supplies of water,salted beans and peanuts and liquor pouches and paid Rs. 500 per day or Rs.1,000 pernight. The slogans shouted by the drunken mobs included, “Hindu baccha Ram ka,Musalman baccha haram ka!’”(“Hindus are children of Lord Ram, Muslims are bas-tards!’) and “Jai Shri Ram!”
5.3. Profile of the assailants: The leadership of large mobs running into thousandswas provided by easily identifiable elected representatives of the BJP (including cabi-net ministers), and others from the VHP, the Bajrang Dal and the RSS. From theevidence before us, it is clear that these leaders were carrying computerised sheetscontaining people’s names and addresses. Houses were marked off community-wise.Evidence regarding surveys collected in advance and details obtained through rev-enue and sales tax records, apart from electoral rolls, was placed before the Tribunal..The mobs, arriving in vehicles such as trucks, Tata Sumos, tempos, jeeps and Marutivans, were led and directed by local Hindu leaders belonging to the sangh parivar.Leaders, who used mobile phones while the attacks were being carried out, have beennamed by Muslim survivors in the complaints sent to the police by registered post orin the FIRs recorded.
5.4. The second rung comprised of the chief executioners who wielded all theweapons — guns, trishuls, swords — and handled arsenals and supplies — petrol,diesel, kerosene, chemicals and gas cylinders — for starting fires. They moved aroundin vehicles loaded with chemicals and weapons. This was the group primarily respon-sible for the brutal killings, sexual assaults and other abuses. Muslim survivors frommany villages told the Tribunal that these aggressors carried identical backpacks filled with pouches ofchemicals. The planning was so elaborate that a particular group ofpeople had been assigned only the task of loading guns.The third group was mainly involved in looting property from the houses and shops.In some of the tribal areas, this group consisted of Adivasis. In some villages, peoplesaid that not all of those who came in the mob spoke Gujarati. Some of them werealso speaking in Marathi and Hindi.
5.5. A well-financed operation: Money, in several instances, was an added factor inmobilising mobs. The Tribunal has recorded the evidence of four witnesses who at-tended training camps conducted by the VHP and the BD, often inside local temples.Swords and trishuls were sold to those attending. They were indoctrinated into beingprepared at all times to attack Muslims and assured that if someone lost his life per-forming his ‘duty’, his dependants would be paid an adequate sum of money; onewitness said that a few lakhs was promised as compensation. The propaganda and theindoctrination created fanatics who were comforted by the assurance that, were some-thing to happen to them, their family members would be well looked after. In manyvillages in Vadodara rural, Panchmahal and Dahod districts, monetary incentives andliquor were offered to Adivasis to kill Muslims. Three witnesses from Mora told theTribunal that two Sindhis from Godhra had come to Mora on the night of February28, offering money and liquor as inducement to attack Muslims and this helped inassembling mobs. They also held meetings in other areas like Methral and Suliath toplan attacks.
5.6. Such access to resources raises the critical question as to who funded these opera-tions and from where such huge resources had come from. From the evidence of ex-pert witnesses and victims recorded before the Tribunal, it is clear that groups like theRSS, the VHP and the BD have access to large sums.
5.7. The state bandh on February 28, and the Bharat bandh on March 1 — bothcalled by the VHP/BD and supported by the state BJP and the chief minister himself— helped in the killing, loot and destruction. The fear created by aggressive sloganeeringand posturing, the deathly silence and empty streets helped the trained militia to carryout their jobs with ease, unhindered by the state police.
6.1. With their relentless hate campaign, the masterminds of the violence ensuredsuch complicity from civil society in their murderous deeds, that there were very fewinstances of members of the majority community coming out to protect Muslims.This complicity was due to the following factors.
6.2. Lack of remorse: The visible lack of remorse among a large section of the Hindueducated middle-class, about the enormous human tragedy that affected such largenumbers of people in the state, is a disturbing feature of the violence in Gujarat. Thissituation is quite unlike that in other communal riots, where this social segment playeda role in the restoration of peace. In many Hindu middle-class localities, Hindus whohad social relationships with their Muslim neighbours, gave encouragement and shelter to attackers. The reality that many of these attackers were lumpen elements, ofwhom they would normally be fearful, did not seem to disturb them. There was en-thusiastic participation of middle-class Hindus in the looting of shops. Right from thebeginning of the violence, statements like, ‘a lesson needed to be taught’ and otherjustifications of the violence were often heard from middle-class Hindus, rangingfrom university teachers to petty businessmen. It is almost as if the affected peopleare the antagonistic ‘other’, beyond the pale of human ethics and morality. There is aneerie silence in which victims of the carnage appear to have been rendered invisible.
6.3. Fear and terror generated by threats and hate speech: The Tribunal has recorded evi-dence that clearly shows how Hindus who sheltered and supported affected Muslimfamilies were threatened and abused. A witness as highly placed as Shri Piyush Desai,CMD, Wagh Bakri Chai, and a corporate leader belonging to the majority community,took the lead in organising relief and mobilising men from the trading and businessgroups to initiate reconciliatory measures. Even on the day he deposed before theTribunal, May 5, Shri Desai was threatened by local VHP-BD goons and asked tostop his activities. If a man as highly placed as him could be so threatened, imagine anordinary citizen or a family wanting to help his/her neighbour. Even retired HighCourt judges and lawyers did not have the courage to come out openly against thegoons, for they, too, felt unsafe.
6.4. Tirades against peace initiatives, secularists: In their public exhortations and speeches,hate pamphlets and articles published in blatantly communal newspapers like Sandesh,and mouthpieces like Hindu Vision and Hotline, top level state functionaries in Gujaratand their minions, have specifically targeted the small number of men and womenfrom Gujarat and outside, who have stood out at this moment of crisis, speaking forsanity and reason, and against hatred.
6.5. Among those singled out for slander, abuse and threat were senior journalistsShri Batuk Vora and Shri Digant Oza from Ahmedabad, social activists Shri RohitPrajapati, Smt. Trupti Shah and Shri Jussar Bandukwala from Vadodara, Star News’political editor Shri Rajdeep Sardesai and co-editor Communalism Combat, Smt. TeestaSetalvad. In early April, danseuse Su. Mrinalini Sarabhai was targeted simply becauseshe took a serious initiative for peace in Ahmedabad. On June 11, Shri Modi stated,“Those journalists who cover Gujarat… may meet the fate of Daniel Pearl… Covercommunal riots at your own risk, look at Daniel Pearl.” This is nothing short of threatand intimidation, an utterance unworthy of the post of a chief political executive.
6.6. In this context, the Tribunal pays tribute to each one of the witnesses — fromAhmedabad and Vadodara as much as from far-flung towns and villages, in Sabarkantha,Mehsana, Himmatnagar, Bharuch, Ankleshwar, and Dahod — who ignored seriousthreats and deposed before us in their quest for justice. The Tribunal hopes that thisreport lives up to the expectation of the survivors who deposed before it in the beliefthat this would be helpful in their search for justice.
6.7. Deep polarisation within Gujarat society: The proliferation of outfits like the RSS,the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, and their sustained and unchecked hate propaganda has, unfortunately, succeeded in creating a sharp polarisation particularly in urban,middle-class Gujarati society. Local newspapers, particularly Sandesh, added to thestereotyping of the Muslim community as anti-national and terrorist. From the tes-timonies of the survivors before various fact-finding teams, and the FIRs lodged bythem, it is evident that throughout Gujarat, while the carnage was masterminded bythe Sangh Parivar and its paid hirelings, in numerous cases, Hindu neighbours, too,actively participated in the attacks on Muslims. However, in as many instances, vic-tims categorically stated that the violence was the work of outsiders.
