Ever since it became apparent that no government could be formed in Pakistan that did not include the coalition of Islamic fundamentalist parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), confusion and uncertainty have reigned supreme in the minds of Indian analysts. One of the coalition partners, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, was the patron saint of the Taliban, which in turn gave shelter and an operational base to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Another, the Jamaat-e-Islami has a long history of sending Pakistanis and Afghans to fight the Indian security forces in Kashmir, and has links with the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Would the MMA's asccension to power, even as part of a coalition containing older, more moderate partners, not make the Kashmir dispute very nearly insoluble?
This fear gained an added edge when the MMA made it clear that it had won its 53 (out of 268) seats and captured power in two provincial assemblies almost entirely on an anti-American platform, and was determined to make US troops leave Pakistan. Since General Musharraf had made it clear that there was absolutely no likelihood of Pakistan ever leaving the coalition against terrorism, this meant that he would not under any circumstances accede to the MMA's demand. This leaves only one area in which the MMA and Musharraf can find common ground: Kashmir.
The logic behind this reasoning is impeccable, but as days go by and the MMA makes its position on various issues clearer, the flaws in it are becoming increasingly apparent. As that happens, a new set of possibilities have emerged for the reopening of dialogue and an eventual agreement with Pakistan.
At an hour-long session with foreign correspondents, MMA leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman accused Pakistan of having no foreign policy. What passed for foreign policy was in fact imposed upon it from outside by the US. Pakistan, he said, needed to formulate a foreign policy that was in line with the aspirations of the people. The Maulana had no doubts about what these were. He ascribed his own party's unexpectedly good performance to the resentment towards US policies, especially on Afghanistan, and the presence of American troops on Pakistani soil.
None of this is new. It's only when it is welded to what he had to say on Indo-Pak relations and especially on Kashmir that an entirely new set of possibilities for our relations begins to emerge. In an interview given to the Press Trust of India, at or possibly just after the conference, the Maulana said that Kashmir and other disputes should be settled bilaterally under the ambit of the Shimla agreement. He also asserted that the MMA would not allow Pakistani soil to be used for terrorist activities against any other country.
Taken together, the above statements reflect foreign policy goals that are diametrically opposed to those of Musharraf. The General not only supports the continued hunt for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in the adjoining areas of Pakistan, but is only too willing to allow US troops to be stationed in his country to take part in the hunt. He is also a total hardliner on Kashmir who has repudiated the Shimla agreement both implicitly and explicitly, times without number.
But the differences go deeper than that. To Musharraf, an army officer who has lived his entire life in the shadow of Pakistan's humiliating defeat in the Bangladesh war, India is the main enemy. His complete identification with the US' war on terrorism, and consequent 180-degree turnaround towards the Taliban after 9/11, was at least partly motivated by a desire to stick to the main item on his agenda, taking revenge on India by separating Kashmir from it. With a long history of cooperation between the Pakistani and American armed forces behind him, Musharraf felt none of the latent animosity that most of his countrymen harbour towards the US.
By contrast, for the MMA, America and the culture it represents is the main enemy. Siding with it has made Pakistan lose its soul. This has to be rediscovered through a return to the fundamentals of Islam. It goes without saying that this requires, at the very least, a far more nuanced approach to the problem of Islam-inspired 'terrorism'. If the MMA's first task is to keep western culture, personified by an aggressive us, at bay, then any foreign policy goal that requires Pakistan to depend heavily upon the US or other western powers must take second place. Kashmir, however reluctantly, becomes the first candidate. That is the reason for the policies towards India that Fazlur Rahman articulated to pti.
Since one still has no idea what shape a government will finally take in Pakistan; what its relations will be with Musharraf, and how much the prime minister, as opposed to the president will control the above key elements of its foreign policy, it is far too early to start calculating what the changes in that country could mean for India. What Indian analysts and policymakers should however bear in mind is the fact that the MMA's success will most likely not make the resumption of a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan any more difficult than it is today. On the contrary, it could just possibly make it easier.
By the same token, it is Pakistan's relationship with the US that will almost certainly come under some strain. No matter what Musharraf's formal powers might be, in practice he will not be able to work with a government led by, or containing, the MMA without stepping back a little from its close embrace with the US. His problems will be especially serious in the nwfp and Baluchistan, where most of the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda are reputed to be hiding. All in all, Musharraf's position is not an enviable one.