Messrs Doubtfire

SCIENTISTS of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had noticed the leak of helium, a fuel in the fourth stage of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), an hour 'before' take-off on September 29, a senior rocket scientist involved in the programme has told Outlook .

But ISRO's big bosses decided to overlook the leak, hoping that the third and second stages would offset the problem. However, the second stage too malfunctioned—one propellant is suspected to have run out before the other—placing the IRS-1D in a wrong orbit, sparking panic. "The leak was visible to anyone who watched the live telecast of the launch. There were reddish-orange fumes coming out near the fourth stage," says the scientist. ISRO bosses, he feels, decided to go ahead as prime minister I.K. Gujral had flown down to witness the "prestigious" event.

ISRO chairman K. Kasturirangan declined comment on the scientist's allegation, which casts a shadow over ISRO's decision-making and fault-management. But the 'chalta hai' attitude could easily thwart India's efforts to enter the global launch market: the very objective of PSLV.

Ironically, only in August this year, ISRO won an award from the World Intellectual Property Organisation for coming up with an advanced imaging system for inspecting spacecraft and rocket launchers. "This is not a technical problem. This is a management failure," adds the scientist, who recalls a similar incident in 1979 with the SLV-3 when an oxidiser leak wasn't noticed because ISRO hadn't installed cameras at that level. The rocket came down.

Fortunately for ISRO, PSLV went up. But it placed the IRS-1D in a wrong orbit. That has since been partially corrected, and the remote-sensing satellite has been sending worldclass high-resolution pictures.

But the orbital correction manoeuvres caused by a defective launch has shortened its lifespan from three to two years. News agency reports that the IRS-1D's life may be just one year have gone uncontested.

Scientists take a broader view of PSLV's underperformance in a high-risk industry.

There is no dispute that ISRO deserves huzzahs for performing so creditably in the face of American embargoes on technology transfer, a spy scandal, and brain drain. And for its openness, media savvy and interaction with industry, facets which most government outfits lack.

But analysts say the PSLV problem coupled with the INSAT-2D disaster reveals a deeper malaise. Namely, misplaced priorities, suspect quality control, poor man-management, ego hassles, the works. Surprised? "U.R. Rao (former ISRO chief) was hellbent on leaving his imprint on the space programme, he just concentrated on building satellites which was the easier part," says an ISRO scientist who had quit last year. "Most of the funds were spent on satellite fabrication whereas the business of perfecting launch systems took a backseat. So what happens? We build INSAT-2D for $30 million, pay Ariane $60 million to launch it. And still it crashes," he adds.

The figures do not bear out the charge. Sure, Department of Space figures show a near doubling of funds for satellite development from Rs 42 crore to Rs 73 crore over the past three years; but rocket development still gets a big chunk: Rs 496 crore.

P. Ramachandran says though Rao may have had some fondness for satellite fabrication since it was his specialisation, he certainly showed no favouritism. "In any case, in autonomous ISRO, individual heads of centres are free to pursue their programme." But Outlook inquiries revealed substantial sniping and backbiting among ISRO's many subgroups. "There's delight in one group if the other suffers a setback," revealed a source. "If the rocket has a problem, the satellite guys are happy, and vice versa." The most serious charge ISRO has attracted in the wake of the twin setbacks, ironically from its own scientists, past and present, is that the organisation conducts far  too few tests on the ground before putting the satellites on the launch vehicle.

"ISRO did not conduct an evaluation of the PSLV launch before its first commercial launch last fortnight," says the scientist who told Outlook of the helium leak. "We had three developmental flights and several changes were incorporated into this flight. For instance, the payload was increased from 900 kg to 1,200 kg. Forget the fact that it was successful, ISRO was to set up a group of experts to assess the changes and evaluate the risks. But this was not done." Adds another scientist: "Other than the zero-g tests that have to be conducted under special conditions, a rocket has to be extensively tested on ground. This ISRO obviously hasn't done."

A S K. Anantha Ram, who resigned as group director of ISRO's satellite propulsion system, told The Pioneer :"We have been launching too many satellites without building reliability. We've the technology, we lack in quality and reliability." But Kasturirangan says INSAT's basic design is flawless. "Enough testing has been done, there's nothing more left." He says ground testing was made much much tougher after the INSAT-1C failure. The 2D glitch, he says, was entirely unexpected.

Many like Business India science writer R. Ramachandran say there is some truth in Kasturirangan's stand: "ISRO does comprehensive simulations in the thermovac chamber." Moreover, you can only do so many tests.

Outer space is finally Murphy territory: if something can go wrong, it will. Kasturirangan says INSAT-2D showed no signs of giving problems for four months till last fortnight.

Analysts fear the reverses could put off clients (like Bill Gates) and countries (like South Korea, Malaysia, Canada) intending to use Indian facilities to launch satellites if ISRO doesn't iron out the imperfections.

But ISRO is showing no signs of slowing down and getting its act together. INSAT-2D had a short circuit; so did INSAT-1C. IRS-1D had an orbital problem; so did INSAT-2A.

