History tells us that when a nation opts for military solutions to political problems, gives its armed enforcers too much power and no clear mission and commits them to any one place for too long, the wayward among them develop their own little fiefdoms. In my time in Kashmir, I saw and heard enough to believe some intelligence agents and mid-level security officers there are well on their way to being as deeply entrenched and reckless as the officers of the isi once were in Afghanistan.
They need no sanction from New Delhi and they can tell whatever they like to their superiors, who have no other ways of knowing. The home minister, for instance, congratulated the security and intelligence agencies in Kashmir for identifying and eliminating the killers of the Sikhs so quickly after the massacre. Now that we know what happened, anyone interested in defaming the Indian state could easily convict Mr Advani of the grossest cynicism and falsehood. But I'm inclined to think Mr Advani had been lied to by some of his own men: the swiftly if clumsily organised kidnapping, murder and defacing of five innocents at Panchalthan was only one of the countless atrocities that speak, if you want to listen, of the warlord-like omnipotence some in Kashmir have acquired. Any analysis, for instance, of our confused and confusing official position on Kashmir (Autonomy within the Constitution? ‘Absolutely not.' Amalgamation with Pakistan? ‘Let's talk about it') could begin no better than by examining the influence and power of the men running what Mr Jha himself calls ‘dirty tricks departments'.