Give Up, Mr Karunanidhi

IN the surcharged atmosphere following the Jain Commission castigation of the DMK and the chorus of denials by M. Karunanidhi and his cohorts, an impression is gaining ground that the report of Justice Jain is biased—that it ignores many facts and its conclusions are based on speculation. The report clearly says: "The LTTE was in continuous interaction with the chief minister, Shri Karunanidhi, primarily to ensure their activities continued unhindered even after the Padmanabha killing." But the UF government, in the Action Taken Report, chose to only state: "No action is called for on this view of the Commission." The DMK makes a number of accusations. That the LTTE was given active support and encouragement by the Indian government itself, especially under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. That negotiations were going on even while the IPKF was in Sri Lanka, proof of which is a letter written by Rajiv Gandhi to Murasoli Maran as late as May 15, 1989. The DMK claims that Rajiv Gandhi himself requested Karunanidhi to act as an intermediary between him and the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran. That the intelligence reports indicating DMK-LTTE links were motivated and manufactured by the Rajiv Gandhi government. Karunanidhi also claims that he had no contact with the LTTE after the Padmanabha assassination. Unfortunately for Karunanidhi and the DMK, the facts speak otherwise.

The Padmanabha assassination is used by Karunanidhi to define the so-called change in his relationship with the LTTE. He deposed before the Jain Commission: "I had initially sympathy not only for the LTTE but also militant groups like the EPRLF, TULF and TELO. Later, with the killing of peace-minded TULF leader Amritalingam and TELO leader Sabaratnam, my sympathy started waning away. After the Padmanabha massacre, the LTTE completely lost my sympathy." Karunanidhi is well aware that it was a matter of national policy to give all aid and assistance to the Lankan Tamils so that they could protect themselves from the genocidal attacks of the Sri Lankan army. Though we were never in favour of a partition of Sri Lanka along ethnic lines, our efforts were always geared towards gaining devolution of power for the Tamil minority regions. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord achieved this objective. The LTTE and other militant groups sought guarantees of amnesty before laying down arms. The guarantees were given and on August 5, 1987, the LTTE took part in the arms surrender ceremony.

The attitude of the Indian government towards the LTTE changed only when it refused to honour its agreements with India and became a threat to our own security. The activities of the LTTE, now seeking to eliminate all threats to its leadership of the Sri Lankan Tamils, had to be curbed—especially when it was found to have established links with the ISI as well as ULFA. This, again, was a matter of national policy. Karunanidhi, in his statement before the Jain Commission, admits as much: "I am of the view that I have always sailed along with the policy of the Centre considering the national interest." Also, if the government of India had refused to come to the aid of Sri Lanka, there was a very real danger of Pakistan intervening to help the Sri Lankans, which would have further endangered our own security.

As regards the letter of Rajiv Gandhi, its very first sentences make the position clear: "Dear Shri Maran, I was surprised to receive your letter of May 2. When Karunanidhi proposed sending a DMK emissary or group of emissaries to talk to the LTTE, I had said that we would gladly provide the facilities to make such a visit possible." It is obvious that it was not Rajiv but, on the contrary, Karunanidhi who had mooted the proposal and that Rajiv Gandhi had expressed his willingness to once again help in arriving at a solution.

Justice Jain has rightly pointed out the importance of the Padmanabha case. The EPRLF leader was assassinated in Chennai by the same LTTE hit squad which later assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. Even the rifle used in the Padmanabha killing was recovered from the Bangalore hideout of One-eyed Jack, Sivarasan. If the Tamil Nadu police had taken proper action immediately and investigated this case thoroughly, the course of history might have been different.

The intelligence reports used by Justice Jain to draw his conclusions against the DMK mostly refer to the period when V.P. Singh was prime minister. It is difficult to imagine Rajiv Gandhi having influenced these reports. According to IB reports as well as independent corroboration through evidence before the Jain Commission, the following facts have emerged:

(The writer was a Congress member of the Rajya Sabha from 1982 to 1988 and again from 1988 to 1994.)