Having read the book, one thing is certain: Jaswant certainly needs no lessons in writing. The lucidity and fluency of his style make the book a delight to read. His command, indeed felicity, with the English language, not to speak of the clever sprinkling of uniquely expressive German or Hebrew words, are a long way from his early days at Mayo College where he describes himself as "extremely touchy...about inconsequential trivia like not knowing English well enough (written or spoken)". Who would have imagined such a transformation?
Transformation perhaps is the underlying theme of the book—what else would explain the presence of a man like Jaswant Singh in the BJP? The feudal order he grew up in was transformed into a modern democracy dominated by the Congress party, and obviously not everybody could accept it. Young Jaswant scrapped his Jodhpuris for the olive green of Central India House (CIH) in a personal transformation, only to take it further a few years later with his "plunge" into politics. But the account of his early life, as indeed his military tutelage under the legendary Maj Gen E. Habibullah, would really have suggested a Nehruvian inclination. Indeed, much of his references to Nehru are couched in appreciation, even admiration. Of course, he disagrees on the merits of certain decisions Panditji took, particularly on China, but there’s no dislike, hostility or indeed any discomfort. This is not the language or sentiment one expects from someone in the BJP. Perhaps as the book gets read more widely, the reported discomfiture of the BJP will grow. Jaswant’s Call to Honour seems to have had the better of the call of BJP culture! "On the BJP’s scorecard there are two major negatives. First, the getting out of hand of the Ayodhya Ram temple issue, the consequent vandalism at the site (Babri Masjid), the pulling down of it in December 1992. This failure of control over the Ram temple movement is accepted, and greatly regretted. The other is the loss of state control, in 2002, in Gujarat. These riots were a blot on Gujarat’s face, they sullied the BJP too." Wonder what L.K. Advani and Modi will have to say?
It’s the latter part of the book that deserves more careful reading. This is the part of history Jaswant can claim to have made or at least to have been a part of the making. And it is replete with transformation: "The cautious, tentative India of March 1998 had, by May 2004, become a self-confident, resurgent India. Its voice was being heard, again." But before India’s voice could be heard, so much happened: Pokhran-II, Kargil, 9/11, the terrorist attacks on the J&K assembly and Indian Parliament, and then the hijacking of IC-814. How did India steer itself through that maze? Who were the protagonists? Did India change the world or did the changing world force the change for India too?
India’s position on J&K, China’s takeover of Tibet, the failure of NAM principles when China attacked in 1962, the problem of CTBT and NPT, was always very difficult. High moral principles we have consistently attempted to adhere to have repeatedly been knocked down by practical realities of the world—Vietnam, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Cambodia, Afghanistan being but a few. Pokhran-II was certainly not easy. Jaswant’s account of the political fallout and the strenuously executed rehab effort makes fascinating reading. The narrative is gripping and specific, helped undoubtedly by the diary he kept from which he quotes extensively. But there are gaps in the story. The book is good on what happened and how, but shies off from telling us why. For instance, the blow-by-blow account of the Agra failure does not in the first place tell what was expected to be achieved and the homework, if any, done to that end. Before that, since it was clearly understood that Gen Musharraf, as the army chief, had attempted to trump the much-celebrated Lahore Declaration at Kargil, why was an explanation not sought from him at some stage? The NDA government’s decision to go ahead with Pokhran-II was understandable, given the BJP’s consistent stance, but how was Pakistan’s inevitable device-testing not anticipated? If it was, why is there no mention of it being factored into the decision to press the nuclear trigger again?
There are some interesting observations on diplomacy. On negotiating styles, for instance: the Russian penchant for starting with the impossibly complex and gradually toning down; the American tendency to come to the table with a crisp checklist to be scored off; the Indian position of slowly working from generalities to specifics; and Pakistan’s unselfconscious shifts from private, agreeable conversation to public postures of hostility. And for Jaswant himself—at all times a soldier used to shooting from the hip, yet able to forge meaningful communication channels with the likes of Strobe Talbott and Madeleine Albright. Curiously, there is little on "a soldier meets a soldier". The Musharraf-Vajpayee exchanges are portrayed in passing but there isn’t much on Musharraf-Jaswant soldier talk!
The best parts of the book are also what the media storm is about—the IC-814 incident—India’s external affairs minister ferrying terrorists (with a red bag full of grenades!) to Kandahar. The moral dilemma that faces a government at such times can be understood only by someone who has sat in the hot seat. Those in Opposition too have their own dilemma on such occasions—to cooperate explicitly is perceived as subservience to an adversary; to be outright critical is seen as a dog-in-the-manger attitude. The world did well to congratulate Jaswant Singh for his handling of the hijack but equally it is difficult to get similar appreciation from all Indians, and not only for political reasons. The overwrought woman who yelled and cried to his face inside the relief aircraft, whom Jaswant heard out with stoic fortitude, reflects that dilemma. Ordinary people come to terms with these trying moments but those who have an institutional memory cannot or do not forget. Kargil or Kandahar will always cause turbulence when mentioned in political circles. Yet the soldier in Jaswant does not seem afraid to take on inclement weather. A hardcore politician might have been more wary. Fortunately, this is one transformation that remains incomplete, and to good effect.
Interestingly, Jaswant clearly approves of and supports the March 2, 2006, announcement by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that as a follow-up to the July 18, 2005, Washington agreement on Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation for Energy, the two countries had successfully worked out a scheme for a separation of India’s nuclear plants. Not everyone in the BJP, or the Congress for that matter, has sounded equally supportive. Natwar Singh, the sole man to head the mea in the present government—whilst much of this road to the ‘Jaswant-Talbott Non-Proliferation Village’ was being traversed—has certainly not clapped his hands. In any case, the signposts are changing with time. Another transformation is under way. The village itself has changed remarkably. It may never be called Jaswantnagar or Talbottganj but one day we have to be there. Rajiv Gandhi had made a roadmap to get there. It’s a pity Jaswant’s account of the journey does not mention it. Will we have to wait for a book by another former external affairs minister from Rajasthan to tell us what happened to it? Mani Shankar Aiyar is too busy empowering the Indian village to take that road to the non-proliferation village in a hurry. But we’re told the prime minister has promised to field a long-distance runner soon. Meanwhile, India awaits a postscript to A Call to Honour—for Jaswant to name the dishonourable mole.
