The N-Powerment Game

The seriousness of the question mark that Lantos' remarks had created depended to a large extent on how the French would react to it. France had made no secret of its eagerness to sell civil nuclear energy plants and technology to India, and had been championing India's cause in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (which is committed at present to denying sales to countries that have not signed the NPT) for years. France had, therefore, welcomed the July agreement and renewed its offer of nuclear power plants and fuel. Most observers, even in the US, had therefore concluded that the threat of competition from France and Russia would hasten the passage of the legislation in the US Congress and Senate. Manmohan's meeting with President Jacques Chirac, therefore, became far more than a routine formality. We waited with bated breath.

Chirac did not altogether disappoint us, but he did not dispel our anxiety either. In his opening statement itself, he made it clear that France would do its utmost to change the international rules governing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy but would not break ranks with the Nuclear Suppliers Group to sell equipment to India. This was spelt out more unambiguously in the joint statement. India had to remain content with Chirac's personal promise that he would leave 'no stone unturned' to change the relevant international regulations.

On September 13, tension rent the air as we boarded Air India One. A flurry of meetings awaited that same evening—first, Bush had asked for a meeting with Manmohan at 6.45 pm and his national security advisor Steve Hadley was to meet his counterpart M.K. Narayanan soon afterwards.To top it off, foreign secretary Shyam Saran was also scheduled to have dinner with under secretary for political affairs NicholasBurns. Clearly, the Americans were losing no time in getting down to business.

Saran was scheduled to brief the media at 7.40 pm, after the Bush-Manmohan meeting. So, despite severe jetlag, two score media persons waited for three long hours to hear the outcome. Saran's briefing left us feeling relieved but not entirely so. The meeting had lasted for half an hour—double the anticipated time. It was Bush who brought Iran up. This gave Manmohan an opportunity to reiterate India's position in terms that left no room for misunderstanding. "India," he said, "had consistently opposed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and would continue to do so." India believed that Iran had to pursue its energy programme in accordance with the international obligations that it had taken on—i.e. within the ambit of the NPT. Referring to India's position in the forthcoming meeting of the IAEA board of governors, India believed it was important to give diplomacy an opportunity to bring about a consensus on the issue. Thereupon, Bush referred to Congress' criticism of India and assured Manmohan that he stood by their July joint statement and hoped that Congress would give its approval.

Bush's reassurance would have carried greater weight if the US had not had a long record of signing agreements and treaties only to have Congress refuse to ratify them later. What is most disturbing about the attempt to change the laws governing nuclear sales to India is the way in which the issue had become embroiled in the larger one of constitutional prerogative. When Burns presented the case for a relaxation of existing laws to exempt India, many members of the committee rounded on him for daring to make commitments to India without first consulting the House of Representatives and the Senate. Even if the administration got past the House of Representatives, it still had to face the Senate.

If the administration does not renege from its present stand, it will enable France, Russia and possibly the United Kingdom to start selling nuclear power generation equipment to India. American firms will be the only losers. This is the final weapon. What is not clear is what India will have to do to get it to use it.