Shed Cold War Blinkers

US secretary of state Madeleine Albright's luncheon speech at the Asia Society in New York on March 14 is notable for the candour with which she has spelt out the purpose of President Clinton's visit to South Asia. Albright has made it clear that the centerpiece of the visit is the creation of a new relationship with India. "For decades," she said, "the enormous potential of Indo-US relations went largely untapped. The main reason was an all-encompassing Cold War. As the world became bipolar, India chose its own path of non-alignment.... Even after the Cold War's end, the United States and India were slow to explore the many areas where our interests increasingly converge. In some quarters in India, there was a lingering suspicion of US intentions in world affairs. And on the American side, some could not or would not understand India's compulsions. Today, however, this mindset of mutual distrust is beginning to change. And, in fact, I believe that both the US and India realise that there was always something unnatural and regrettable about the estrangement of our two democracies."

The secretary of state made it clear that although India-Pakistan relations will be discussed, what the US is basically keen on establishing are the parameters of a more comprehensive relationship with India. For a host of reasons that Albright spelt out, the US sees India as a future partner in building the world order of the 21st century. But if India wants to be a part of that endeavour, it needs to take tangible steps to show that it subscribes to the overall goal of nuclear non-proliferation. The US no longer insists that India should eliminate its nuclear weapons. But it wants India to sign the CTBT, strengthen existing formal and informal export controls on nuclear technology, and exercise restraint in developing its nuclear potential because of the "consequences it will have beyond South Asia".

"How India addresses all these issues will, of course, influence the decisions we make. But our goal is a qualitatively better relationship with India-not a simple return to the status quo before the tests. Our ability to attain this goal will depend largely on what India does. And the limits of our ability to cooperate with India are a matter of US law as well as our international obligations."

Albright's remarks constitute as clear a repudiation of the policy of "even-handedness" towards India and Pakistan that characterised the first Clinton administration as India could wish for. Her description of the purpose of Clinton's stopover in Islamabad is also reassuring. "The conflict in Kashmir has been fundamentally transformed. For nations must not attempt to change borders or zones of occupation through armed force.... And we can be sure of one more practical reality: tangible steps must be taken to respect the Line of Control". On terrorism, Albright #had this to say: "And we want to see steps to address the effects of terror on Pakistan's neighbours, notably India". This is the first public recognition by the US that what is happening in Kashmir is terrorism and that Pakistan has a hand in it.

Most of what Albright had to say was not new. What distinguished it was its coherence and the fact that it came from the secretary of state. New Delhi's response has so far been cautious. This may partly be because it has not had time to study and digest the full implications of the Albright statement. But it also reflects the persisting confusion in India's foreign policy goals. South Block still does not know whether it wants to accept the new international order that has emerged after the Cold War or to fight it. That new order revolves around the US' political and economic pre-eminence, and a host of agreements such as the Helsinki Accord on the sanctity of European boundaries and the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. These agreements and conventions seek to freeze the present hierarchy of nations in the global State system and limit future competition to the economic sphere.

India challenged that order profoundly when it exploded its nuclear weapons in May 1998. But it is a tribute to US flexibility and to the negotiating skill of the Indian foreign minister and his aides that the shock has been absorbed and India is once more being offered a position in the hierarchy that is more in keeping with its size and importance. To accept the offer all it needs to do is demonstrate its willingness to abide by its rules.

THERE is a similar confusion in India's stance on its conflict with Pakistan. On the one hand it has spared no effort to inform the world that there has been a sharp rise in the intensity of the Pakistan-backed proxy war in Kashmir. On the other it has taken exception to Clinton's description of South Asia as a nuclear flashpoint.

New Delhi's allergy to such remarks, when made in public, arises from its fear that they could be a prelude to offers of international mediation. But it does not seem to have crossed the policy-makers' minds that its strenuous efforts to repudiate fears of an imminent war with Pakistan also carry a message. This is either that New Delhi is exaggerating the extent of Pakistan-backed infiltration into Kashmir, or that no matter what Pakistan does in Kashmir India will not send its troops across the Line of Control. Both messages can only mislead it recipients: the first because it is plainly wrong, and the second because it offers an implicit commitment that India will not cross the LoC no matter what Pakistan does in Kashmir.

When reported by Clinton to Musharraf in Islamabad, this will only embolden Pakistan and force India to break it at some future date. A far better course would have been to recognise the risk of war in Kashmir and promise to exercise restraint provided Pakistan does so too, but make no promises if it does not. One can only hope that Vajpayee will deliver this message in his private talks with President Clinton even if South Block does not do so in public.