Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's first visit to Delhi as Jammu and Kashmir chief minister could not have been better timed. The defeat of the National Conference in Kashmir's first demonstrably free election may not have surprised those familiar with the evolving politics of the state. But it certainly knocked the wind out of the government agencies on whom the home ministry depended exclusively for advice and information. What followed was a frantic scramble to reorient their thinking and predict what the defeat of the National Conference and the installation of a PDP-led government would mean for national security.
To no one's surprise, the agencies highlighted the links that the PDP had maintained with various Kashmiri nationalist groups, and the presence in it of politicians who were known to be close to the separatists. It also issued dire warnings to the decision-makers in New Delhi about the threat to India's security that the Mufti government could pose. These were triggered above all by the PDP's avowed intention of winding up large parts of the repressive regime that had ruled the state during the previous six years. The security agencies focused their ire especially on Mufti's announcement that his government would not invoke the Prevention of Terrorism Act, would in effect disband the dreaded Special Operations Group of the Kashmir police and would release political prisoners against whom there were no specific charges or who had already spent more time in prison than the charges against them warranted—even if they were proved.
The fears of the security agencies were understandable. From their point of view, these three measures represented a sudden and substantial loss of control over Kashmir at a time when Pakistan's goals and tactics remained unchanged and the Hurriyat continued to reject every effort to bring it into the political mainstream. But their campaign against the PDP government and their exhortations to rein it in threatened to undo most of the good that the free elections had done in Kashmir. In particular, it threatened to make the Mufti's position in the state untenable. For the PDP had secured a large segment of the vote on an explicit promise to apply a healing touch to the wounds of the Kashmiris.
The Kashmir chief minister's problems were further complicated by the manner in which his three actions were politicised by the campaigning that preceded the Gujarat election. Both the BJP president, Venkaiah Naidu, and its spokesman, Arun Jaitley, missed no opportunity to misrepresent the Mufti's initiatives as being anti-national. Needless to say, their purpose was to embarrass the Congress and sow doubts about Sonia Gandhi's patriotism in the Gujarati Hindu voters' minds. That they were playing with fire did not bother them in the least.
The Mufti's response to these pressures has been statesmanlike to say the least. Refusing to be drawn into a confrontation with the Centre, he asserted that he had a complete understanding with New Delhi and followed it up with a visit to the Capital. It is apparent from the newspaper reports of his meetings with Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and deputy PM L.K. Advani that he has succeeded in allaying most of their doubts and fears. Perhaps the most important outcome of his meeting with the latter was the joint decision to set up a screening committee to examine the release of political prisoners and jailed militants before they were set free. As was explained in these columns last week, the Centre has not been averse to the release of political prisoners in the past. By working together in the screening committee, the Centre and the new state government can establish a base of mutual trust that will make it easier to ease pressure on Kashmiris in other ways.By taking one step backwards, therefore, the Mufti may have paved the way for a more complete restoration of normality in Kashmir in the coming months.
The Mufti's timely visit may have prepared the ground for further relaxation of repressive laws in Kashmir but the task that lies ahead is mountainous. Since India is unable—and the US unwilling—to make Pakistan pay a price for sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, it is obvious that the only way to end the dispute is to make the Kashmiris want to stay within the Indian Union. The election and the PDP's rise to power showed Kashmiris for the first time that they had the power to change their government and influence its policies without having to pick up the gun.
But this is only a beginning. Today, few people in Kashmir believe that New Delhi will allow the Mufti to work unfettered. Fewer still have the confidence that he and his party will not sell them out to New Delhi as Farooq Abdullah so readily did six years ago. These fears need to be dispelled. Giving Kashmir still greater autonomy on paper while denying the people empowerment in practice is not the way to do this. The right course is to restore the rule of law in the state, to the maximum extent possible in a proxy war situation. That means restoring accountability of the government to the people in every branch of the administration. The new government has taken a number of steps in this direction with respect to the economy. Its next—and more difficult—task is to make the security forces more mindful of the civic and human rights of the people. Separatism will fade away only if Kashmiris come to believe that they can have all the benefits of independence with none of its disadvantages within the Indian Union itself.