For Pakistan, Clinton's brief stopover is a clear win over India, which staked its all to prevent it.
The news of Clinton's expected touchdown in Pakistan has created an unprecedented euphoria among a diverse collection of people-ranging from the official media to the US-centric elite of this country. The fact that this brief visit reflects a failure of Indian diplomacy has further accentuated the high. However, looking beyond all the hype, one needs to examine the question: who gains most from Clinton's decision to touch base with Pakistan?
To begin with, it can't end a situation-Pakistan's international isolation-that simply doesn't exist on the ground. After all, has any country severed links with it after the nuclear tests or the military counter-coup? What the visit does do is to reflect clearly the American priorities and constraints. To begin with, the US realises that if it seeks peace in South Asia, it can't achieve it by ignoring or bypassing a nuclear Pakistan. By casting aside Pakistan from Clinton's South Asian itinerary, the US would have lost its already declining influence in this country.
Its increasing strategic interest in India-and its vulnerability to Indian blackmail at the moment-made it difficult for the US to make Pakistan part of the official visit. The absurdity of it all became more pronounced after the US decided to include Pakistan for a non-state, brief stopover for Clinton. The US is now citing its love for the Pakistanis, not approval of the military government, as a reason. To highlight this, it appears Clinton will also be given access to the Pakistani media to talk live to the people of Pakistan!
Furthermore, the Americans have been at great pains to stress that all Clinton will do is to discuss issues of concern to the US-terrorism, democracy and nuclear non-proliferation! The fact that this may amount to a monologue rather than a dialogue is of least concern. Besides, without discussing the core issue of conflict-Kashmir-how can the US help achieve peace in South Asia? It would, thus, be ridiculous to assume that the Pakistani leadership-vehemently committed to the Kashmiri cause-would avoid discussing it with Clinton.
So, at the end of the day, how does the US benefit from Clinton's visit to Pakistan?
One: It gains a certain leverage which it had lost. Pakistan will be made to feel obligated since Clinton has chosen to "defy" India by stopping over in Pakistan!
Two: Clinton can't simply go back empty-handed from Pakistan-so what will he be "given"? Hopefully "good faith" assurances on issues of terrorism and nuclear stabilisation. On the issue of terrorism, Pakistan could ask the US to put pressure on its ally Britain not to harbour Pakistanis wanted for criminal acts in this country. The Osama logic can work to our advantage too.
Three: If Clinton addresses the Pakistanis directly through the electronic media he gains a rare-though undeserved-privilege of making a statement on Pakistan's internal affairs in the Pakistani media.
Four: The US manages to have its cake and eat it too: visit Pakistan for a few hours without making it official.
What of Pakistan's gains?
The recent public revelations of satellite exposes of Pakistan's nuclear and missile facilities by the Americans have obviously been timed to undermine some of the goodwill that would have underlain the Clinton visit. The American intentions are now suspect in Pakistan-as if they are trying to signal to the Indians that they can't ignore Pakistan but they really don't intend to "offer" anything. So, in many ways, the visit has been undermined in terms of substantive achievements. Nevertheless, Pakistan can still see some positive aspects of this visit.
One: The limited time and non-state nature of the visit notwithstanding, Pakistan has an opportunity to make its views on critical issues known directly to the American president-albeit a lame-duck one. Most important, at least seemingly, the Pakistanis have not compromised on any critical issue to bring about the Clinton stopover-so if they continue to stick firm to the crucial core issues there is little to lose from this visit.
Two: For Pakistan this visit is clearly a diplomatic victory over India which staked its all on preventing Clinton from even touching down in Pakistan. The negative Indian diplomacy which saw a new upsurge since the military counter-coup in Pakistan has finally rebounded and the extent of India's distress is evident in the new histrionics they are adopting to explain away this failure.
Three: Pakistan has the opportunity to put across its views and proposals on terrorism and nuclear stabilisation-the latter should include proposals involving American know-how in stabilising nuclear command and control systems. For, after a visit to South Asia, Clinton will have no doubt about the durability of the nuclear reality of South Asia, so the objective should be to stabilise this reality.
Beyond this, Pakistan should have no great expectations from the visit. However, the opportunity should be used to apprise Clinton of the actual situation in Indian-held Kashmir and its repercussions within the region. At the end of the day, it is to the Americans' advantage that they have realised the criticality of Pakistan if there is to be peace in South Asia. Now it is up to Pakistan to use the Clinton visit to its advantage.
However, one final word of caution for Clinton: if the Indians make some form of a military move post the Clinton visit then it will be clear that the US has given India the go-ahead for a military adventure. That would put paid to the US having any effective peacemaker role in this region.
(The author is an Islamabad-based defence & security analyst)