7.1. The public exhortations to and celebrations of violence by the Sangh Parivarleadership against Muslims and Christians in recent years, and especially during thebuild up to the proposed start of the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya onMarch 15, and during and after the carnage in Gujarat, is evident from their publishedstatements that were placed before the Tribunal. (see Annexures, HateSpeech, HateWriting, Volume I, and chapter, Preparation for Violence: Hate Speech and Hate Writing, Vol-ume II). That these were not mere exhortations is apparent from the direct participa-tion in and leadership provided by many of these very people during the carnage.
8.1. Among the clear patterns that emerge from the state wide violence in Gujarat,is the widespread use of upper caste Hindu symbols: fire, to kill and burn; trishuls, asweapons of assault; ‘Hulladiya Hanuman’ (literally, ‘Riot Hanuman’) idols, to symboliseconquest over Muslim places of worship. The ethnic cleansing was premeditated andthe plan had been worked out to the last detail. The slogan, ‘Jai Shri Ram!’ was scrawledon the external walls of Hindu houses and shops, so that Muslim premises could beeasily identified at the time of attack.
8.2. Other Hindu religious symbols that were extensively used during the violenceincluded the following: shouting of ‘Jai Sri Ram!’ as a battle-cry by marauding mobsand politicians of the ruling party; forcing Muslims to chant, ‘Jai Sri Ram!’ or ‘SabseBada Hanuman!’; projection of the Godhra victims as ‘martyrs’ in the cause of Hindu-ism; aggressive and loud bhajan singing (especially on March 15, the day chosen by theVHP for shiladan in Ayodhya, but also before and after); public recitations of theHanuman Chalisa organised by those involved in looting and arson (as in Tarsali).
8.3. Shrines, mosques and madrassas, several of them dating back to Gaikwadi andeven earlier times, were damaged in the violence. In several cases of attacks onmosques, copies of the Koran was vandalised or burnt (Naroda Gaon and Patiya,Paldi, Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Raja Rani Talav, Kisanwadi, Navayard and Raghovpuravillage, Tarsali). Books, furniture and other items in mosques and durgahs were dam-aged or burnt. The installation of ‘Hulladiya Hanuman’ was evident in many religiousplaces that were attacked or destroyed. Temples were quickly constructed on de-stroyed Muslim property. In Sama, for example, on February 28, poultry shops were destroyed and a Hanuman temple was quickly raised at the same place. By the eveningof March 2, artis were being held, with bhajans blaring over loudspeakers and prasaddistributed. A ‘Hulladiya’ Ganpati was installed at the damaged Shenshani dargah onWaghodia Road. In Navayard, a mob attempted to install a Hanuman idol in a garagebelonging to a Muslim.
9.1. Widespread hate propaganda was conducted through pamphlets distributed byHindu communal organisations in different areas in large numbers. The content ofthese included calls for the social and economic boycott of Muslims, warnings aboutMuslims constituting a danger to the survival of Hindus, urging Hindus to awakenand to decimate and drive Muslims out from India. (See chapter, Preparation for Violence:Hate Speech and Hate Writing, Volume II).
9.2. Much of the local media played a reprehensibly partisan and inflammatory roleright from February 28 onwards. Local political leaders used the electronic media inthe most despicable manner. The intentions of leaders belonging to the ruling partyand their affiliates becomes very clear if one examines the speeches on local TVchannels like JTV, Deep and VNM. For example, inflammatory speeches by certainleaders on local cable news channels on March 15, after the Machchipith incident inVadodara, prompted combing operations by the police. Despite several appeals to theadministration requesting action against particularly offensive local news channels,the police commissioner only acted in the last week of March, by filing FIRs, ironi-cally, against two of the relatively less provocative channels.
9.3. It would be no exaggeration to state that the local press, particularly Sandeshand Gujarat Samachar (the former with greater impunity) was party to fuelling commu-nal tension in the state through sensationalised, provocative, and, at times, highlyinflammatory reporting. Sandesh, for example, carried the headline on February 28:‘Around 10 Hindu girls pulled out of the railway carriage by a group of religiousfanatics’ even though the report that followed merely said this was a rumour. (Seesection on Role of Media, Volume II). Had these newspapers played a more sober andresponsible role, allaying rather than preying on the fears of people (particularly thosebelonging to the majority community), they could, perhaps, have contributed to de-fusing tension and restoring peace in the state.
