Want Real Nukes? Spend A Billion

IF the land of Buddha wants to make a quantum leap to weaponisation from the Pokhran tests, it would have to spend a billion dollars. Shorn of the military jargon, "weaponisation" means India has to develop a systematic framework to manufacture atom bombs and the carriers so that they can be dropped accurately on enemy targets. The quest for an ideal atom bomb, which could be handled by army jawans or Indian Air Force technicians without the hazards of an explosion on home soil, would entail a colossal investment, say defence experts.

The government would have to plough in enormous amounts not only to make such bombs but also to develop a variety of methods to carry these weapons to the enemy. Missiles with a range of 2,500 km-plus, and fighters which can fly up to 500 km, are the ideal delivery systems for these bombs. And, according to defence sources, India is a long way off from being such a nuclear weapons state.

A credible deterrent, according to a top Ministry of Defence official, would mean manufacturing at least 50 Agni missiles with a range of 2,500 km, each with a capability to carry a 10-tonne nuclear warhead. Each Agni missile with such a long range would cost at least Rs 5 crore each. Add to it the cost of making bombs of 15 to 20 kilotons yield—about the size of one of those which were tested in Pokhran—the cost of holding them in bomb-proof silos, the expenditure of moving them from one high-security base to another in order to evade detection by military satellites, and the funds required to develop a network of radars and early warning systems to detect possible enemy attacks.

"We need missiles with a range of 2,500 km because we must demonstrate our ability to strike deep into China in order to prove that we have a deterrent. The missiles must be powered by a solid propellant because liquid propellants defeat the purpose of a quick response with a laborious loading operation. We have deployed Prithvi near the border, but with its range being 150 km to 250 km, it is not an ideal system to carry a nuclear weapon on target. We could also risk an enemy strike as we move the missiles close to the border," he pointed out.

Atomic Energy Commission chairman R. Chidambaram says India can produce a nuclear bomb of 200 kiloton yield after the hydrogen bomb test in Pokhran. And though he says that many technologies are being developed in the nuclear field which would be of great benefit to India, the country still lacks all the basic attributes of a nuclear weapons state. For, to achieve such a status, India has to first evolve a nuclear doctrine—identify the adversaries, prepare a flexible response if a nuclear weapon were mounted on India, set up a foolproof command, control, communications, computers and intelligence network to pick up information of a possible attack. But the most important component of the doctrine would be to build up an effective range of weapon delivery systems.

According to the MOD officials, "Some components of a command and control network exist, like images from our remote sensing satellites, a network of radars along our borders and a communication network set up by the Department of Telecommunication. What we need is a secure network where either the prime minister or the president, who is the supreme commander of our armed forces, hands out a command to fire a nuclear weapon."

Defence analysts say the five nuclear powers have studied these issues at length before deploying a triad of nuclear weapon delivery systems: intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), fighter aircraft which could toss a nuclear bomb and scoot to safety, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles from nuclear-powered submarines.

Sources in DRDO claim India's own nuclear triad could only be achieved over the next decade. "We have yet to prove Agni's capability as a missile of IRBM class. And, if we have to drop a bomb using an aircraft, we must develop a missile like the French Air-Sol-Moyenne-Portee, which is launched by a fighter about 80 km away from the target, leaving the jet ample time to move away before the explosion. We have been working on the advanced technology vehicle, the nuclear-powered submarine, and Sagarika, the missile to be launched from this submarine. We may reach the phase of prolonged tests a couple of years from now. We want to hand out the most secure nuclear deterrent, just like the one the UK's Royal Navy has, a weapon ensconced inside a nuclear submarine," the scientists point out.

THE scientists say a special test bed has been set up to develop a perfect ejection system for Sagarika. Initially,gases generated inside the submarine would push the missile out, while by another mechanism, water would be prevented from gushing into the vessel. Boosters on board the missile are fired after it clears the surface of the sea and destroy the targets with a total element of surprise.

The IAF has identified three fighters—Mirage 2000, the Jaguar and the recently acquired Sukhoi 30—if India ever needs to carry out a nuclear attack. In fact, pilots who fly the Mirage 2000 have been trained to toss dummy nuclear warheads just as they begin a steep climb into the skies in order to escape the aftermath. "We would narrow down the choice to a hit squad of either Mirage 2000s or Su-30s," says one defence official.

But analysts, of course, admit that one way out from pouring funds into a black hole and fuelling a nuclear weapons programme would be to mend fences with nuclear powers in the neighbourhood. And to restore funds for development, they suggest a reduction in conventional arms. "The more one weaponises, the higher is the insecurity. That's how America and the erstwhile Soviet Union stockpiled weapons. India should instead work to reduce defence expenditure through a series of confidence and security-building measures. Otherwise, India would only prove true the statement of Admiral Eberle of the Royal Navy, UK, that poor countries can be military powers only by impoverishing their population." For now, India's missiles brains are more intent on taking the country's nuclear programme beyond Pokhran.