On November 24, India will face the most serious test of its foreign policy in recent years. On that date, the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency will have to decide whether or not to refer Iran's alleged violation of Article XII-C of its statutes to the Security Council for further action. Within India, the Left has already made it clear that it will withdraw support from the UPA coalition if the government votes in favour of taking Iran before the Security Council. The Left has made such threats earlier as well but every indication received by political analysts in Delhi so far suggests that this time it means what it is saying. The fact that the Samajwadi Party and the Janata Dal (Secular) have thrown in their lot with the Left shows that were it to come to a trial of strength, the UPA can no longer rely upon absenteeism and abstentions in the Lok Sabha to retain its majority.
On the other hand, having once voted in favour of a resolution that only postponed taking Iran before the Security Council on the grounds that its activities constitute a threat to international security, India can reasonably decide to abstain only if it can show that the fault for not engaging in a constructive dialogue during this period lies with the EU3—France, Germany and the UK—and not with Iran. At this moment, that is by no means obvious. On the contrary, President Ahmedinejad's recent statement denying Israel's right to exist has heightened suspicion of his long-term objectives just when he needed to allay them.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that India is pinning its hopes on not having to vote at all. But this does not mean that New Delhi is simply keeping its head down and hoping that the storm will blow over. On the contrary, it has been in continuous discussion with the EU and will engage in crucial discussions with Iran next week, before the IAEA meeting.
New Delhi has remained firm in its belief that Iran has not violated Article XII-C of the IAEA statute and that it has the right to process its own nuclear fuel. But it must convince the rest of the world that it also intends to adhere to the npt of which it is a signatory. New Delhi also believes that the best way to make sure that Iran honours its commitments is to make it want to do so. This means that the EU and the US must address their valid security concerns.
In Delhi's perception, President Ahmedinejad's earlier offer to allow transnationals to invest in, and run, uranium enrichment plants within Iran, and the EU3's most recent counter-proposal that Iran should make uranium hexafluoride within the country and only pass it through centrifuges located in Russia, has narrowed the search for a solution that satisfies everyone sufficiently to justify the continuation of the dialogue.
New Delhi's belief that a compromise solution is attainable is reinforced by the international situation today. The US is bogged down in Iraq and cannot take on another military adventure till it finds a way to extricate itself. Even after that, it would be extremely reluctant to enter into a head-on confrontation with Iran because it needs its continuing cooperation to keep the Shias in Iraq quiescent. It is acutely aware that the vast majority of the Shias in Iraq have not taken up arms against the US and the UK, and have taken part in the two elections held so far because they have been strongly urged to do so by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who has close ties with the clergy in Iran. Economic sanctions or an assault upon Iran's nuclear installations could upset the delicate balance that prevails in Iraq.
The US and the EU, therefore, have very strong reasons to avoid a confrontation with Iran. But they too cannot afford to back off now without some conciliatory move from Tehran. The best step that Iran could take—one that does not impinge upon its sovereignty—is to suspend once again the uranium enrichment that it restarted at Isfahan on August 1. In its letter to the IAEA board of August 9, the EU had made it clear that it regarded this as an uncalled-for action that had needlessly derailed its efforts to find a compromise solution that took all of Iran's concerns on board. Tehran's action too was purely symbolic because it does not have any power reactors in which to use the small amounts of enriched uranium that this plant can produce. Having made its point, Iran can afford to show some flexibility on this issue now.
New Delhi will no doubt urge it to do so next week. But it also needs to decide what it will do if its efforts fail and a confrontation ensues. Were that to happen, it would be well advised to abstain from voting on the resolution altogether and allow others to drag Iran before the Security Council. When the chips are down, any democracy must respect the sentiments of its people. Today, rightly or wrongly, every imam in a mosque—be he Sunni or Shia—is busy turning the vote in the IAEA into a litmus test of the government's attitude towards Indian Muslims. This certainly does not only have political implications.
The reason why Islamic extremism has made so little headway in India, despite terrible lapses like Gujarat, is that Muslims know that at least one of the two major parties in the country is staunchly secular. As a result, block voting by the community can determine the outcome on key issues. If India sides with the US a second time, it will put the Congress party in the same boat as theBJP and severely undermine the community's belief that democracy will always protect them at their moment of need. At a time when a third of Muslim youth cannot find job, this is one development that we could do without.