Red Bumps On The Highway

The slowness is telling.  It has taken the Chhattisgarh government nine years to construct a seven-km road between Dorna­pal and Jagargunda down the state in its particularly forested terrain. Nearly 450 security personnel have lost their lives in this period, majority of them while deployed in the Road Opening Party (ROP), protecting the construction workers in the region. Another 49 km needs to be built bef­ore the road is completed.

On April 24, a 99-strong CRPF team was providing security to workers building this road when it was attacked at Kala Pathar, a point between Burkapal and Chintagufa. As the personnel sat down for lunch inside the forest around midday, 300-odd Maoists launched the attack, catching the uniformed men like sitting ducks. Twenty-six CRPF men were killed even as the accompanying party that was out on the road was held back by heavy firing by Red rebels. Even then the CRPF men managed to return fire. It is expected that 10-15 Maoists were downed in the firing, but it is not clear how many were dead and injured.

Construction of roads has emerged as a major source of conflict between the security forces and the Maoists. Even an earlier incident—on March 11—involved the CRPF ROP that was providing protection to the workers constructing the 20-km stretch between Injiram and Bheji in Sukma district. That ambush claimed the lives of a dozen CRPF personnel. These two roads will connect the remote, Maoist-held areas to National Highway 30 and state capital Raipur, sev­erely affecting their free run.

K. Vijay Kumar, senior security adv­isor on Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in the Union ministry of home affairs, adm­its that road construction is a matter of agony. “The security forces have lost several lives and limbs in pursuit of road construction. Ensuring construction of roads is itself a security mission,” he tells Outlook. “The Maoists don’t want roads to come up at any cost. It is the biggest threat and enemy for the Maoists. Their solid liberated zone will be cut up and they fear that the security forces will have easy access.”

The expert explains that the work of ROPs is a complicated security mission. It is not just about the road itself, but also the 3-4 km circumference around the road that needs to be developed. “So it is not just the narrow area of the road; there has to be a bubble around it.”

Intelligence sources claim that the forces appear to have been lax in following the standing operating procedures (SOPs) laid down. Kumar, who has himself led the CRPF, says that whenever there is a big incident, there is a presumptive gap in SOPs, and that something could have been done better. “In my definition, SOPs are smart operating procedures; not standard. The routine of forces becomes predictable. They only have time between sunrise and sunset to finish the job. The adversary has better terrain knowledge—and used the opportunity better,” he says.

Former Home secretary G.K. Pillai, in whose tenure a 2010 Maoist attack killed 78 personnel in the same region, says ROPs lay down “very stringent” procurers that can prevent these kinds of casualties. “When one company is doing the ROP work, the other has to protect the road from both sides. The ROP has to be flanked on either side to provide supporting fire. The men on the ground have to think and plan like the Maoists and cover all potential points of ambush,” he says.

After the 2010 attack, 3-D GPS-enabled maps were prepared of the Maoist-infested areas, Pillai says. These were given to each Company Commander, who is supposed to carry it on his laptop. This gives him a live view of the topography and also all points of ambush. “These points need to be covered. The forces need to occupy all high points from where the Maoists can shoot you. If the commander notices something, he is supposed to send an advance party in teams of twos and wait for a radio-signal from them,” he explains.

The procedure is slow and arduous, but it can save lives. “Like, it is said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. The forces need to be extra-vigilant and not let complacency set in,” he cautions. “They cannot fall into a set routine like breaking for lunch around the same time every day. The Maoists are watching and exploit these weaknesses.”

Pillai also advocates use of more adv­anced technology. According to him, each company must have two to four drones with them, which can perhaps even replace the advance parties. “I have seen images from a drone myself. The moment the Maoists hear the whirr of a drone, they just scatter from the place. They know that the forces cannot be far behind,” he adds.

Sources in the security establishment agree on an urgent need to upgrade training and bring in technology to ens­ure faster construction of roads. “It is criminal to keep losing personnel like this. It is demoralising for them,” an official says. He suggests that road construction activity in LWE areas should be handed over the ministry of road transport and highways, which can give out contracts faster and make use of more expensive technology that is latest.

“Roads are a concurrent subject,” poi­nts out a senior government official. “So, unless the state asks the Centre to take over, it cannot be done suo motu. It can also be done if the MHA intervenes and tells the state to take the Centre’s help. The NHAI (National Highway Authority of India) is already making roads in some of the LWE-affected areas, but Chhattisgarh has never asked.”

In fact, the transport and highway ministry recently created an other autonomous body like the NHAI. Called the National Highway Development Corporation of India (NHDCI), it is building roads in hilly region and the sensitive areas of the Northeast. “A similar body can be made for LWE areas or maybe the NHDCI can take over road projects there too,” the official suggests.

Faster the roads come up, easier it will be for the state administration to bring in schools, hospitals and ancillary deve­lopment—measures the authorities in any case know are so essential to wean away local villagers from the rebels.

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Never-ending

Maoist threat has impeded the construction of a road

• An attack on April 24 killed 26 CRPF men, between Burkapul-Chintagufa area in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district

• The ambushed CRPF personnel were providing security for road construction along a critical stretch

• 56 km of road between Dornapal and Jagargunda has been under construction for past nine years

• Only seven km has been built so far. Tendering has been a problem, as no contractor is willing to take up the project. It was tendered 18 times.

• Sukhma faced a similar attack on March 11. It killed 12 CRPF personnel, also on Road Opening Party, deputed to protect construction of Injiram-Bheji road. This is a 20-km stretch

• The roads will connect National Highway 30 and Chhattisgarh capital Raipur with remote Maoist-held areas

• Work on both roads has been extremely slow-paced since contractors don’t want to risk landmines and Maoist attacks

• Maoists are determined to prevent construction of the roads since it will make movement of security forces much easier and create conditions for schools and hospitals to come up, breaking their stronghold