The Road Not Taken

True, there is a live situation on the ground in Kargil. Something has to be done and the army is doing just that, with what it has in its possession. If this was going to be a minor skirmish lasting a month, a re-appreciation could wait for the skirmish to end. But there may not be a quick end to the fighting, unless the reinforcement routes are cut off and occupied throughout the coming winter. There is an urgent need to look at the manner of the fighting by rear echelon staff, while the troops on the front are giving off their best. The advantage that the infiltrators have is one of having occupied the heights earlier. This translates into visual and daylight superiority.

It is for this reason that the emphasis for the army and air force action must shift to the night, when the height superiority of the infiltrators counts for much less. In shifting to an emphasis by night, the rules of the game will change dramatically. Instead of the exchange ratio being counted between inconsequential Afghan mujahideen and Indian troops, the competition will shift to technology versus infiltrators. And there is an inexhaustible supply of technology. A tactical situation like the one we face in Kargil would be handled in quite a different way by advanced countries. Many of the technologies that would be employed to beat the infiltrators have been in existence since '82. This, of course, raises the question of staff and command responsibilities in the armed forces as well as the ministry of defence, as to why the technology being used by our troops is so primitive and ineffectual. This is a question that can be raked up later, without disturbing the morale and equanimity of the troops actually doing the fighting at the moment. But the fact that these technologies do not exist with the Indian armed forces will become of catastrophic importance if the conflict widens, of which there are good chances.

There is no question that the skill and tenacity of the Indian infantryman in Kargil is of great importance-equal only to the technology that he is supported by. So no one should take a stand that either one can independently bring the battle to a speedy close. Unfortunately, there are many in the hierarchy who believe that technology has little role to play in the current scenario. This issue, therefore, needs wider debate-and to do so, the possibilities of their use are discussed here. If they are needed, they should be bought, flown in and given to the troops to use. They are not fighting alone-the country stands behind them. Kargil may be a boon in disguise, because years of under-funding of the armed forces and the failure to modernise has been demonstrated in a small battle. These deficiencies must be rectified before we embark on anything bigger. The technologies that the forces lack will probably cost Rs 500 crore to induct for the army and air force. We are not discussing the purchase of new weapon platforms, but making the existing ones relevant. The F-16s being used in Kosovo are 14 years old, the B-52s are 40 years old, laser-guided bombs are 20 years old and the EA-6C, the missile radar-suppressing aircraft is 30 years old. The failure to modernise is more the failure to prioritise than the lack of money. But make the money available and fix the accountability later.