In Uncle Sam's Cabin

When East Asians refer to 'Asia', they mostly mean themselves. Singapore's senior minister Lee Kuan Yew rarely includes India while referring to Asia, because India differs so much from the authoritarian milieu—Confucian, Islamic or feudal Christian—of these parts. Despite India's efforts in the 1990s to get closer to East Asia, the gulf remains. A gulf of understanding and a general lack of concern. And it was evident in the reactions to the Indo-Pak tests, the major exceptions being China and Japan.

With a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, a member of the Nuclear Club and as Pakistan's closest ally, China had to take the anti-India line—though the Sino-Indian security balance had not changed materially. By being quick off the mark in denouncing the explosions and halting all official aid, Japan scored some points with its Western friends and allies. But Tokyo's selective morality should not be ignored. When China and France carried out their explosions before signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Japanese regrets were just that, polite and formal. Aid to China has grown unabated since.

Needless to say, Japanese society grieves for the nuclear victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But what have the Japanese leaders done to further the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation? They feel snug under Uncle Sam's security blanket and point fingers at others. And one can't believe that Japan is serious in offering to mediate over Kashmir. Is it another nice-sounding gesture to please their G-8 counterparts?

The other East Asians—the likes of Malaysia's Mahathir Mohammad and Singapore's Lee—who would not normally miss an opportunity to lecture the world, have been rather quiet. They have been too preoccupied lately with the wrenching economic crisis gripping this region. And worse times are yet to come. ASEAN's largest country, Indonesia, is also going through a political upheaval after the forced ouster of President Suharto.

So the Indo-Pak developments have received scant attention and elicited "routine" statements, criticising the explosions and decrying a South Asian arms race. The only leader to refer to a nation's sovereign right to "determine its destiny" was Indonesian foreign minister Ali Allots. Having said this, even he reverted to the mantra of "security without nuclear arms". The Philippines president, Fidel Ramos, made a mental leap when he opined that the Indo-Pak situation will affect Southeast Asian economies.Ramos' foreign secretary, Domingo Saigon, came up with a brilliant suggestion to ask Russia to mediate. Pakistan's Gohar Ayub Khan, whose father went to Tashkent after the 1965 war and came back disappointed, will have no positive vibes on Boris Yeltsin or his foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov.

All this is sweet music to Washington and the chorus is being sung with a little orchestration by the US State Department. Gone are the days when Madeleine Albright or her predecessor would find ASEAN leaders rather "recalcitrant" as former Australian leader Paul Keating said about Mahathir in another context. Most of East Asia will remain so dependent on the IMF, meaning at the mercy of a US veto in case of misbehaviour, that for some years Washington can take East Asia for granted.

On the Indo-Pak issue, for once China and Japan are on the American side. And East Asia can't ignore that reality. From Japan they want capital—even if it is not forthcoming now, they will have to look to Tokyo in a few years. As for China, its economic sinews may not be so strong, but it has a military and political potential to selectively discipline an errant Southeast Asian neighbour. Much as ASEAN countries make fists in their pockets on Chinese activities in the disputed South China Sea islands, they will lie low on an issue like Pokhran-Chagai where China, Japan and the US see eye to eye. Incidentally, the three Indo-China countries are so down in the dumps that they have no voice in foreign affairs and they have even stopped pretending that they have a say in the larger game of nations.

So where does that leave India and Pakistan for the foreseeable future vis-a-vis East Asia, excluding China and Japan?

East Asia will toe the Anglo-American and Chinese line, while still making pompous noises on the desirability of universal disarmament when the matter is discussed at the UN General Assembly later this year. In the event of a Sino-Indian tussle on the nuclear issue, or for that matter on any issue, don't expect ASEAN, Seoul and Pyongyang to side with New Delhi. (The Ghauri version of the Scud missile came from China via North Korea; American satellites and other surveillance apparatus tracked it but kept the information quiet.)

 In late 1962, after the Chinese invasion of India, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's founding PM, was the first Southeast Asian leader to voice his support for India and donate blood to that cause. Times have changed in the past four decades. If there is a major Indo-Pak showdown, the region will sit on its haunches and not side with either. At best it will go along with the Anglo-American consensus. Times have not changed all that much.

On matters nuclear, ASEAN should have some qualms. After all, it was ASEAN, which pushed the concept of ZOPFAN, the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia. Despite all the diplomatic hot air, ZOPFAN was cold-shouldered by the two nuclear powers that mattered. China and the US do not want to meet the ASEAN conditions to make the region nuclear-free. China has territorial problems with its neighbours and the US would not be seen as stooping to its former client states on a nuclear issue. If ASEAN proposes a South Asian nuclear-free zone—as it should after its advocacy of ZOPFAN—China and Pakistan will support it, but India will most certainly not. If and when that happens ASEAN's hypocrisy on the nuke-free areas will be exposed.

Nevertheless, ASEAN, with US backing, will still try to assert itself. It is likely to invite Pakistan to the July meet of the ASEAN Regional Forum—though India's said to be lobbying to stop it. India worked hard to be included in this forum, consisting largely of East Asia, the major N-powers and the European Union. Once in, even as an observer, a nuclear Pakistan will hang in there and, with the connivance of others, raise Kashmir. India will be forced to fight a rearguard action to keep Kashmir out of East Asia's security agenda.

(V.G. Kulkarni is a Hong Kong-based journalist)