Why Jammu Is Turning Into A Battleground

“They have a tactical advantage due to the terrain as well. They are also moving with weapons, we believe, salvaged from Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US withdrawal in 2021,” an official said. 

Some of the ammunition were recovered by security forces in Jammu almost around the same time when similar US weaponry were recovered from members of Tehreek-e-Taliban in Pakistan. 

This year’s worst terror attack was carried out on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims in Reasi district of Jammu. Nine people died in the attack and 33 others suffered grievous injuries, The attack sent shockwaves across the country and reinforced the belief that a true state of normalcy is yet to be achieved in Jammu and Kashmir. 

Earlier in July, Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai told the Upper House of Parliament that since Article 370 was revoked, the government forces had killed over 900 militants in Jammu and Kashmir, a big number that included commander Alvi and other top names known to almost everyone closely following Kashmir’s new insurgency since 2014. This insurgency is different from the one in the 1990s when tens of thousands crossed the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan to return as ‘mujahids’.  

The recruitment this time peaked following the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani in 2016. Hizb emerged as the main force behind this resurgence, led by Wani and others like Riyaz Naikoo and Yasin Yatoo. At the same time, Lashkar e Toiba (LeT) also became a prominent recruiting outfit with underground networks developed by Abu Qasim, Sheikh Abbas and Majid Zargar.  

As these networks expanded, outfits like Al Badr, Tehreek ul Mujahideen–previously active in the 1990s–and, Ansar Ghazwat ul Hind (AGH) also surfaced on the militant map, only to turn into local franchises of global terror outfits like DAESH and Al Qaeda. Officials later claimed that these group could not gain prominence due to lack of alternative networks or supply chains for receiving arms and other logistic support. As militant recruitments plunged over the years, the total number of active militants has also declined sharply. Today, it is as low as it was in 2013; much before the tech-savvy Wani’s death rekindled the insurgency in the valley.  

Following the abrogation in the midst of sustained pressure on Pakistan–the main backer of Kashmir insurgency–by the FATF over terror financing, new outfits surfaced that appeared more indigenous, such as The Resistance Front (TRF), People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) and Kashmir Tigers. They claimed attacks both in Kashmir as well in Jammu, many of which were carried out against local civilians, non-local labourers and members of the minority community like Kashmiri Pandits. The spate of attack on unarmed civilians marked another shift after 2019.  

Alvi’s killing in July 2021 may have thwarted some of JeM’s plan for Kashmir but by October, they launched offensives in the forest areas of Poonch and Rajouri, south of the Pir Panjal Range. In an attack in Dera Ki Gali area of Chamrair forest, at least five Army soldiers including a Junior Commissioned Officer, were killed. This was followed by the death of two more soldiers a week later. Since then, at least 50 security personnel, including 40 Army members and one from the IAF, have been killed in terrorist-related incidents in Jammu, gradually turning the region into a battleground. 

While militancy related incidents decreased proportionally in Kashmir, they spiked in Jammu areas including Udhampur, Reasi, Kathua, Poonch-Rajouri, Kishtwar and Doda, where search and counter offensive operations against the militants are ongoing. 

“They are operationally skilled and have achieved a few objectives like bringing this region back on the map of violence. Although this region has seen worse, it was not the case for a long time now,” a senior Army officer said. 

Fighting in these vast forest areas and grasslands without proper leads is a dangerous gambit even for trained forces who have what the military men refer to as ‘theatre superiority’. Unlike Kashmir, besides leveraging the difficult terrain, the flow of intel is also slow, according to a security official posted in Doda. Their movement is sometimes tracked after sightings by locals or when they use someone’s internet hotspot connectivity. 

 “They move in groups of two men and sometimes they are in a group of seven which means that they split sometimes and then merge at other instances,” the official added. 

The Director General of Police (DGP) RR Swain in August said that there are only around 15 locals remaining in militant ranks, while approximately 70 to 80 foreigners are active. The DGP termed it significant that for the first time in three decades the number of locals is less than that of the foreigners. 

The security establishment, however, believes that the overall numbers of active militants are lesser, even as they are spread across the territory, and hence does not count as a major concern. “They remain in isolated areas with minimal contact with the locals, many of whom will ultimately turn hostile against the unwanted visitors. The communication transcripts also show that they are being advised against meeting with locals or staying at their homes,” the senior officer said. 

The surge of attacks were reported months after the military representatives in India and Pakistan renewed agreement to observe a ceasefire along the LoC in February 2021. While the fragile agreement continues to hold up, security officials believe, infiltration along the old routes, particularly in Jammu areas along the International Border (IB), have exposed vulnerabilities in the region.  

Many officials are also of the opinion that the influx of foreigners and subsequent violence in Jammu can be to offset the advantage India may have aimed to gain at a time when Pakistan has thinned its military presence to launch operation Azm e Istekham against outfits including the TTP and the Baloch insurgents. Then there are the high-pitched announcements about wresting Kashmir’s remaining territory from Pakistan’s control.  

The face-off between the Indian Army and People Liberation Army (PLA) in Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh also resulted in the thinning of “division-size” military presence in Jammu, according to a security official, which may have been one of the factors exploited by the militant groups. 

The senior Army officer, however, said that the security presence was thinned mostly in the hinterland than along the LoC, given the relative peace observed in the region for years. “I think more than the number of troops, it was about the orientation of the troops that played a role in the situation,” he said. 

While the spillover in Jammu is also seen in the backdrop of heightened surveillance and crackdown in Kashmir valley, there seems to be little reason for the security officials to believe that the militants currently active in Jammu will shift base to Kashmir. 

 “With the onset of winter season, there is a possibility that those using deep forests and upper reaches to their advantage will move towards settlements for sustenance and that is when the possibility of establishing contacts will likely increase,” the officer from Doda said.