No sooner had INSAT-2D been abandoned, programme director K. Narayanan was speaking of launching INSAT-3A soon after INSAT-2E early next year. In fact, he said, he couldn't wait to put out a new bird: "I want to launch one tomorrow." ISRO's haste is understandable. There's a pie in the sky that's worth grabbing. It has sought 29 new orbital slots overlooking the South Asian subcontinent (it has just three now) over the next 10 years to prevent INTELSAT from cornering them.

BUT if—as a rule—satellites land up in wrong orbits, transponders fail to operate,power buses conk out, and short circuits destroy expensive birds, India's reputation of a "true space-faring nation" (US Air Force Philip Lab's very deserving certificate) may be in grave danger.

For instance, all the four Made in India 2-series satellites have had transponder problems. Together, INSAT-2A, 2B, 2C should have had 74 transponders up for grabs. But only 62 were in operation when INSAT-2D crashed. Transponder failure should not be a yardstick to judge a satellite builder, says R. Ramachandran. But it's been the same transponder problem with all the satellites. A faulty transistor device supplied by reputed Japanese company Fujitsu.

But instead of nipping the problem in the bud, when all of 2A's transponders failed to get operational, ISRO used the device in all the next three satellites. Worse, it will be used in the INSAT-2E due for launch next year. "It seems to be a batch problem," say ISRO sources, meaning they bought five faulty devices from the same batch.

Why no one put his foot down after the first failure, no one says. So we lost six transponders on 2A, five on 2B and one in 2C. Each transponder costs $5 million a year.

Twelve defunct transponders means $60 million or Rs 200 crore lost every year! Ditto, the short circuit that felled INSAT-2D. The US-built INSAT-1C developed the same problem within a week of its launch in the late '80s. Ditto, the momentum wheels which keep a satellite's orientation in place. Only Teledix of Germany makes them and ISRO, like other operators, has had consistent problems. But we persisted with them instead of indigenising in a hurry.

In fact, when other operators refused to part with information on the performance of the wheels, Teledix relied on Indian satellites to improve its product since we were more open about it. Finally, the INSAT-2C was fitted with a momentum wheel produced by the Vikram Sarabhai Space Cen-tre along with the German one, and its performance was found to be on a par.

ISRO can say with some justification that there has been a general overreaction to the setbacks. It can say that the failure of two of the four INSAT-1 series satellites proves that even the more experienced and qualified Americans make mistakes. The Americans have had two failures in the last two months. It can point to the 11 satellites lost last year, most of them in their first year of operation, to show that ISRO and INSAT are not immune from the ravages of outer space.

But that's neither here nor there. Says analyst Tilak Sarkar: "More than the loss of the satellite, it's the loss of end-service—telephone disruptions, stock exchange closure, VSAT operators inconvenienced—that matters more. That just doesn't seem to count in our mindset." International operators have spare satellites, spare transponders to fall back on in emergencies. INTELSAT wants 11 transponders on INSAT-2E not because it's short of transponders, but as an on-orbit reserve. Not so ISRO. It doesn't have alternative capacity; there are no reserves; the next launch is always too far.

That contention, too, ISRO might contest. When the INSAT-1C had a short circuit, 12 transponders were leased from Arabsat. This time, when INSAT-2D developed the same problem, its capacity was transferred to other INSAT satellites. But the fact is that both INSAT-2A and 2B were sent up as test satellites. It's simply good fortune that they have performed operationally over the past five years, and lasted this long.

Analysts say the way to get around the problem is to build more numbers. "Space is no longer about one or two or three satellites. The more birds you have the better. The demand will only grow. The setbacks show how space has permeated our lives," says Y.S. Rajan.

But, says a former ISRO scientist: "We do not have the potential to mass produce rockets or satellites. Unless we mass produce we cannot test the reliability of our systems. Unless we test reliability, we cannot guarantee success. Unless we guarantee success we can't commercialise." Given INSAT-2D's young age at the time of its death, will ISRO be brave enough to retrieve the satellite? Asiasat was lost due to loss of earth lock four years ago. But the American space shuttle brought it back. Three years later, it is in your home every night: Star TV's transponders are on it. Who said there's no life after death?

SPACED OUT ?

• Helium tank leak noticed  an hour before the PSLV launch last forthnight, but was ignored because the prime minister was to preside over the "momentous occassion".
• INSAT - 2A transponder had a faulty Fujitsu transistor. But sets of same batch used in INSAT - 2B,2C,2D and 2E. Result  : 11 transponders lost; Rs 200 crore loss/year.
• Too much attention paid to Satellite fabrication instead of perfecting the launch systems. So we spend $ 30 million building INSAT - 2D, and $ 60 million to launch it.
• Not enough testing to establish reliability : three satellites including INSAT -2D lost due to short circuits; risk -assessment poor.
• All satellite transponders being used to maximum capacity. No back-up satelliteor on - orbit reserves for emergensies.
• Brain drain following liberalisation.530 top employees ahve left in alst five years.
• Fresh talent from from IITs and IIMs staying away. Most new talent coming from RECs and private engineering colleges. Less than 5 per cent of 17,000 employees PHDs.