The alliance between the Maoists and the RPF/PLA will have defining impact on the course of the insurgencies in Manipur-- though it is not expected to result in any extraordinary spike in violence in the immediate future. The PLA can, however, be expected to gain in strength over the coming months, profiting from its strategic alliance with a powerful nation-wide insurgency, particularly in terms of improvements in training, tactics and strategies of irregular warfare which the Maoists have evolved to a fine art. Significantly, the RPF/PLA’s camaraderie with other Manipuri insurgent groupings such as the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) [the three constitute an umbrella organisation, the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)] and the UNLF’s strategic linkages with the KCP-MC, would suggest that the pact with the Maoists could gradually be extended to embrace all these outfits.
The KCP-MC, created out of a split in its parent group in the last quarter of 2007, has seen phenomenal growth in its brief existence. Irrespective of its actual involvement in the October 21 explosion, the Institute for Conflict Management database records 80 incidents involving the KCP-MC before this last incident. With an estimated 110 active cadres, the group’s activities include abduction, extortion, attacks on politicians, bureaucrats and SFs and the imposition of several dictates and restrictions on the media. The group’s cadres have been described by the Police as ‘experts’ in manufacturing improvised explosives devices (IEDs). With 370 kilometres of the 1,640 kilometre-long open and porous Indo-Myanmar border running along Manipur, smuggling of small arms and explosives from the Southeast Asian arms markets is not particularly difficult. KCP-MC, like any other militant formation in the region with surplus funds, faces little challenge in going in for a radical makeover.
At present, no area in Manipur -- either in the Valley or the Hills, including thestate capital Imphal -- is free from militant activities. A lion’s share of the violence is, however, orchestrated by the Valley-based Meitei groups (like the KCP-MC, UNLF, PLA, PREPAK), who accounted for over 63 per cent of the total 465 incidents reported till August 31, 2008. Imphal, spread over 30.75 square kilometres, has been described by the Manipur Home Department as the nerve and extortion centre of militant activity. The Institute for Conflict Management database records at least 170 militancy related incidents in and around Imphal in the current year alone. Heavy security presence in the capital does not appear to have deterred the militants in the least. Just two days before the October 21 explosion, PREPAK militants had executed a grenade attack right in front of the Chief Minister’s bungalow, breaching high levels of security.
Given the character of militancy in Manipur -- especially in the four valley districts(Imphal East, Imphal West, Bishnupur and Thoubal) -- the state Police, which is familiar with the intricacies of the conflict and its key players, should have the lead role in counter-insurgency (CI) operations, backed by the Army and Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs). Manipur has a healthy Police-population ratio (Policemen per 100,000 population) of 554 and Police density (Policemen per 100 square kilometre area) of 63.8, as against the All India averages of 126 and 44.4 respectively. However, the Force has a current vacancy of 28 per cent against a sanctioned strength of 22,936 men. Worse, the Police have preferred to relinquish all initiative in CI operations, allowing the Army and CPMFs to shoulder virtually the entire burden. Despite the creation of a Unified Command Structure in thestate in 2004, to coordinate the activities of the Police, the Army and the CPMFs, there has been little operational improvement.
Authorities in Manipur insist that popular support for the militants is on a decline, but this is difficult to reconcile with the realities of the ground. Public opinion in Manipur has been hijacked by community-based organisations, which have little influence on the militant outfits, but which are deeply divisive and partisan, either favouring particular armed underground groups, or ambivalent in their approach towards militant violence. The influential United Committee Manipur (UCM), for instance, has maintained a studied silence on KCP-MC excesses and attributed the October 21 explosion to the "inherent weakness and total failure of thegovernment in maintaining law and order." Another prominent ‘civil society’ group, the All Manipur United Clubs' Organisation (AMUCO) has implicitly supported insurgent activity and responded to the October 21 attack with qualified criticism, stating: "regardless of thenon-state or state actors or agencies who may have been perpetrators, this should never be considered a part of the ongoing armed conflict since the attack targeted a crowded place." The ethnically polarized civilian population has tended to seek refuge in an imaginary insularity which offers no protection, but which has prevented the consolidation of public opinion against the militancy and violence that dominatestate politics. The state leadership, in turn, has failed comprehensively in managing the minimal tasks of governance and in executing its basic duty to protect the lives and properties of citizens.
There have been repeated calls by the state leadership -- including the Chief Minister-- for a dialogue with the insurgent groups and a negotiated ‘solution’ to Manipur’s multiple insurgencies and this has been picked up by the security establishment as well. On October 24, 2008, a senior officer of the para-military Assam Rifles called for a ‘political dialogue’ between the militants and thegovernment to secure a ‘lasting solution’ to the enduring conflict in the state. Such an approach, however, ignores a long historical record that demonstrates that insurgent groups almost never engage in good-faith negotiations when they are in an ascendant-- and it is more than evident that Manipur’s militants are fighting anything but a losing battle. With the new alliance between the RPF/PLA and the Maoists-- and the potential for further consolidation of the Maoist presence and support to the militancy in thestate, Manipur is heading for an insurgency far more intractable than the disorders it has experience in the past. Unless the security establishment addresses this augmenting challenge with determination and a strategic perspective far more coherent than is currently manifest, the situation in Manipur threatens to hurtle entirely out of control.