The Cold War nuclear risk management still holds water vis-a-vis South Asia.
Nuclear risk reduction during the Cold War was far from easy. The US and the Soviet Union worked hard to put in place nine key elements to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Despite sustained efforts to prevent a nuclear exchange, US and Soviet leaders barely avoided potentially catastrophic accidents.
In vastly different circumstances, India, China, and Pakistan are now in the early stages of developing nuclear weapons. While recognising the obvious differences between the US-Soviet experience and the India-China-Pakistan relationship, it's still useful to consider whether these key elements of nuclear risk reduction also apply to South Asia.
One key element in the US-Soviet case was a formal agreement not to change the status quo in sensitive areas militarily. This accord, signed at Helsinki in 1975, was the product of detente, not a battlefield victory. Weight was added to its guiding principles as 35 heads of state with a stake in avoiding another war in Europe endorsed them.
A second key element of nuclear risk reduction was tacit agreements between the US and Soviet leaders to avoid brinkmanship in each other's backyard or along particularly sensitive Cold War faultlines - divided Germany and Korea. Tacit pacts to avoid brinkmanship over the status of Berlin came after harrowing crises in 1948-1949 and 1961. The status quo in Korea was restored only after a war in which the use of -weapons was proposed but rejected by President Truman.
The most worrisome example of Cold War nuclear brinkmanship - the Cuban missile crisis - came 12 years after the Soviet Union joined the US as a -weapon state. This crisis prompted the removal of nuclear-capable missiles from Cuba and Turkey. After this brush with disaster, US and Soviet leaders continued to jockey for geopolitical advantage - but with an understanding not to play for such high stakes so close home.
A third key element of risk reduction was an agreement to minimise dangerous military practices. During the Cold War, US and Soviet forces engaged in activities with a potential for escalation or accidents. Surface naval vessels and submarines jostled for position in tight spaces; combat aircraft carried out exercises near national borders; and provocative intelligence-gathering operations were conducted. The first guidelines for avoiding incidents at sea were negotiated in 1972. A pact to prevent dangerous military practices on land and in the air was negotiated in 1989.
Special reassurance measures for ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon systems were a fourth key element. Reassurance was provided by prior notifications of missile launches and other arrangements, requiring transparency for the deployment and dismantlement of nuclear forces.
A fifth key element in risk reduction was trust in the faithful implementation of treaty obligations and confidence-building measures. On occasion, such trust was generated through unilateral or reciprocal actions: removal from operational status of the least safe and secure nuclear weapons in 1989 by presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. More often, trust was built on verification. Therefore the sixth key element was reliance on one's own monitoring capabilities, known euphemistically as "national technical means."
The seventh key element was the establishment of reliable lines of communication across borders, both for political and military leaders. The first communication channel, the "Hotline", was established after the Cuban missile crisis.
Eighth, risk reduction required reliable and redundant command and control over nuclear forces, as well as exceptional intelligence regarding the disposition of opposing nuclear capabilities. The expense of these arrangements was considerable, but well worth it, considering the many things that could go badly wrong.
Ninth, the US and the Soviet Union worked constantly to upgrade and strengthen existing nuclear risk reduction measures in quiet times. The original Hotline has been improved considerably. Reassurance measures were recently extended to include shared early warning arrangements. Gradually, treaty arrangements led to intrusive on-site inspections to build trust.
What conclusions might be drawn from Cold War experience? Clearly, even with all of the measures described above, the US and Soviet leaders still found themselves "eyeball-to-eyeball" on several occasions. Somehow, they managed to escape nuclear disaster, which suggests that a tenth key element is divine intervention, or at least plain dumb luck. US-Soviet risk reduction measures took many years to put in place. But even after the safety net was presumably in place - during the first Reagan administration - there was severe miscommunication.
It would be extremely unwise to dismiss this record as being irrelevant to South Asia. Thankfully, the hyperactive nuclear rivalrly between the US and the Soviet Union is not being replicated in this region. But redundant nuclear capabilities were supposed to reduce risk during the Cold War. Great nuclear risks can also arise from smaller arsenals. Indeed, these risks are greater in the early phases of arsenal-building, when perceived vulnerabilities are felt, verification is weak and command and control untested.
As bad as Cold War nuclear dangers were, bipolarity provided a measure of simplification. In Central Europe, boundaries were fixed, but South Asia has lines of control, not borders. And nothing replicates the J&K situation.
The introduction of overt, offsetting nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles has not reduced nuclear risks in South Asia. Seeking safety in more powerful weapons is likely to make matters worse. How many of the key elements of nuclear risk reduction are now in place? Can India afford to wait 10 to 15 years to put them in place? Even in the darkest periods of the Cold War, US and Soviet officials maintained active lines of communication to reduce nuclear risks. At present, India refuses to talk to Pakistan and China is not ready to engage India on these matters. Deafening silence is not a key element for nuclear risk reduction.
(The writer is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center)