Surrender at Dacca aims to fill in this gap. Written by an insider who was part of the higher military command managing the conflict with Pakistan and bringing Bangladesh's liberation struggle to successful culmination, Jacob has highlighted and detailed shortcomings in Indian policies and strategic planning without trying to rationalise or justify them with the benefit of hindsight. Instead, he gives details of events and expects the reader to draw his own conclusions.
With deliberate objectivity, Jacob has concentrated on his specialised knowledge of the professional aspects of the '71 war. The operational details of the war in the Eastern Theatre provide valuable reference material for future military historians, and give insights into the geophysical factors affecting our campaign against the Pakistan Eastern Command from December 3 to 15, 1971. The insights are fruitful because of the vantage position the General held as Chief of Staff of Eastern Command during the war. These chapters, in fact, could provide material for the official history of the war which one believes is in preparation in our Defence Ministry.
However, in his assessment of the prelude to war, political developments and the Mukti Bahini, Jacob neglects the institutional dynamics which affected high-level political decision-making. Nor does he cross-check his personal assessments with the general politico-geographic orientations of the Indian government as the East Pakistan crisis became critical. His implication that it was his advice to the exiled Bangladesh political leaders which led to the creation of the Mujibnagar government at Kamak Street is exaggerated. He would have been present at the meetings but it is public knowledge that the decision to support a Bangladesh government in exile was taken by Mrs Gandhi's cabinet within a week of Mujib's arrest by Pakistani military authorities. Leaders like Tajuddin and Nazrul Islam were in contact with the Indian government through other channels and their escape to India was a result of these contacts. It is difficult to imagine even the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army initiating any such political process, much less that of the Eastern Command. The implied role that Jacob claims for the Eastern Command distorts perspectives and ignores reality. His claim that the Eastern Command initiated plans to organise the defection of Bengali members of the Pakistan Foreign Service in Calcutta is far-fetched. This process commenced with a number of Bengali diplomats approaching Indian authorities in April '71. The initiative came from Bengali officers of the Pakistan Foreign Service to which India responded, once the decision was taken to support the liberation struggle.
Further, his suggestion that Gen Maneckshaw was keen on immediate military operations under pressure from Mrs Gandhi is also inaccurate. While the decision to extend support to the Bangla struggle was taken soon after the breakdown of constitutional processes in Pakistan, Mrs Gandhi didn't take any immediate decision about the actual nature of this support. Field Marshal Maneckshaw is himself on record saying he told Mrs Gandhi that if India chose the military option, it would be implemented after careful and detailed preparation. The overwhelming impression one gets is that Gen Jacob alone was responsible for all the major policy decisions relating to the conduct of the 1971 war and that Gen Arora and Field Marshall Maneckshaw did not have significant roles to play.
Jacob also comes across as judgmental in the critical evaluations of his colleagues and the political decisions taken by Mrs Gandhi after the Dacca surrender. He should have examined the validity of his conclusions in the larger political context and detailed the political crosscurrents among various categories of Bangladeshi freedom-fighters. The undercurrents of jurisdictional tension that must have existed between East Pakistani military personnel and the Indian military command over the conduct of war too are ignored. But Jacob gives useful appendices, specially the records of discussions of the Washington Special Action Group held in the first half of December '71.
The general has taken considerable pains in collating these records. However, what's missing is the urgent message sent by the Pakistani eastern command autonomously to the UN Secretary General, seeking the Security Council's intervention for a ceasefire as Indian military pressure mounted. Maj Gen Rao Ferman Ali had sent such messages towards the end of the campaign.
In all, Surrender at Dacca is a relevant contribution to the military archives and military history of our country. It balances the interpretations and assessments of similar books written by Pakistani military figures like Siddiqui and Hasan Zaheer. And that, indeed, is its major strength.
