As we commemorate Kargil Vijay Diwas, Colonel RK Srivastava offers a compelling, firsthand account of the Kargil War
With a career spanning crucial counterterrorism roles and key positions during the 1999 Kargil War, Colonel Rajiv Kumar Srivastava shares unique insights into the strategic challenges, battlefield realities, and heroic efforts that defined this pivotal moment in Indian military history, on the occasion of Kargil Diwas.
I was fortunate to be involved in the Kargil War from the beginning to the end. Having joined the Indian Army in 1985, I have spent most of my career in counterterrorism roles. For Operation Vijay, I oversaw the Order of Battle and studied the Personality Profile of Pakistan’s Military Leadership. In May 1999, we were initially caught off guard by the infiltration. Our Chief of Army Staff, General Ved Prakash Malik, was abroad, and there was a complete information blackout at Command Headquarters.
Our proactive DGMI, General Sahni, first noticed something was wrong when a patrol was unaccounted for. Early reconnaissance missions and helicopter searches confirmed that something was amiss. Gradually, it became clear that we were dealing with a serious intrusion from across the border. However, our first response was flawed. Local commanders initially misjudged the situation, thinking it was a terrorist infiltration. This led to inadequate artillery support for our troops. Our soldiers went in thinking they were dealing with terrorists, not realising they were up against a well-prepared regular army. How could we have missed it? Terrorists typically don't engage in bunker battles; they usually strike and then flee. We were certainly unprepared to engage a regular army effectively. In a war, forces are meant to match the combat potential of the opponent, but in this case, our miscalculation cost us a large number of casualties and we had lost the strategic upper hand.
Vice Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Chandrashekhar had briefed PM Vajpayee, who was understandably displeased with the situation at the LoC. By the end of May 1999, preparations improved significantly - artillery buildup and weapon stocking was fast tracked. Despite this, there was still chaos on the battlefield due to uncoordinated logistics and combat efforts. Pakistani artillery fire was intense, and they had occupied high-altitude positions, which gave them a significant positional advantage. They had orders to double down on their firepower, and our troops faced accurate as well as heavy bombardment from their high-calibre weapons.
Our information level was deplorable. The aerial photographs showed nothing but total white snow cover, with just one black dot. When soldiers were sent to investigate, expecting to find Pakistani troops, they discovered a Yak. General VP Malik was furious. As soldiers, we are supposed to be equipped with vital information that can at the very least help us identify the enemy, their positions, strengths and have some idea about their strategies. We were completely in the dark in terms of proper tactical intelligence. Despite these gaps in information, our soldiers, the real heroes, faced these challenges head-on. Casualties were heavy, and logistical support was slow, but junior leaders and commanding officers on the ground showed immense resolve and bravery. It was their determination that eventually turned the tide in India’s favour.
The coordination between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and ground forces was crucial. The initial setbacks, including the loss of an Indian MiG-21 and Mi-17 to Pakistani air defence, were demoralising. However, intercepted communications between Pakistani Army chief Gen Parvez Musharraf, who was in China, and Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz confirmed their involvement. This was a turning point, as it provided direct evidence of Pakistani military action, shifting the international narrative in our favour.
Our decision-makers and formation commanders made momentous errors. I attended the Kargil Review Committee meetings and presented the reasons that caused the combat intelligence inadequacies. Composed mainly of retired bureaucrats, the Committee’s final report that was produced failed to address real-time operational issues that ail our military infrastructure. Tactical intelligence was overlooked, and senior officers responsible for fatal blunders faced no repercussions. An audit of all the apex bodies like, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) created post-Kargil is necessary to correct these mistakes.
The Kargil War was fought under intense media scrutiny. However, the knowledge repository did not come from soldiers on the ground. The true situation was often glorified and misrepresented, while the core issues remained unaddressed. Celebrations of the war’s anniversary are hollow without addressing these concerns. India needs to be self-reliant (atma nirbhar) in defence production and take diplomatic initiatives to address border conflicts with external challengers such as Pakistan and China.
(As told to Gayatri Sapru.)
Colonel RK Srivastava is a Sena Medal Gallantry Awardee and also received the Chief of Army Staff Commendation Card for his service during Operation Vijay.