9.4. Hate propaganda: There are numerous examples of motivated and false propa-ganda used to fuel local passions leading to violence against Muslims. (See section onIncidents of Violence, Volume I). One example bears mention here. Shri Dalsukh Maharajof Sanjeli, mobilised a mammoth crowd of 30-35,000 people, mostly Adivasis, someof whom had gathered for a wedding, to slaughter local Muslims and to burn and loottheir houses. Baseless propaganda about the abduction of Adivasi women by Muslimmen, giving communal colour to the prevalent exploitation of Adivasis by all tradersto paint a picture of the Muslims as ‘exploiters’, were some of the strategies behindHindutva’s mobilisation among Bhils and other tribals. Similarly, the sustained propagation of myths and falsehoods such as, ‘Alarming increase in Muslim population’,‘Hindu women being violated by Muslims’, ‘More Hindus than Muslims killed in allearlier riots’, ‘Muslims collecting weapons to attack Hindus’, were used throughoutGujarat to generate widespread hostility against Muslims.
9.5. A top district-level official who deposed before the Tribunal provided evidenceof distribution of CDs and pamphlets among Adivasis and others in Panchmahal, thatcontained blatant falsehoods about Muslims. The administration had to crack down onrecording and video parlours and photocopy shops engaged in this nasty business.9.6. Muslim refugees from Pandharwada (Panchmahal), Randhikpur (Dahod), Sanjeli(Dahod), Por (Gandhinagar), Rajpardi (Bharuch), Unjha, Dasaj (Mehsana) and sev-eral other areas reported the steady build-up of anti-Muslim propaganda through meet-ings, leaflets, etc. over the last decade and, more intensively, in the last few years.‘Kodar Doctor’, one of the chief accused in the Pandharwada violence, would tellMuslim villagers that Pandharwada was the land of the five Pandavas where Muslimswere not wanted; they were repeatedly told to go away to Pakistan.
10.1. Adivasis: The systematic organisation of tribals by the Sangh Parivar and at-tacks on Christian missionaries working among the former has been common in west-ern and central India in recent years. Evidence before the Tribunal shows how deter-minedly the Sangh Parivar had been organising Adivasis over the past few years andhow this work had intensified a few months prior to the violence.
10.2. The Sewa Bharti sponsored a Hindu Sangam in the Jhabua district of MadhyaPradesh on January 17 and 18, 2002. The Sewa Bharti, which is an outfit of theRashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS), had been carried out a drive to install idols ofLord Hanuman in the homes of “Hindu tribals” in Jhabua district in the three monthsfrom November 2001 onwards. The RSS chief, K Sudershan, and Sadhvi Rithambarahad addressed this gathering.
10.3. The mass mobilisation of tribals by the RSS at Jhabua in MP — a gathering of1,50,000 that was addressed by RSS chief, KS Sudarshan — was an occasion whenmany utterances were made to relatively innocent tribals, and which the Tribunalviews as a deliberate attempt at communalising them. Poisoning the minds of tribalsagainst the minorities and drawing them into the intolerant Hindutva fold, seemed tobe the agenda here.
10.4. In the tribal dominated districts of Panchmahal, Banaskantha and Sabarkantha,the landscape presents a profusion of saffron flags aflutter over freshly painted, wellmaintained temples. This is clear evidence of the growing political presence of theseforces in the tribal regions.
10.5. The incitement of tribal communities, and the targeting of Muslims in ruralareas, is a disturbing feature of the recent violence in Gujarat. Violence spread torural areas by March 3. In August 2000, too, when the international general secretaryof the VHP, Shri Praveen Togadia, exhorted cadres of the Sangh Parivar to avenge thedeaths of Amarnath pilgrims in Kashmir, — ‘Wahan Ka Jawaab Yahan Denge’ (‘Kash-mir will be avenged in Gujarat’) — there was widespread destruction of Muslim prop-erties in tribal areas like Lambadiya and Khed Brahma.
