A Strange Collaboration

Gen Pervez Musharraf and Jaswant Singh appeared on the same cnn programme last Wednesday. Singh sounded firm as he reiterated the stand that India would not talk to Pakistan until the latter created an atmosphere suitable for a dialogue by stopping cross-border terrorism. Musharraf sounded reasonable, and asserted that he was prepared to travel anywhere at any time in order to resume the stalled dialogue with India. But he went on to say that Kashmir was witnessing a freedom struggle not cross-border terrorism; and that he would enter into a dialogue with India only if New Delhi recognises the centrality of the core issue of Kashmir and takes it up first. So has nothing changed? Not quite. Something has indeed changed, but it has changed in Sri Lanka and not Kashmir.

Without a word said in public, India and Pakistan have been cooperating to help Chandrika Kumaratunga's government weather the ltte storm in Jaffna and to preserve the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. This cooperation has existed ever since Colombo issued an appeal for help after the fall of Elephant Pass on April 27. Pakistan and Israel came to its help militarily within a matter of hours. Israel supplied Sri Lanka with a fresh batch of Kfir jet fighters and, according to some reports, pilots to fly them. Pakistan has supplied Sri Lanka with thousands of tonnes of ammunition and other armaments. India refused to get militarily involved, partly for political but also for military reasons. Not only had the ipkf's experience been a bitter one, but in the years that followed Colombo procured its arms from virtually every other source except India. India has, however, given a commitment that it will give humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid has been defined as just about whatever is needed to ensure an orderly evacuation of Jaffna, with a minimum loss of life, should the need arise. Reports from usually reliable sources suggest that 'humanitarian' may also have been redefined to include the denial of ammunition and weapon replenishments to the ltte from the sea.

Together, the three countries have succeeded in shoring up Sri Lanka's military capability and morale to the extent of foiling the ltte's thrust at Jaffna. As of the time of writing, the guns have been almost completely silent for more than three days. This was preceded by two weeks of heavy fighting at the end of which the ltte had not gained any of their military objectives. Slowly but surely, the fresh infusion of arms, the Sri Lankan army's superiority in numbers, the openness of the terrain around Jaffna and the ltte's losses have evened the scales between the two sides. The goal of paving the way for a negotiated solution within the framework of Sri Lanka's unity, by denying the ltte an outright military victory, has therefore been partly served.

Had this only been a tacit cooperation between Pakistan and India, it would still have been a notable development. Pakistan's strategists must surely know that an outright ltte victory would magnify Prabhakaran's already larger-than-life image among sections of the youth in Tamil Nadu to epic dimensions and create the serious possibility of a Punjab-type insurgency among marginalised groups in that state. So shouldn't Pakistan be quietly cheering on the ltte?

The fact is that it has done just the opposite. And what's more, it has done so with New Delhi's approval. In concrete terms, Pakistan has kept India informed about everything it's supplying to Sri Lanka. This quiet, constructive cooperation between India and Pakistan to deny victory to what must be the world's most ruthlessly efficient terrorist organisation stands out in the sharpest possible contrast to the lack of it in Kashmir. And that therefore raises questions Indian policy-makers and intelligentsia must confront squarely. First, if Musharraf is willing to help in combating terrorism in Sri Lanka, should we not give greater credibility to his assertions that he wants to prevent fundamentalist violence in Pakistan? Second, should we not credit him with knowing that he cannot do this beyond a point if he also wishes to use them to weaken India's hold on Kashmir? And if that is so, is it not possible that Musharraf is keener to start a process of detente with India than we give him credit for?

It is against this background that some of his remarks to cnn need to be reappraised. Musharraf said, "Let us not live in the past." He clearly does not mean 1948, when the first Kashmir war took place, for he still considers that to be unfinished business. He is referring to Kargil. In effect, he is asking India to stop thinking of him as the architect of the Kargil war and start thinking of him as the head of the Pakistan government. Another remark too gains fresh significance: Musharraf conceded that Pakistan could 'persuade' the 'freedom fighters' to moderate their attacks on India in Kashmir but wanted India to reciprocate by reducing 'human rights abuses' in Kashmir. The first part of this statement is an admission that he has some control over the jehadis. The second part is a request for a face-saver if he were to curb their activities. It is after all not in Pakistan's but India's interest to bring down human rights abuses in Kashmir by making the security forces and the Kashmir police publicly accountable for their actions (as Farooq Abdullah did in the Pathribal killings).

In the final analysis, however, it remains up to Gen Musharraf to make the first move. India can ease its demand for a complete cessation of cross-border terrorism but there must be a noticeable decline for it to even contemplate talks with Pakistan. What Sri Lanka shows is that Musharraf's overtures are not solely aimed at winning over the Americans but part of an attempt to cope with his own very real problems. India needs to look upon them therefore with a shade more receptivity than it has so far.