Learning From Pakistan

THE creation of the Council for Defence and National Security by Pakistan President Farooq Leghari confirms the axiom on socio-political behavioural patterns: that in any society, power gravitates to its most cohesive and disciplined segment. Leghari had his explanations for the need to set up a high-powered Council that would comprise the president, the prime minister, the three services chiefs, the defence minister, the foreign minister and the home minister. His main reason: the armed forces were being given a formal role in governance because of the internal ferment, the inefficacy of civil institutions and the corruption permeating political processes.

The three services chiefs have always been the most important constituent of the ruling troika. What is significant is that the role of the armed forces in the country's governance has been formalised, something that could even evolve into a constitutional role. I make this assessment in the context of another development which coincided with the creation of the Council. The Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution which vests the president of Pakistan with the power to unilaterally dismiss an elected prime minister if he is convinced that the prime minister's continuation in office will affect the country's stability and security. Leghari's decision to set up a council fundamentally changes the constitutional characteristics of the Pakistani state and its power equations. The Pakistan army's erstwhile covert, and periodical, role as arbiter of the country's political destiny now stands transformed as a legitimised permanent reality.

Pakistan's military establishment had sought such a role ever since Zia-ul-Haq's regime. But it refrained from pushing through a decision due to the emotive fervour for democracy after Zia's long military tenure—and also due to two other reasons. First, American friends of the military establishment advised it to encourage a facade of democracy while retaining real power. Second, the military leadership, having experienced the burden of direct political governance, did not wish to be enmeshed in realpolitik so soon. Former army chief General Aslam Beg, however, asserted as early as 1990 that the Pakistani armed forces had a supra-governmental role—of defending not just the territorial integrity, but the stability and ideology of Pakistan beyond the stipulations of the Constitution. Beg's successors, Generals Asif Nawaz Janjua and Waheed Kakkar, also pressed for a council. Kakkar almost succeeded, with Benazir's increasing dependence on the Pakistani army to manage the disturbances in Sindh and in operations in Punjab and Baluchistan. Benazir herself suggested the need for such a council to defuse the impression that she was not getting along with the military establishment.

The instability in Pakistan due to Benazir's mismanagement of affairs obviously prompted Chief of Army Staff Jehangir Karamat to tell Leghari that if he wanted to remain in control, the army had to be given a legitimate role in governance. It would not be an inaccurate speculation that Leghari must have consulted senior members of the Supreme Court, the US government and senior civil servants apart from interim Prime Minister Meraj Khaled and General Karamat before setting up the council.

It is interesting that no political party or leader has challenged Leghari's decision in court as yet. There has been criticism from major political parties like Benazir's Pakistan People's Party and the Jamaat-i-Islami, but their reactions are muted. Significantly, none of the political parties has criticised the armed forces but directed their ire at Leghari, accusing him of political motivations and a lust for power.

The Council is likely to have far-reaching consequences on Pakistan politics. First, the Council, dominated by the armed forces, will function as a super-cabinet, operating in tandem with the president, exercising greater authority than the elected government. Second, the military is firmly entrenched in the power structure—it will be difficult to upstage it.

Third, the importance of electoral politics and the party system will diminish even if Pakistan remains a democracy with a parliamentary form of government. Fourth, the influence of the armed forces on foreign, defence and economic policies will increase. Finally, the military establishment would have acquired a role conceived by Zia-ul-Haq and articulated by Aslam Beg—that of being the supreme symbol of Pakistani ideology. In the short term, the armed forces have taken on the responsibility of managing the impending political crises in Pakistan.

Leghari has already announced that the army, not the civil administration or the police force, will be solely responsible for the operational aspects of the election. The elections itself are unlikely to clear the confusing scenario—with the prospect of a hung National Assembly looming large. The situation stands compounded by the loss of faith in the political system, articulated in recent weeks by Pakistani leaders themselves, including Khaled, Leghari, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. Even a democratic leader like Khaled lamented that "Pakistan is a crowd rather than a nation," suggesting that salvation perhaps lies in letting the army manage the country. This is a tragic commentary on Pakistan's political predicament and at the same time a justification for the role given to the armed forces. There are indications that the people, tired of the skullduggeries of their political leaders, endorse their acting prime minister's view of the nation. This being so, the creation of the Council is not going to be objected to by the people at large. Pakistan's major allies, the US and Saudi Arabia, are not averse to this situation, because the stability and military reliability of Pakistan is more important to them strategically than Pakistan remaining a genuine democracy.

What are the implications for India? If not anything else, our political parties and leaders should take a lesson from Leghari's move. The corruption, the maladministration and the increasing dependence on our armed forces to manage internal crises can generate a feeling among our army leaders also that if they are entrusted so frequently with responsibilities, they would be justified in seeking a direct role in governance. With the army's dominance in Pakistani policy-making processes, one should expect the drift in bilateral relations to continue. But if the armed forces bring some stability to Pakistan, it may be less inclined to be adventurist towards India. The Pakistan army's new status in the state is a warning to us about the importance of maintaining our democratic integrity. Politicians and the people should heed this warning—and revive our conscious commitment to the Constitution we gave ourselves 46 years ago.