10.6. This time, there is clear evidence that Adivasis were incited by Hindu com-munal organisations to attack Muslim houses and property in Vadodara, Banaskanthaand Sabarkantha districts. Terror was created by stoning, spreading rumours and kill-ing animals, followed by mob attacks, which forced Muslims to flee. This was fol-lowed by the looting of houses, which included carrying away their animals, such asgoats, (or killing them by running them over with vehicles), and, finally, burning,smashing and breaking whatever was left in or around the houses. In many cases,victims fled to nearby fields. In Sokhada village, all the Muslim residents hid in thefields at night, watching their homes being looted and burnt. However, Adivasi in-volvement in killings and rape seems to have been the exception rather than the rule.
10.7. While this was a discernible and distrubing trend in many parts of Gujarat,especially sections of Panchmahal, Sabarkantha and Dahod, where the direct politicalinfluence of the RSS/VHP/BD had spread, in other pockets adivasis and Dalits rose indefence of Muslims: Rabaris in some villages of Panchmahal actually prevented a mas-sacre and the Tribunal has examples of Dalits, too, in rural areas who sheltered Muslimsfor days before they could escape. Often this was at great risk to their lives.
10.8. Dalits: Dalits and members of the denotified tribes like Waghris and Charaswere active in the violence in urban areas, especially in the more gruesome instancesof rape, killing and bestiality. The tragedy behind this pattern lies in the fact thatinfluential and dominant sections of caste Hindu society have driven a wedge amongthe oppressed sections, pitting Dalits, Waghris and Charas against the Muslim minor-ity. In urban Gujarat, especially Ahmedabad, Dalits and Muslims live in close proxim-ity. The lower castes were cynically trained to indulge in violence of a kind thatdehumanises the perpetrators themselves. The Tribunal has recorded evidence to showthat, especially in the past two years, in Gujarat, the Bajrang Dal paid salaries of Rs.3-5,000 a month, to lure unemployed Dalit youth to camps where indoctrinationagainst Muslims and arms training were the main activities.
10.9. Women: Women, especially from the affluent classes of Hindu society, werevisible participants in the violence; in some cases, they even led the assaults andinstigated Hindu men to commit sexual crimes against Muslim women. Examples ofthis are the BJP’s elected representatives, namely, Su. Maya Kotdani and Su. AmitaPatel, who guided marauding mobs that indulged in the most vile forms of violence atNaroda Gaon and Naroda Patiya. Or the large number of women and young girlsfrom elite sections of Ahmedabad who came in their cars to loot from the shops onCG Road. The Durga Vahini, the militant women’s outfit affiliated to the RSS/VHP/BD, which gives arms training to women, has a significant presence in Gujarat. SadhviRithambara, the fire-breathing priestess of the VHP who played a major role in whip-ping up mass frenzy in the build-up to December 6, 1992 and the countrywide vio-lence that followed, is very popular in the state of Gujarat.
10.10. Communal violence spread to new areas: Unlike in the earlier riots of 1969, 1985and 1992, which were largely restricted to ‘traditionally riot-prone’ areas, new areaswere affected this time. Areas where people have co-existed peacefully for genera-tions have been targets of violence, e.g., Pira Mita and Fatehgunj. This trend began in1992, when Surat, a city which had, until then, remained unaffected by the communalvirus, was first racked by large-scale violence including gang rapes of Muslim women.Elected representatives and persons associated with the ruling party have played akey role in spreading violence to peaceful areas. Municipal councillors have chal-lenged colleagues from relatively unaffected areas and implied a lack of mardangi (man-liness), because there was no destruction or killing in those areas. MLAs of the rulingparty, in Anand district, even sent bangles to villages that maintained peace. Similarcases were reported from other parts of Gujarat, where local leaders from the morepeaceful districts were sent bangles to denote a lack of manliness.
