The Centre has succeeded in containing the triple crisis that exploded within days in Bihar, Jharkhand and Goa, but only just. In two of the three states—Bihar and Goa—it did so by imposing President's rule. In Bihar, this became inevitable when Ram Vilas Paswan refused to back Laloo Yadav's RJD under any circumstances. In Goa, the Centre declared President's rule when its chief ministerial nominee, Pratap Singh Rane, won the confidence vote by getting the Congress pro-tem speaker to disqualify an MLA on the constitutionally untenable ground that he had disobeyed his party's whip. In the third, Jharkhand, it enlisted the help of the President, no less, to curb the excess of zeal to form a 'secular' government displayed by the governor, Syed Sibtey Razi, and make him advance the date by which Shibu Soren has to prove his majority from March 21 to March 15. Even before the SC advanced it further, this took some of the wind out of the BJP's accusation that Razi was acting on Delhi's orders to give Soren ample time to buy the support he needed.
In all three states, therefore, the central government has taken exemplary, even if somewhat belated, action. But although the tremors are subsiding, it would be idle to pretend that the three crises have not changed people's perception of the Congress for the worse. For one thing, they have revived memories of the Congress' high-handed behaviour in the '70s and '80s. Many have therefore concluded that despite having a party president who has demonstrated her lack of interest in acquiring and exercising power and a squeaky-clean prime minister, the Congress continues to be a party that considers the acquisition of power to be an end in itself and not a means to an end. For another, they have revived the fear that governors cannot be relied upon to be impartial guardians of the Constitution. Worst of all, despite the central government's belated damage control, the fear aroused by the initial confusion and scramble for power that the Congress is not above using its control of Delhi to make governors take partisan decisions has gained a new lease on life. In sum, the three crises may have brought the new government's honeymoon with the public to an end.
There has been enough ambiguity in the Congress party's initial responses to the crises to feed these fears. But it is possible to take too jaded a view of these actions. For instance, Sibtey Razi was apparently not influenced by anyone from the Congress high command. He called upon Soren as the latter was able to furnish verified letters of support from 41 MLAs in the house of 81. The confusion arose because one of them, Enos Ekka, changed sides the very next day.
What is less easy to explain is the indecisiveness that has characterised the high command's responses to each crisis. In Goa, it stood by and allowed the Constitution to be mauled for a full five weeks before declaring President's rule. In Jharkhand, it allowed the state unit to ignore constitutional precedent which required that the BJP be given the first chance to form a government and support Soren's bid for power. Only in Bihar did the party do the right thing—extend support formally to the RJD, its ally at the Centre and the largest single party in the assembly. But it did so only after first stabbing Laloo in the back, and only because the results of the elections left it with no other alternative.
This indecisiveness has provoked a spate of criticism of Sonia Gandhi's leadership. But its real cause is the high command's fast dwindling control over its state units. Paradoxically, this loss of control is getting more pronounced as the party gets weaker. One consequence is the growing inability to control behaviour of the state cadres that will harm the overall, long-run interests of the party as a whole.
This enfeeblement is most noticeable in states where the Congress has surrendered its erstwhile dominance to a regional party. In these, the party cadres have lost the confidence they once had of coming to power with the next swing of the political pendulum. With that has faded their hope of turning power into profit. Thus, when a sudden possibility of coming to power arises, even as part of an unstable alliance that will at best last for a few months, they become virtually uncontrollable. That is the root cause of the seeming indecisiveness of the high command. For, it is forced to balance the loss the party will sustain from allowing its cadres to have their way against the loss it will sustain from disappointing them.
As I pointed out last week, there is no easy solution to this problem but if there is one at all, it lies in making structural changes to Indian democracy that will strengthen the hands of party leaders at the national level over their cadres and minimising the chance of sudden, opportunistic changes in the states. The first can be done by creating a system of state funding for recognised political parties, based upon their share of vote in the last election. This money will go to party leaders and strengthen their control over the organisation and the selection of candidates for Parliament and state assemblies. The second can be done by amending the Constitution to reunite central and state elections and put states where the government falls prematurely under President's rule till the next election. This will effectively put an end to the kind of opportunism the Goa unit of the Congress displayed.
Both reforms have been on the agenda of the Congress, the BJP, or both parties. Obtaining a constitutional amendment should not be impossible. But for that to happen, both parties have to show a modicum of decency and respect toward each other first.