Restoring Letter And Spirit

Home Minister L.K. Advani will have to do much more than express willingness to talk to militants and release three Hurriyat leaders if he’s serious about paving the way for meaningful talks on bringing peace to Jammu and Kashmir. He continues to bear an attitude of condescension, as if doing the Kashmiris a favour instead of recognising their rights. New Delhi has to show that it realises the mistakes it has made in the last 50 years and wants to make amends.

President Clinton’s visit opened a window of opportunity that delay will inevitably close. His warning to Islamabad against trying to alter Kashmir’s borders with blood rules out support to separatist forces, while his assurance that the US would not mediate assuages India’s fears. If the Centre now convinces discontented elements in Kashmir that maximum autonomy within the Indian Union will be granted to them, they may have no option but to respond.

The key to reaching out is to admit that the promise of respecting the special status given to the state, the basis on which it joined the Union of India in October 1947, has not been honoured and take steps to reverse the erosion of its autonomy. One condition for this is tighter control over the security forces, elements of which behave as if their mission is to repress the people rather than protect them.

To place the future of the state in perspective, the past cannot be overlooked. Fifty years ago, J&K elected its own constituent assembly. In his inaugural address on November 5, 1950, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah had said: "The Constitution of India has treated us differently from other constituent units. With the exception of items grouped under defence, foreign affairs and communications in the Instrument of Accession, we have complete freedom to frame our constitution in the manner we like."

This underlines the extent of autonomy given to gain the confidence of a Muslim-majority state adjoining Pakistan. The manner in which Sheikh Abdullah addressed the issue is no less relevant today. "The Indian Constitution," he said, "has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction.... This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India, where the large majority of the population are Hindus... The Indian Constitution has amply and fully repudiated the concept of a religious state." Pakistan’s claim to being a Muslim state, he described as "a screen to dupe the common man so that he may not see...that Pakistan is a feudal state".

But the Sheikh was not oblivious to the threat of Hindu communalism: "Certain tendencies have been asserting themselves in India which may in the future convert it into a religious state wherein the interests of Muslims will be jeopardised.... The continued accession of Kashmir to India should, however, help in defeating this tendency."

The process of securing the accession of J&K more than two months after India attained independence reflected the delicate balance struck between accession and independence. For this, it was essential to appeal to the Valley’s distinct historical background and culture of religious tolerance, guided by the secular leadership of the National Conference. The Congress was committed to the accession of princely states being determined by popular wishes rather than the ruler’s. As for Maharaja Hari Singh, he’d held out for independence until forced by the Pakistan-organised tribal incursion into the Valley to reluctantly seek accession.

Documents exchanged at the time bear witness to this. Hari Singh’s letter seeking accession stated he had been considering whether to accede to India or Pakis-tan, "or stand independent with cordial relations with both". Aware of Nehru’s insistence on popular support for accession, he promised to invite Sheikh Abdullah, whom he’d previously imprisoned, to head the government. The Instrument of Accession he signed on October 27, 1947, detailed the subjects under the heads of defence, external affairs and communications on which Parliament was to make laws. The state retained authority over all other subjects.

Accession was officially accepted by Lord Mountbatten. His letter of acceptance contained a unique provision. It stated: "Consistently with their policy that when the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, it is my government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the raider, the question of the state’s accession should be settled by reference to the people."

This became the basis for proposals for plebiscite raised at the UN which New Delhi countered on grounds that elections in J&K constituted reference to the people. It did not prevent the steady erosion of the state constitution. A key provision, for instance, provided that the Sadr-i-Riyasat (head of state) be elected by the state assembly. Under pressure from New Delhi, he was designated governor and appointed by the Centre, giving the Centre authority to impose President’s rule in the state, which it didn’t hesitate to do.

These changes were endorsed by successive state governments after Sheikh Abdullah’s detention under pressure from New Delhi. The reaction in the Valley was expressed by its leading historian, Prem Nath Bazaz, in a letter written in June 1965 to the then CM, G.M. Sadiq: "The biggest problem in present-day Kashmir is the reconciliation of local nationalism with Indian nationalism.... It’s unfair to accuse Kashmiri patriots of parochialism...when they display communal tendencies as long as Indian nationalism...remains based on religious beliefs.... When last autumn Indian nationalism launched upon an aggressive campaign to demolish the autonomy of the state without the consent of Kashmiris, you faltered and acted according to its bidding."