It is easy to feel disappointed by the outcome, or the lack thereof, of the first meeting of the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan after the signing of the historic Islamabad declaration in January. The wide gap in the approach of the two countries to their 'composite dialogue' was apparent even before the foreign ministers met. India went to the conference with a list of no fewer than 72 confidence-building measures, but Natwar Singh had signalled, even before the meeting began, that so far as Kashmir was concerned, his focus would be squarely upon Pakistan's obligation to fulfil General Musharraf's January undertaking not to let any territory controlled by it be used for terrorism in India or Kashmir.
Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri, by contrast, came prepared to discuss all issues, but was intent upon discussing Kashmir. Before leaving Islamabad, he made a significant statement: "By denying them (Kashmiris) their rights, we have kept their future in a perpetual limbo and our relations in perpetual tension". While the MEA reacted to this 'unifocal' statement with 'disappointment', it chose not to react to the more significant part of what he had done. This was to hold Pakistan responsible, along with India, for the denial of their rights to the Kashmiris.
If this was not a verbal slip (and it is most unlikely that it was) then this is the first time that Pakistan has admitted that it too has denied the people of Azad Kashmir their democratic rights. This is the first time that a Pakistani spokesman of his eminence has equated India and Pakistan. By doing this, Kasuri opened the gates for a wide-ranging discussion of possible solutions centering on meeting the Kashmiris' aspirations to autonomy, limited sovereignty, constrained independence, or some such arrangement, on both sides of the Line of Control. It was the closest that any Pakistani foreign minister could have come to conceding explicitly what is implicit in the Simla agreement, that the Line of Control should be the starting point of any resumed discussion on the final status of Kashmir.
Had Natwar Singh met him halfway, the two foreign ministers would have been able to pave the way for a more meaningful meeting between Manmohan Singh with General Musharraf in New York. They would, without any doubt, have disagreed on basic issues. But they would have felt out each others' minds, and this would have enabled them to sharpen the focus of the talks between Manmohan and Musharraf. Instead, judging by newspapers reports, there was little discussion of Kashmir beyond a restatement of known positions. Even Kasuri's spur of the moment suggestion to emulate the China-India border talks model and appoint special representatives to discuss Kashmir fell upon unreceptive ears. Instead of saying that India would consider the suggestion and get back to Islamabad, Natwar Singh stated that the existing machinery would suffice.
Our disappointment with the lack of meaningful talks on Kashmir needs, however, to be tempered with realism. Let us not forget that there has been a change of government in Delhi. Although it was briefed by members of the outgoing government, the new dispensation is not conversant with nuances of the discussions that had led to the Islamabad declaration. Also, the rancour that erupted between the bjp and the Congress within days of the change of government has prevented Manmohan and Natwar Singh from drawing upon the experience of their predecessors for framing their future strategy. Add to this the fact that in the NDA government the negotiations had been led by the PMO, while in this one the task has gone back to the foreign office, and it is understandable why, in his first formal meeting with his counterpart within the framework of the Islamabad declaration, Natwar Singh has chosen to be circumspect and stay within the confines of previously stated positions.
In the light of these constraints, last week's meetings cannot be said to have been fruitless. Both governments have demonstrated their determination to continue with the peace process. Important steps have been taken towards defusing the conflict in Siachen and defining the border in the Rann of Kutch, and talks will at last be held on an oil pipeline from Turkestan through Pakistan to India. These are no mean achievements. If there is also a sharp increase in two-way trade between Pakistan and India in the coming months, we will be more than halfway towards building the trust between the two nations that is an essential prerequisite for a durable solution to the Kashmir problem.
As the focus shifts to the meeting in New York, Pakistan too would do well to clear some of the ambivalence that surrounds its position on Kashmir. Its lack of enthusiasm for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service stems from the advice that Salahuddin in Islamabad and Ali Shah Geelani are giving its representatives, that any 'defusing' of the tension between Pakistan and India in Kashmir will play into India's hands by making a solution based upon the Line of Control more acceptable to the Kashmiris. If Geelani's logic is sound, then every step that Pakistan takes to make the Kashmiris more miserable will make them keener to join Pakistan. Before they buy this proposition, they would do well to remember the outcome of the mori poll of April 2002 and the advice that other members of the Hurriyat council have given them.
India and Pakistan can settle the Kashmir dispute and achieve their much desired peace only if they keep the Kashmiris' welfare and wishes in mind as they negotiate with each other. Every measure that empowers Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control, and lifts the disabilities imposed upon them by their struggle over Kashmir will make the resolution of the dispute that little bit easier.