War gaming in the late '60s showed that if control of the nuclear trigger was decentralised to subordinate commanders to fire nuclear weapons in the central NATO-USSR front, 21,000 tactical weapons would be fired in 48 hours, catapulting limited war through the strategic stage to a nuclear holocaust. Kashmir will be no different. The rationale behind nuclear strategy today is a mystery to lay Indians, which is understandable, but it is an area of darkness to most members of the strategic hierarchy on both sides of the border. There are probably only two libraries in India that can muster more than 50 relevant books on the subject and certainly none of the declassified official studies done in Washington and London. The signals from Pakistan, post Chagai, show wide variations in strategic comprehension. Nawaz Sharif's reference to a hitherto "existential" deterrence indicates that someone there understands strategy. Gohar Ayub clearly has both feet in 1946 and brings back the oft-repeated Hollywood thriller line, "It's not the professional killer, but the amateur that frightens me...."