10.11. The violence affected not only Muslims but poor Hindus as well, because ofloss of livelihood, and in many cases, the burning of their homes. Poor and Dalitwomen have complained to citizens’ fact-finding teams of harassment and sexualabuse by the police during curfew.
11.1. The Tribunal recorded extensive evidence on the systematic pre-planning andpreparations that also explain the military precision with which the violence was ledand its devastating consequences for the state’s Muslims. The evidence that was putbefore the Tribunal is dealt with in a separate section (see chapter Preparations for Vio-lence, Volume II). Suffice it to say here that meetings, training camps and other formsof mass mobilisation were all part of the planning and preparation for the ensuingviolence.
11.2. Six months before the carnage, the tempo of communal mobilisation hadincreased in a number of villages, with the launch of the shilapujan connected to thebuilding of the Ram temple in Ayodhya. ‘Trishul diksha’ programmes, in which trishulswere distributed at large gatherings, were also organised in a number of areas duringthe same period. Pranti (Sabarkantha), Sanjeli, Pandharwada and villages from allover Khanpur taluka (Panchmahal) reported such meetings. These meetings were onlyheld in villages where there were Muslims and where openly threatening the latterappeared to be one of the main objectives of the assembly.
11.3. Shri Faiz Mohammad Ahmadbhai told the Tribunal that people from 50-60neighbouring villages came for the meeting held at Ayodhya Chowk in Pandharwadaonly a fortnight before the fatal attack on Muslims. Nearly 300 to 400 people fromnearby villages, men and women, had collected at the meeting. They included VHPleaders, sadhus and others. The entire meeting was broadcast on loudspeakers pro-vided by Shri Anil Modi. According to Shri Ahmadbhai, one leader said, “There were2-3 households of Muslims earlier, now they have 100-125 houses. The Muslim popu-lation is increasing. We must do something now. We have no arms. In Muslim houses there are arms ready for use. We must prepare to fight them.” Shri Kantibhai AmbalalPandya, the principal of Shri KM Doshi High School, who chaired the meeting said,“We must give serious thought to what the speakers have said today; and we mustprepare ourselves so that we confront them… The Muslims don’t believe in familyplanning so their population increases. Let us also also increase our population …”
11.4. In almost all the affected villages, meetings were held on the evening of Feb-ruary 27 or on February 28 to plan the attacks. Some of the villages where suchmeetings were held are Leach (Mehsana), Motera (Gandhinagar), Prantij (Sabarkantha)and Sanjeli (Dahod). In some villages, these meetings were described as ‘Shanti Samiti’(‘Peace Committee’) meetings, but, curiously, as in the case of Sanjeli (Dahod), partici-pants in these so-called ‘Peace Committee’ meetings led the attacks the following day.In Piplod (Dahod), the attack was launched at 4 p.m. on February 28, soon after a four-hour-long meeting in the town, destroying the handful of Muslim houses in the area.
11.5. It was only due to such organisation and pre-planning that mobs as large as 7-10,000 or more could be so quickly mobilised, not only in a large city like Ahmedabadbut also in the rural areas of Gujarat.
11.6. Evidence before the Tribunal also reveals there were many cases where theMuslims fled the villages before the attacks, thanks to their being alerted in time bytheir peace loving Hindu neighbours. This was true especially in Bharuch, Ankleshwarand Sabarkantha districts and in parts of Panchmahal.
11.7. On the strength of the extensive evidence placed before the Tribunal, it is ledto the conclusion that the Gujarat carnage has its roots in the sustained anti-Muslimmobilisation by the Sangh Parivar, among specific social groups. In the face of all theevidence of prior planning, the ‘pratikriya’ (‘spontaneous reaction’) explanation forthe post-Godhra violence touted by officials and political leaders is hopelessly inad-equate, to say the least.