In the past decade, corruption in infrastructure contracts and land deals has raged unchecked because those in power began to share the loot with anyone who was likely to object. Throwing crumbs at opposition politicians to buy their silence and rewarding babus through allotment of undeserved flats became a regular feature. “A flat for a signature” seems to have been the policy in the Adarsh Housing Society scandal, where almost every bureaucrat whose concurrence or clearance was crucial (for denotification and conversion of user status) has been allocated super-expensive real estate in Mumbai.
In comparison, the Harshad Mehta scam of 1992 really burst on an age of innocence. The outrage in Parliament over my report on how Mehta had stolen Rs 500 crore from the State Bank of India was fairly genuine. Politicians found it hard to believe that one upstart trader could amass such stupendous wealth from the capital market in so short a time. The Reserve Bank had even called a press conference to deny my subsequent report that the scam was worth around Rs 5,000 crore. Perception changed so rapidly that a few months later, people found it hard to believe Harshad Mehta’s claim that he had bribed P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then prime minister, with a paltry Rs 1 crore. If the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) that investigated the Harshad Mehta scam served any purpose at all, it was to educate our neta-babu class about the immense potential of the capital market as a vehicle to amass wealth, launder black money and convert it into legitimate investment income. After all, one had to hold shares for only a year and, lo and behold, it emerged through the system as tax-free earnings.
This education coincided with the entry of Foreign Institutional Investment (FIIS) into India and provided the perfect opportunity for ‘round-tripping’ of money. Black money left India through hawala channels and returned as super-clean ‘foreign investment’. Is it surprising that demands to disallow non-transparent fii sub-accounts have always been ignored? Or, that despite several known cases of abuse, including the recent investigation involving the Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group (ADAG) with Union Bank of Switzerland and others, the regulator merely tinkers with the rules?
Sadly, all this interest from business and politicians hasn’t strengthened the capital market. It remains narrow, shallow and illiquid. Official reports now confirm that India’s investor population has shrunk to a third of the 20 million in 1992. This explains why stock prices are so easily manipulated and controlled by a bunch of anonymous moneybags masquerading as institutional investors. Even among Indian institutions, goings-on at the mammoth Life Insurance Corporation and its subsidiary exposed what is an open secret in the market—that government officials loot institutions under their charge to prop up stock prices or lend money to companies under political pressure and for petty gratification. This scam is on its way to a quiet burial without anyone asking why so many former lic top honchos, including one who was a member of the Securities Appellate Tribunal, were on the board of an unknown brokerage firm called Money Matters.