I am highly alarmed at reading the Outlook report published last week on what the Americans think of the Indian army. I reject most of their conclusions. I don't think we are clear about why we want a military alliance with the US. It would appear that we take great pride in our collaboration with the country without determining what we want from them. I have nothing against such alliances and would have appreciated if the cooperation between the two countries was confined to the navy and air force where India could benefit from superior technology. But it makes no sense to hold joint paramilitary exercises in Agra at the unit level. While we may be unclear about what we want from the Americans, the same cannot be said about them. They know exactly what they are looking for and chances are they have got it.
The US assessment that the vast Indian army structure is crumbling is patently untrue. Man to man, the Indian army is better than America's. The nature of our operations is such that it calls for manpower intensity. There is a Line of Control, there is a Line of Actual Control and there are massive anti-insurgency operations. The forces necessarily have to be large. The Indian army operates on a different scale altogether and it would be a good idea to take some of the Americans to the heights and inaccessible places to make them aware of the harsh ground realities of fighting in the subcontinent. The Americans do not employ manpower-centric tactics and there is a difference in approach here which cannot be seen as value judgement on the Indian army.
The Americans, before they arrive at hasty and questionable conclusions, have to realise that our requirements are totally different. In some of the places where our units are stationed, even highly sophisticated equipment does not work and there is no harm in conceding that the Americans have very advanced technology at their disposal. Certainly much more than us. I remember during the 1962 war, some of the American equipment just did not fire and when we asked questions, the cryptic reply was "information is confidential, we cannot talk".
The charge that the Indian army is protocol-bound is false. Maybe at the higher corps or division-level, there are norms that need to be followed, but the junior command levels, let us say captains and majors, take their own decisions and are quite open and mix freely. If there is any protocol, those are government rules: the Indian army has to have inhibitions since there are strict instructions not to deal with foreigners. The decisions taken are not entirely in the hands of the military either. It has to depend upon the civilian leadership and this cannot be construed as being status-conscious.
As for the accusation that Indian army officers are not easy to get along with, I don't think that it is a handicap: I see no reason why army officers have to get along with everyone. That is scarcely an asset, given the nature of the job. And if the Americans look at it that way, you can hardly blame the Indian army. After all, in our five decades of wars and operations, the Americans have always been on the side of our adversaries. So if there is some amount of suspicion, it is understandable.
Again, it is perfectly understandable if the US feels that Pakistanis are easy to get along with. The US-Pakistan army cooperation goes back a long way. In fact, the arming of Pakistan by Americans started way back in the early 1950s leading ultimately to the first military coup in 1958. It is my belief that however much we want to delude ourselves that we are now staunch US allies, it would do well to remember that the Americans will never ditch Pakistan. They have been, and will continue to be, US' real ally. Euphoric as we may be with our new association with the US, it is important to remember this historical fact.
As for the charge that Indians are not businesslike, there cannot be any sweeping generalisations. I do not know who was detailed to deal with the Americans—chances are that they may have dealt with someone who was not business-like enough—but to use it as the yardstick to assess the whole Indian army is absurd and superficial. I think the important thing right now is for the Americans to look at themselves. In a sense, the US assessment of our army is an eye-opener because it puts into perspective how they perceive us. There is another aside here: just as the Americans have assessed us, we should assess the Americans. I think such an exercise should be undertaken.
Certainly, the point about adequate modernisation is a valid critique. The Indian army operates largely with borrowed equipment and there are natural handicaps. Some of our offices, no doubt, could do with better facilities—particularly some of our field offices.
Another disturbing trend is our willingness to send troops to Iraq to keep the Americans in good humour. But I think it is a move fraught with dangerous implications. It is okay to send logistical troops there—doctors, engineers. But to send a fighting combat division to Iraq is to involve the Indian army in conflict with the civilian population in Iraq. It is most likely that the Indians will be deployed in 'difficult' areas—territories not being manned by Americans themselves.
On the whole, I think the US assessment of the Indian army is highly subjective and exaggerated. I would again like to emphasise that we have to be very careful while dealing with the Americans.