In a television programme aired on the evening of Dr Manmohan Singh's visit to Kashmir, Omar Abdullah, the National Conference president, asked, "What did the prime minister say during his visit that every prime minister of India has not already said?" The answer, regrettably, is "not very much". Since militancy began, every one of Manmohan's predecessors has announced an economic package, has exhorted the Kashmiris to embrace peace and has promised to ease the draconian rule of the security forces and make them more accountable for their actions. These promises have turned out to be inflated, and have done little to ease the uncertainty and fear in which most people in the militancy-affected parts of the state live.
Most of the Rs 24,000-crore package consists of projects that have already been sanctioned and are at various stages of implementation. Manmohan's offer amounts mainly to a promise that New Delhi will not let the perennial shortage of investible funds, which has littered India with incomplete infrastructure projects, stand in the way of speedy implementation.
No one in Kashmir doubted Manmohan's sincerity and goodwill, but to them his emphasis on peace appeared to be a plea to the Kashmiri people to accept the status quo and get on with their lives. Peace, the prime minister clearly implied, would facilitate the revival of economic activity. That was the only road to economic security and prosperity. The response to this was given in advance by Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, who warned the listeners on the eve of the prime minister's visit that if he confined himself to offering economic sops, the Kashmiris would think that he was trying to buy their loyalty to India. That, regrettably, is pretty much what he did.
Manmohan also reiterated, as Vajpayee had done before him, that he was prepared to talk without any pre-conditions with anyone whose aim was to restore peace. But this too did not satisfy the Hurriyat which has long objected to being lumped together with political parties that accept the union with India and are prepared to work within the framework of its constitution.
Perhaps most important of all, Manmohan's visit to Kashmir did not address the central concerns of the Kashmiris. Every last Kashmiri knows that he or she will never know genuine peace till Pakistan and India cease disputing over the final status of their state. Now that the two countries have at last begun to negotiate seriously with each other, they are desperate to be taken into confidence about how the talks are progressing, and how India and Pakistan view the future. Above all, they do not want a repeat of 1947 when they were treated as cattle to be traded between the two dominions. It is their future that Pakistan and India are discussing. So, they want to have a say in it.
Manmohan did make several statements that touched, albeit tangentially, upon these concerns. He repeated that New Delhi could not consider a solution that would weaken India's secular fabric (short for cause a backlash against Indian Muslims). This should satisfy the vast majority in the Valley, including the separatists, who are openly against any further partition of the State. He also said that India was against any change of boundaries. While this negates one of the proposals made by Gen Musharraf, it leaves others open. Finally, as a way of signalling a departure from the past, he offered Kashmir peace with honour, a phrase so far used only by the Hurriyat. This is admittedly a vague promise. But at this moment, when the real engagement with Pakistan is about to begin, it would have been difficult for an Indian prime minister to be more precise.
But most Kashmiris are incapable of understanding these subtleties. As far as they are concerned, the PM offered them no assurances, made promises so vague that it would be impossible to hold New Delhi to them, and in sharp contrast to Pakistan which has been talking even to the moderate Hurriyat leaders who openly oppose any merger of Kashmir with their country, made no special effort to involve the Hurriyat in the peace process.
Despite these limitations, the visit has done some good. By confirming that India will reduce its troop strength in Kashmir, he has signalled a measure of trust in both Pakistan and the Kashmiris. One consequence is the Hurriyat's decision, being taken even as I write, that it will probably meet the prime minister when it visits Delhi over the weekend.
If the Hurriyat does so, it will pave the way for Manmohan to let them visit Pakistan and POK, to talk to not only the government there but, more importantly, to the militant organisations that are still clinging to the dream of jehad in Kashmir.
In the coming days, the prime minister also needs to spell out an alternative to changing boundaries to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The history of Europe during the past half century shows that boundaries do not need to be changed if their importance can be diminished progressively till they lose their emotive significance. That is the direction in which India has been trying to steer its negotiations with Pakistan, but Pakistan has been dragging its feet because it suspects this to be a method of foisting the status quo upon it through the back door. This is the gap in trust that the two countries need to bridge in their future talks. The Srinagar-to-Muzaffarabad bus link would be a good starting point.