A Heretical Question

This highly unscientific, random and minimalist sample suggests that the glacial ice of India-Pakistan hostility is finally cracking. Other meetings in Pakistan leave the impression that the brilliant use of symbolism and gracious remarks by the two prime ministers have tapped into a latent public readiness to improve relations. The continued, skilful use of symbolic gestures and empathetic language, backed up by substantive steps, now has the potential to shape mass opinion in favour of reconciliation and a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

A sense of optimism is rare among Pakistanis. Negativity comes easily, while adopting a positive view-especially toward India-entails risks. The surprisingly successful Lahore summit has challenged longstanding dogma, engendering an uncommon, largely muted feeling of hope and the contemplation of divisive issues in a somewhat new light.

Good timing isn't everything in international relations, but it counts. Sharif's detractors doubt if he has the capacity, help or focus to succeed in sustaining this opening. But Sharif has his reasons for breaking new ground. His economy is faltering. His government's Kashmir policy, which now rests heavily on "guest" militants, is weakening Pakistan and alienating Kashmiris. Moreover, Sharif has never been an India "basher"; he means it when he says that 50 years of hostility have gotten both countries nowhere.

Sharif would also like to increase business prospects for Pakistan. He knows that the Vajpayee government may have a short half-life and that this Indian leader is better able to succeed in normalising relations than any alternative. Both prime ministers stand to gain in domestic and international politics from a normalisation process. Both men also have to demonstrate responsible custodianship of the nuclear option. Sharif isn't the analytical type but his instincts appear to conform closely to objective necessity.

On the other side of the ledger sheet, Sharif faces strong impediments to progress. He is embarking on this initiative without help from opposition parties and against the intense opposition of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The elements of a resolution of the Kashmir dispute remain as contentious as ever. Everyone understands that the military and intelligence services as well as parts of the vernacular press could make it extremely hard for Sharif to compromise. The ground has not been laid for a retreat from maximalist positions and both prime ministers face multiple distractions that can derail progress.

Even with full appreciation of the hurdles ahead, guarded optimism about Indo-Pak relations is warranted. Subtle shifts in thinking within Pakistan are now apparent, which have accelerated post-Lahore.Both prime ministers have now personally and dramatically committed themselves to improved to bilateral ties: if either falters, they both lose. The nature of their highly symbolic meeting in Lahore suggests that neither wishes to walk away empty-handed.

Sharif is more interested in business than ideology; his stubbornness will now be tested against his inattentiveness. Much also depends on the turbulent politics of coalition maintanence and manoeuvre in India. A key variable at this point is surely the staying power of the Vajpayee government. Another is the ability of both leaders to press forward despite acts of terror perpetrated by hard-core oppositionists.

Wordplay continues to bedevil efforts to sustain the mood of goodwill established at Lahore. Vajpayee and Sharif are both walking a tightrope away from maximalist positions but almost all nuance is lost via the orthodoxy of blame-driven media reporting. Unequivocal statements that cannot be misconstrued would help accelerate the process of accommodation within Pakistan, such as an acknowledgement by Vajpayee of the obvious-that Kashmir is, indeed, a dispute between the two countries.

Moving away from mutually reinforcing orthodoxies regarding Kashmir will be a tortuously difficult process, but an unavoidable one. At the same time, there is a clear-headed appreciation within Pakistani military circles of the need to put into place nuclear risk-reduction measures. The deadline established at the Lahore meeting gives content and substance to declarations of good intent-a welcome change from past declarations. One clear test for the prime ministers will be whether the entirety of the work programme established at Lahore can be met by the mid-1999 deadline.

Many powerful figures in Pakistan remain convinced that New Delhi will proceed with nuclear risk-reduction and confidence-building measures while stonewalling them on Kashmir. Serious people in both countries and within Kashmir know the broad parameters of a settlement. One question worth asking at this juncture is whether the passage of time will make a settlement any easier.

Conventional wisdom suggests a gradualist approach to the Kashmir issue, but every modest change to established orthodoxies is likely to generate vitriolic political criticism in both countries. If every small step along the way in finding a settlement for Kashmir is likely to become a volatile political issue in Pakistan, India and in J&K, a heretical question begins to form: why not skip steps?

( Michael Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC)