The Supreme Court ruled recently that “there is no fundamental right which inheres in an individual to claim reservation in promotion”, and that “no mandamus can be issued by the court directing the state government to provide reservations”. So, have reservations been interpreted in the spirit of Articles 14,15 and 16(4)—the last specifically dealing with the right to equality of opportunity in employment? How have entitlements as justiciable fundamental rights and non-justiciable directive principles been interpreted juridically over the years? Can directive principles impose an obligation on the State to realise the citizen’s entitlements, thus giving the Constitution, as Babasaheb Ambedkar held, a transformative potential? Are fundamental rights discretionary, as this Supreme Court verdict suggests, and hence the State has no obligations? Underlying the verdict are ideas of ‘merit’ and ‘efficiency’, a social debate finding interpretations in varied juridical pronouncements going back to the 1960s, and which gained strength in the discourse around anti-Mandal Commission agitations. It pits individual mobility against class entitlements (of scheduled castes, in this case) and the State’s need to identity ‘legitimate claimants’. The verdict also said there is no justiciable right or constitutional duty to provide reservations, thereby reducing substantial equality to formal equality against the spirit of the Constitution.