The Singh-Talbott talks have a limited utility, since a better idea of each other's position alone won't ensure progress.
AFTER eight rounds of talks, a spin-free evaluation of the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks is in order. Both participants and their staff have travelled through countless time zones in search of a new post-Cold War and post-Pokhran relationship. Each meeting ends with moderately upbeat appraisals, as might be expected. But where do we now stand?
First, it's true that both sides have begun to understand each other's security concerns. The last sustained bilateral dialogue on security issues dates back to the Kennedy administration, and the absence of high-level discussions in the intervening decades is a record of sorts for deafness between democracies. In the 18 months prior to India's nuclear tests, the Clinton administration committed itself to ending this abnormal state of affairs. The Pokhran tests dealt a serious setback to this belated initiative. When the dialogue resumed, Washington brought to the table a more urgent agenda - and a more constrained one as well.
Still, officials who covered important ground in privacy needed to show sincerity of purpose. Rhetorical slogans were left at the door, and serious topics discussed constructively. These conversations have more depth when carried out by political appointees than by civil servants. Here, India fared better than Pakistan, since prime minister Nawaz Sharif - unlike his Indian counterpart - was unable or unwilling to appoint a political ally of great stature and extensive background in security matters to serve as his interlocutor with the US.
While a greater understanding of each other's security concerns is necessary and useful, it is not sufficient to sustain intensive intercontinental diplomacy. The limited ability of New Delhi and Washington to move beyond greater understanding to more demonstrable achievements is no doubt disheartening. Indeed, downbeat assessments surrounding Indo-US dialogue rest, in part, on inflated expectations.
India's frustration with Washington's inability to be more forthcoming on matters relating to sanctions relief and dual-use technology has been quite evident. But it would be well to recall that the Clinton administration's interest in repairing the breach with New Delhi had to be weighed against other interests, especially the need to bolster non-proliferation policies severely damaged by India's tests.
As for the sanctions imposed by US laws, India has every right to be confused. Sanctions were imposed immediately after the tests, followed by partial relief, and followed again by listing a number of entities within India (and Pakistan) to be penalised. This ill-timed progression testifies to the tortured process of inter-agency deliberation and belated decision within the US executive branch. Only those who have participated directly in the practice of bureaucratic delay and bargaining can fully appreciate these arcane practices. What matters most at this point is that Capitol Hill has given the administration a year-long authority to ameliorate the sanctions, if conditions warrant such relief.
India's near political consensus on nuclear matters was cracked when the bjp leadership decided to move beyond keeping the nuclear option open. Henceforth, Indian governments will face far more domestic divergences on these matters, providing more reason not to make decisions. India-watchers abroad have noted with concern the extent to which low domestic politics are now being applied to the highest national security issues.
Few national decisions are more important than those relating to nuclear weapons. In the US, such debates have been intense. Often, the executive and the legislature made bad decisions, prompted by political defensiveness and the false promise of security residing in these fearsome weapons. In nuclear matters, one bad decision typically leads to more. Corrective action in the US did not begin until the early '70s, picking up considerable momentum in the late '80s. The biggest breakthroughs required transforming events in the Soviet Union. For the last decade, the US and Russia have each been dismantling between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads annually. Both countries have a long way to go to correct past mistakes.
Given this track record, North Americans have little standing to expect quick and wise decisions by a fellow democracy just beginning to address momentous choices relating to nuclear danger. India's nuclear tests shocked a world accustomed to New Delhi's penchant to avoid difficult choices. In the aftermath of the tests, it is for Indians to consider whether the culture of postponement continues to serve national interests and, if not, what decisions regarding the nuclear option would serve those interests to best advantage. If New Delhi can learn from the mistakes of others, so much the better. Among the nuclear weapon states, only China has not suffered from a cascade of bad choices: Beijing has reinforced its no first-use pledge by maintaining a zero-alert rate for its strategic forces. This, too, could change with unfortunate choices by India.
Additional discussions between US and Indian officials are unlikely to provide further clarification. But such meetings would provide grist to the mill of those who complain that India faces intolerable outside pressures while contemplating whether and how to decide. Decisions to reduce or increase nuclear dangers are India's to make. A harmonisation of Indian and US views in the absence of such decisions appears unlikely, unless forced by events elsewhere. Without more concrete steps toward harmonisation, the Singh-Talbott talks would have to be judged a disappointment, given the talent and time spent in this pursuit.
(Michael Krepon is president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington )